Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2020

Bethan Harris

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2020-0133, written 22 Jun 2020. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report22 Jun 2020
Reference2020-0133
DeceasedBethan Harris
CoronerSean Cummings
Coroner areaWest London
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths · Child Death (from 2015)
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Coroner's Court 

25 Bagleys Lane  Fulham  London  SW6 2QA 

TL,,·HO  E  020 8753 6800/6802 

F ACSIMILE  020 8753 6803  EMAIL  HMCoroner@lbhf.gov.uk 

REGULATION  28  REPORT TO  PREVENT  FUTURE  DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS  BEING  SENT TO: 

1.  The Chief Executive,  St  George's University  Hospitals NHS 

Foundation Trust 

1  CORONER 

I am  Dr Sean  Cumm ings  Assistant Coroner, for the Coroner area of London 
(West) 

2  CORONER'S  LEGAL POWERS 

I make th is  report  under paragraph  7,  Schedule 5, of the Coroners and  Justice Act 
2009 and  Regulations 28  and  29  of the Coroners  (Investigations)  Regulations 
2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION  and  INQUEST 

On  the 20111  February  2019 the  Senior Coroner for the Coroner area of London 
(West) commenced  an  investigation  into the death  of Bethan  Naomi  Harris who 
was born  on  the  16th  November 2018 at the  St George's  University  Hospitals  NHS 
Foundation Trust.  The  Investigation concluded  at the  end  of the  Inquest on  the  19th 
November 2019. 

The conclusion  of the inquest was that the  medical  cause of Bethan's  death 
was ( 1 a)  Hypoxic lschaemic Encephalopathy 

I recorded  a narrative conclus ion : 

Bethan  Naomi  Harris died  at Shooting  Star Hospice on  the 26th  November 
2018 after delivery at St George's Hospital  NHS  Foundation Trust on  the  16th 
November 2018 . Her mother, 
pregnancy  had  been 
uneventful. After admission  to  labour wa rd  labour progressed very quickly 
indeed and  she  sustained  severe brain  injury during  delivery . Despite best 
efforts by  the  Neonatal team  she  succumbed to  her injuries. 

 4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF  THE DEATH 

1 . -was 41  weeks+ pregnant when  she went into labour at St George's 
University Hospitals Foundation NHS Trust. 

2.  She progressed through labour very rapidly - unusually so for a first time 
mother to  be. 

3.  After she was moved to room  four and at around 0450 to 0500 her unbroken 
membranes possibly containing meconium were visible to~nd she 
and I find  that she did make the suggestion 
drew this to 
that CTG  monitoring be undertaken. 

4.  For whatever reason the CTG was not placed.  I find  it was incumbent on  MW 
Dunbar as the more senior midwife present - she was the Triage Midwife - to 
insist on the placing of the CTG. 

5.  Correct management of descent of membranes with  liquor staining in  a post 
dates woman progressing quickly in  her first delivery was to rupture the 
membranes.  Indeed 
in the liquor she would  have ruptured the membranes and  started the CTG 
monitoring. 

me that had she known there was meconium 

6.  In my view it is likely ~ id know and  did  not act at the time for 
reasons unknown 

7.  Had the  membranes been ruptured  it is  more likely than  not that delivery would 
have been expedited and the situation with the plunging fetal  heart rate obviated.  I 
consider it more likely than  not that Bethan would then  have been born  in  better 
condition.  Unfortunately I cannot say on  the balance of probabilities even with this 
intervention that Bethan would more likely have survived longer term. 

2 

 5  CORONER'S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to 
concern.  In  my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action 
is taken.  In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  -

(1)  The Inquest was held one year after Bethan  Naomi  Harris's death. 

During the course of the oral evidence it emerged that several,  in my 
mind important,  learning issues had not been addressed. 

(2)  There were issues relating to handover of patients to midwives and at the 
time of Inquest there had been  no further specific training in relation to 
handover.  Indeed it was stated that the process in place at the time of 
Bethan's delivery still  pertained without alteration. This represented a risk 
to patients. 

(3)  At the time of Inquest a team debrief, which  I consider to be a source of 

learning to reduce the risk of serious incident in future was still 
outstanding. 

(4)  There was little evidence from  the oral  evidence given that any effective 
reflection,  reflective discussions or learning had taken place subsequent 
to Bethan's birth  and then death. I consider it important that 
organisations seek to ensure individual and collective reflection to seek 
to avoid repetition.  The evidence for this,  one year on,  was lacking. 

3 

 6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you 
have the power to take such action. 

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this 
report, namely by  17th  August 2020.  I, the Coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, 
setting  out the timetable for action. Otherwise you  must explai n why no action is 
proposed. 

8 

COPIES and  PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following 
Interested Persons:  the family of Bethan Naomi Harris. 

I am also under a duty to  send  the Chief Coroner a copy of your  response. 

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or 
summary  form . He  may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes 
may find it useful or of interest.  You  may make representations to me, the 
coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your 
response by the Chief Coroner. 

9 

Dr Sean Cummings 

Assistant Coroner, London (West) 

22No  June 2020 

4

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from St. Georges University Hospitals Trust (PDF)
Chief Executive 
St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust 
Blackshaw Road  
London SW17 0QT 

H.M. Assistant Coroner Dr Sean Cummings 
For the Coroner Area of West London   
West London Coroner’s Court 
Bagleys Lane 
Fulham  
SW6 2QA 

18 August 2020 

Dear Dr Cummings 

I  am  writing  in response  to  the  Regulation  28  Report that  you  issued to  St.  George’s  University 
Hospitals  NHS  Foundation  Trust  on  22  June  2020  following  the  Inquest  into  the  death  of  baby 
Bethan Naomi Harris which took place on 18 and 19 November 2019.  

I note your concerns as set out at paragraph 5 of the report.  For ease of reference, I will address 
the concerns in the order raised in the report.  

1  The  Inquest  was  held  one  year  after  Bethan’s  death.  During  the  course  of  the  oral 
evidence it emerged that several important learning issues had not been addressed.  

I am very sorry that the important learning issues and improvement actions related to each of 
the  issues  were  not  conveyed  effectively  during the  oral  evidence given  by  the midwives  at 
the  Inquest.  The  staff  involved  were,  and  still  are,  profoundly  affected  by  this  incident.  The 
Midwives  involved  had  not  participated  in  an  Inquest  hearing  before  and  found  it  incredibly 
stressful. I believe this impeded their ability to verbalise how deeply they were affected by the 
case  and  to  describe  their  reflection  and  learning  at  various  points  in  time  in  the  year 
following  Bethan’s  death.  I  am  aware  that  this  individual  reflection  and  learning  continued 
after  the  hearing  with  the  support  from  the  Professional  Midwifery  Advocate  (PAM)  team 
through  verbal  discussion,  written  reflection  and  a  Professional  Practice  Action  Group 
programme for one of the midwives. 

The  senior  midwifery  team  has  also  assured  me  that  all  of  the  highlighted  issues  in  the 
serious  incident  investigation  report  have  been  completed,  and  are  monitored  by  the 
maternity  governance  team.  In  response  to  the  serious  incident  action  point  1  ‘to  ensure 
patients are adequately counselled regarding management options in the post-dates period’ 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the  maternity  governance  team  undertakes  a  quarterly  maternity  notes  audit.  This  involves 
auditing  the  notes of  women  attending for 40  and  41  weeks  antenatal  appointment  and  the 
information  given  regarding  induction  of  labour.  The  last  quarterly  audit  reported  67%  of 
women  had  induction  of  labour  discussed  and  offered  at  40  weeks  and  83%  at  41  weeks 
gestation. Although this percentage is below the expected  performance target of 95%  at 40 
weeks,  the  maternity  governance  team  is  working  towards  ensuring  induction  of  labour 
information is discussed and given from 36 weeks gestation in preparation for more in-depth 
discussions on induction of labour at 40 weeks. This audit will be repeated in October 2020 
and will review the notes of attendees at appointments between July to September 2020.  

Action point 2 of the serious incident report required  ‘greater clarity of options around risks, 
benefits and alternatives to induction of labour’. The induction of labour information leaflet has 
been reviewed and updated and is now available on the maternity page of the Trust website. 
As a Trust we recognise for many of our women English is a second language and we are in 
the  process  of  having  this  leaflet  translated  into  different  languages  which  will  be  available 
from 1 September 2020. 

The maternity governance team will continue to monitor this compliance with the provision of 
information,  discussion  and  offer  of  induction  of  labour.  The  team  is  also  responsible  for 
continuing  the  quarterly  audits  of  the  antenatal  care  pathway,  the  results  of  which  will  be 
shared  with  all  staff  at  various  forums  which  include  governance  meetings  and  the 
governance newsletter.  

2  There  were  issues  relating  to  handover  of  patients  to  midwives  and  at  the  time  of 
Inquest  there  had  been  no  further  specific training  in  relation  to  handover.    Indeed  it 
was  stated  that  the  process  in  place  at  the  time  of  Bethan’s  delivery  still  pertained 
without alteration.  This represented a risk to patients.   

Following on from the Inquest the maternity governance team undertook an audit of the use 
of  the  clinical  handover  tool  Situation  Background  Assessment  Recommendation  (SBAR) 
within the maternity unit. The result demonstrated poor compliance with the SBAR tool. The 
staff reported they were unclear on when and how to use the SBAR tool. This resulted in a 
review and update of how the SBAR tool is taught and used. The revised SBAR tool provides 
clarity on how, when and where the SBAR should be used; practical use of the tool has also 
been  incorporated  into  the  unit  mandatory  multi-disciplinary  training  which  includes  clinical 
scenarios. The updated version of the SBAR tool is included in the maternity unit Admission 
Guidelines.  The  updated  version  of  the  SBAR  tool  was  re-launched  in  May  2020  through 
various forums including staff meetings, face to face teachings, newsletter and email.  

The maternity governance team is responsible for undertaking quarterly audits of the SBAR 
tool  and  sharing  the  results  both  locally  within  the  maternity  unit  as  well  as  at  the  Trust 
monthly divisional and directorate meetings.  

3  At the time of Inquest a team debrief, which you consider to be a source of learning to 

reduce the risk of serious incident in future, was still outstanding. 

Although there had not been a formal team debrief, there had been numerous meetings with 
individual members of staff and groups of two or three staff on a number of occasions, long 
 on 16 November 
before the inquest, to discuss and reflect on the care provided to Ms 

 
 
 
 
 2018.  Following  the  coroner’s  Inquest,  a  team  debrief  was  facilitated  by  the  Professional 
Midwifery  Advocate  (PMA)  team  and  lead  midwife  for  governance  with  attendance  and 
support  from  the  legal  team.  The  midwives  in  this  case  have  attended  leadership  and 
PROMPT (Practical Obstetric Multi-Professional Training). The Trust recognises the value of 
this training and registered all staff groups to attend PROMPT.  

Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic more than 90% of staff within the maternity unit had attended 
PROMPT  training.  The  pandemic  resulted  in  a  pause  on  training.    However,  following  the 
easing of restrictions, the maternity practice support team is now working towards achieving 
the  target  of  100%  staff  trained.  Compliance  with  mandatory  training  is  monitored  by  the 
maternity governance team. 

The arranged Human Factors training has, unfortunately, been suspended due to the Covid-
19  pandemic  but  once  it  restarts,  it  will  equip  all  midwives  to  develop  better  situational 
awareness.  Due  to  the  requirements  of  social  distancing  we  are  currently  working  with  the 
training provider to explore alternative methods for the delivery of the training.  

The  value  of  team  debriefs  following  any  serious  incident  has  been  acknowledged  by  the 
midwifery governance team. The team  agrees wholeheartedly that staff should be offered a 
team debrief immediately following any serious or adverse incidents and have facilitated team 
debriefs since January 2020.  

4  There  was  little  evidence  from  the  oral  evidence  given  that  any  effective  reflection, 
reflective  discussions  or  learning  had  taken  place  subsequent  to  Bethan’s  birth  and 
then death.  You consider it important that organisations seek to ensure individual and 
collective reflection to seek to avoid repetition. You felt that the evidence for this, one 
year on, was lacking. 

Learning from  Bethan’s death  has  been shared throughout the maternity unit  via  PROMPT, 
as outlined above. The case, appropriately anonymised, was presented at the maternity unit 
meeting  on  15  November  2019  and  at  the  Clinical  Governance  study  day  on  19  December 
2019.  Individual  reflection  and  learning  has  also  taken  place  with  the  support  of  the  PMA 
team through verbal discussion and written reflection.  

The issues identified have been communicated to staff via the governance newsletter and at 
staff forums. There is also on-going learning through mandatory training as Bethan’s case is 
used  as  a  reference  during  the  Fetal  Monitoring  and  Skills  and  Drills  study  day.  It  is  a 
requirement at the Trust that each member of staff attends a yearly training update with the 
practice development team facilitating monthly training sessions. As of February 2020 more 
than 90% of the midwives and doctors have attended this training. 

I  am  aware  from  the  senior  midwifery  team  who  have  reported  back  to  me  that  there  has 
been,  as  reflected  in  the  paragraphs  above,  many  individual  discussions  with  the  midwives 
involved about the events of Bethan’s birth and subsequent sad death in November 2019, but 
there was no  recognised structure to support  a  formal  team  debrief  involving  all  staff  in  the 
year  following  Bethan’s  death.  The  team,  and  the  organisation  as  a  whole,  unequivocally 
accept  that  individual  and  collective  reflection  after  such  incidents  is  key  to  avoiding 
repetition, and it is truly regrettable that this was not taken forward in a clear and structured 
manner  in Bethan’s  case.   We hope  you  will  accept  that this  has  now  been  addressed and 
will always feature in the way such incidents are managed in future.  

 I  hope  this  response  provides  assurance  that  the  Trust  is  fully  committed  to  learning  from 
incidents  and  it  is  a  matter  of  true  regret  for  all  involved  that  this  was  not  demonstrated 
effectively in Bethan’s case.   

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you would like further information or assurance on any 
residual concerns you may have.   

Yours sincerely  

Chief Operating Officer  

On behalf of 

Chief Executive 

C.C Ms

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