Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2025

Leigh Nardelli

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2025-0328, written 29 Jun 2025. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report29 Jun 2025
Reference2025-0328
DeceasedLeigh Nardelli
CoronerSean Cummings
Coroner areaMilton Keynes
CategoryRoad (Highways Safety) related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS

NOTE: This form is to be used after an inquest.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT DEATHS

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:

1 National Highways
2
3
4

1

CORONER

I am Sean CUMMINGS, Assistant Coroner for the coroner area of Milton Keynes

2

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013.

3

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On 11 July 2024 I commenced an investigation into the death of Leigh NARDELLI aged 46.
The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 03 March 2025. The conclusion of
the inquest was that:

Road traffic collision

Road traffic collision

4

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

Leigh Nardelli died on the A5 Southbound in Milton Keynes on the 6th July 2024. He was
driving a Mercedes AMG car at speed in torrential rain. There was extensive water pooling
on the A5. There was dashcam footage of the vehicle aquaplaning and losing control. The
offside of the vehicle hit the central reservation and travelled along it for a distance before
hitting a ramped terminal of a further section of restraint barrier. This had been in place to
protect the concrete support pillar of an overhead bridge. However, it is acutely ramped
and allowed Mr Nardelli's vehicle to be projected up it, travel along the top before entering
a wider space between the barriers on the south and northside. The vehicle then seems to
have descended and "flipped" becoming airborne and striking the concrete support causing
fatal injuries. The barrier ramp, known as a "P1 terminal" had been due for replacement to
a safer bifurcated system in 2022 but for financial reasons was not.

5

CORONER’S CONCERNS

During the course of the investigation my inquiries revealed matters giving rise to concern.
In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows:
(brief summary of matters of concern)

The hazard posed by the design of the P1 terminal was known by National Highways and it
was due for replacement at the site of the collision in 2022. It presented and continues to

Regulation 28 – After Inquest
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021

 present a significant risk and was not replaced for financial reasons. There is a gradual roll
out programme across National Highways to replace P1 terminals with a safer bifurcated
system but I consider the implications of the financial limitations represents an ongoing
safety concern for vehicles approaching them on designated roads.

6

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you (and/or
your organisation) have the power to take such action.

7

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report,
namely by August 12, 2025. I, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the
timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed.
COPIES and PUBLICATION

8

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested
Persons

I have also sent it to

Thames Valley Police

who may find it useful or of interest.

I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all
interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.

I may also send a copy of your response to any person who I believe may find it useful or
of interest.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form.
He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of
interest.

You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response about the
release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner.

9

Dated: 29/06/2025

Sean CUMMINGS
Assistant Coroner for
Milton Keynes

Regulation 28 – After Inquest
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from National Highways (PDF)
REGULATION 29: RESPONSE TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS RESPONSE IS BEING SENT TO: 

The Assistant Coroner for Milton Keynes, Sean Cummings of 1 Saxon Gate East, Milton Keynes 
MK9 3EJ. 

1  National Highways  

I am 
of Viables 3, Jays Close, Basingstoke RG22 4BS. 

, Head of the Vehicle Restraint Systems Team at National Highways Limited 

2  CORONER’S MATTERS OF CONCERN  

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: –  

The hazard posed by the design of the P1 terminal was known by National Highways and it 
was due for replacement at the site of the collision in 2022. It presented and continues to present a 
significant risk and was not replaced for financial reasons. There is a gradual roll out programme 
across National Highways to replace P1 terminals with a safer bifurcated system but I consider the 
implications  of  the  financial  limitations  represents  an  ongoing  safety  concern  for  vehicles 
approaching them on designated roads. 

3  BACKGROUND 

This note has been prepared in response to a Regulation 28 report, received from the Milton Keynes 
Coroner’s Service by National Highways in response to a fatal road traffic collision on 6th July 
2024. The incident occurred on the southbound carriageway of the A5, shortly after the end of the 
on slip road from the A509 (Portway roundabout) onto the A5, and at the pedestrian footbridge 
linking Milton Keynes Central station to Kirkham Close. 

Nature of the current barrier provision at the material location 

The current barrier provision at the incident location is unchanged from the time of the incident; 
prior to the pedestrian footbridge bridge linking Milton Keynes Central station to Kirkham Close, 
there  are  two  lengths  of  barrier  in  the  central  reserve.    The  length  of  barrier  adjacent  to  the 
northbound  side  of  the  central  reserve  is  a  double  sided  Tensionned  Corrugated  Beam  type  of 
barrier.  The length of barrier adjacent to the southbound carriageway of the central reserve is a 
single  sided  Open  Box  Beam  barrier.    Approximately  34  m  prior  to  the  central  bridge  pier 
supporting  the  pedestrian  footbridge,  the  length  of  single  sided  Open  Box  Beam  barrier  rises 
gradually from carriageway level to full barrier beam height, in an arrangement known as a “ramped 
end (P1) terminal”. 

This  type  of  terminal  design  is  no  longer  in  use  for  new  installations  on  the  apporoach  end  of 
barriers located on roads with a speed limit of 50mph or more.  

In the material incident, Mr Nardelli struck the ramped end terminal, causing his vehicle to launch.  
The vehicle subsequently impacted the central bridge pier supporting the pedestrian footbridge. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I have been informed by colleagues within National Highways that the barrier system at the material 
location and impacted in the material incident, was installed in 1984.  

Given the installation date of the barrier system at the material location, Technical Memorandum 
H9/73 (published in 1973) was the standard in place for barrier systems at the time. Clause 19 of 
Technical Memorandum H9/73 stated that “Exposed leading ends of safety fences shall be ramped 
down to an anchorage at ground level.”  Clause 2 of Appendix C of Technical Memorandum H9/73 
which  details  the  layout  requirements  for  Open  Box  Beam  barrier  system  stated  that  “Fig  6 
illustrates  how  the  fence  may  be  used  at  wide  bridge  piers  on  central  reserves  where  there  is 
insufficient space for deflection of a tensioned beam safety fence. Also how the barrier may be  
connected by means of a transition piece to the single sided tensioned beam safety fence. This avoids 
doubling of the tensioning beam at and in advance of [the pier,] and the provision of anchorages 
on each side of the pier.”   

The barrier layout at the material location met the requirements of Technical Memorandum H9/73. 

Following  an informal  site visit  carried out  by  National Highways  colleagues  on 12th  February 
2025, I have been made aware that on the A5 between the junction with the A508 (Old Stratford) 
and Kelly’s Kitchen there are currently three ramped end terminals in the central reserve of the 
southbound carriageway and three ramped end terminals in the central reserve of the northbound 
carriageway.  

A  review  of  the  current  barrier  provision  at  this  locality  with  reference  to  more  current 
requirements 

The aforementioned Technical Memorandum H9/73 was superseded by TD 19/06 in 2006.  Since 
the  publication  of  TD19/06,  it  has  been  a  requirement  for  barriers  to  split  (“bifurcate”)  around 
structural supports (such as a bridge pier) in the central reserve.  Hence, as and when the barrier in 
the central reserve at the material location were to be renewed/replaced, the ramped end terminal 
would not be replaced with a different terminal, it would be replaced completely, with a bifurcated 
length of barrier. 

These  requirements  have  since  been  included  in  National  Highways’  current  requirements  for 
Vehicle Restraint Systems (VRS) which are contained within the published document CD 377 – 
Requirements for Road Restraint Systems. 

When a new standard is produced, it only applies to new works/designs and therefore TD 19/06 
and CD 377  would  not  be  applied  retrospectively  to existing barrier systems, nor would it be a 
proportionate and effective use of public resources to do so. 

The delivery of schemes 

The regional Service Delivery team have a remit for Safety Inspections of the barrier which are 
undertaken every two years to identify potential safety issues. If there are immediate safety concerns 
these  can  be  addressed  through  routine  maintenance  budgets  or  through  the  Minor  Capital 
Interventions  renewal  programme.  Short  term  mitigation  can  also  be  utilised  such  as  temporary 
lower speed limits until a repair or renewal is implemented.  

In terms of renewal of barrier where no specific safety concerns are identified, the regional Planning 
and Development team undertake a network wide review across the region and prioritise schemes 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 for development  in  the  forward  programme.  It  can  take  2  to  3  years  to  develop  a  scheme  from 
feasibility  and  preliminary  design,  and  detailed  design,  through  to  construction.  Schemes  are 
prioritised for delivery based on available condition data.  

The  central  reserve  safety  barrier  renewal  on  the  material  section  of  the  A5  was  identified  for 
renewal in 2020 mainly based on its age. It is over 25 years old and so nearing its expected end of 
serviceable life. However visual condition inspections are also done to assess the urgency or priority 
of the timing of a renewal intervention and due to its condition, this section was not considered to 
be urgent.  

A design was developed ready for implementation in around 2022 to remove the P1 terminal at the 
material location and replace it with a bifurcation as set out above, but lack of resources and road 
space constraints meant the renewal could not be delivered at the end of the financial year. The 
renewal was only considered to be delivered at that time due to budget availability in the East region 
and was considered against other renewal opportunities elsewhere in the region.  

The condition of the barrier system was deemed adequate and able to perform its intended function 
for some time longer, so the renewal remained in the forward programme.  

Central Government awards funding to National Highways in multi-year settlements (usually 5-
year cycles). National Highways then determines how much of the funding is assigned to different 
assets in each region. The indicative next allocation of funding did not assign a high level of funding 
to the  East  region  for the renewal of  VRS.  The funding that  is  available  will be  targeted to the 
poorest  condition assets  across  the East  region.  The condition of the  VRS  asset on the material 
section of the A5 is expected to warrant an intervention in the next 5 years so is currently earmarked 
for  renewal  in  that  period.  However,  if  its  condition  proves  not  to  be  deteriorating  as  much  as 
expected and other sections of barrier in the East region are a higher priority, then a decision may 
have to be made to reassign funding to those other VRS renewals. 

National  Highways  currently  has  interim  funding  for  the  year  2025/26  but  is  still  waiting 
confirmation from Central Government of the next multi-year funding settlement and so are unable 
to commit to our programme beyond the 2025/26 period. 

DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN SINCE THE INQUEST 

A review of similar incidents on the National Highways Strategic Road Network (SRN). 

A review of fatal incidents on the whole of the SRN in England has been undertaken to identify any 
other  incidents  where  a  vehicle  has  impacted  a  ramped  end  terminal  in  the  central  reserve  and 
subsequently  impacted a bridge pier.    This  search  has  been  limited to  fatal incidents as there is 
typically insufficient detail available for serious, slight and damage-only incidents in order to make 
a detailed assessment of the circumstances of the incident. 

The review of fatal incidents has  identified  no  similar incidents  between  2014 and 2022 on the 
whole of the SRN in England. 

As a result, it is concluded that such incidents are uncommon on the SRN. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A review of incidents at this locality 

A review of incidents on the A5 in this locality (between the A509 (Portway roundabout) and the 
H6 Child’s Way overbridge) has identified three slight injury and one serious injury incident within 
the five year period from 1 October 2019 to 30 September 2023.  Within these four incidents, there 
is no other reported impacts with this section of barrier. 

Formal survey work 
A formal survey of the central reserve barrier provision and condition along this length of the A5 
(between the junction with the A508 (Old Stratford) and Kelly’s Kitchen) has recently been added 
to the survey programme, and survey work is due to start in mid-August 2025.  

4  TIMETABLE FOR PLANNED ACTION  

Date     

Action 

Mid-August 
2025 

Late 2025 

Survey work of the central reserve barrier provision to start 

Subject to overall network need, barrier condition along the route and 
current funding levels, design brief to be started to remove the six ramped 
end terminals within the central reserve along this length of the A5 
(between the junction with the A508 (Old Stratford) and Kelly’s Kitchen) 
and replace them with bifurcations compliant with CD 377.   

5  SAFETY OF ROAD USERS  

The safety of our road users is an imperative for our business, and safety is a core value of our 
organisation. We are working hard to make our entire network safer.  

We consider that the action we have taken to date has confirmed that the barrier arrangement at the 
material location met the requirements of the standards in place at the time of construction, but that 
they are not compliant with our current requirements.   

However, when a new standard is produced, it only applies to new works/designs and therefore 
current requirements would not be applied retrospectively to existing barrier systems, nor would it 
be a proportionate and effective use of public resources to do so. 

All improvements to the SRN are to be progressed in a considered and controlled fashion so that 
the  consequences  of  changes  to  the  SRN  are  fully  understood  and  any  linked  safety  risks  are 
eliminated or reduced as far as possible. Furthermore, works to the SRN are required to demonstrate 
value for money, in accordance with the Highways England: Licence (April 2015), and our duty to 
manage public funds. 

That  being  said,  we  are  shortly  to  commence  formal  survey  work  of  the  barrier  provision  and 
condition in the central reserve of the A5 (between the junction with the A508 (Old Stratford) and 
Kelly’s Kitchen) and, subject to overall network need, barrier condition along the route and current 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 funding levels, we will commence works to progress the replacement of the six existing ramped 
end terminals with bifurcations compliant with our current requirements (in CD 377). 

6  Signed and dated 

, 11th August 2025 

5

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