Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2022

Oli Hoque

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2022-0316, written 13 Oct 2022. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report13 Oct 2022
Reference2022-0316
DeceasedOli Hoque
CoronerNadia Persaud
Coroner areaEast London
CategoryOther related deaths · Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

MISS N PERSAUD 
HIS MAJESTY’S CORONER 

EAST LONDON 

Walthamstow Coroner's Court, Queens Road Walthamstow, E17 8QP 

REGULATION 28:  REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS (1) 

Ref: 13422724 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:  

1.  Rt Hon Therese Coffey, Secretary of State for Health & Social Care  

1 

CORONER 

I am Nadia Persaud area coroner for the coroner area of East London 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 23 June 2021 I commenced an investigation into the death of Oli Akram Hoque 
(aged 26 years old). The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on the 7 
October 2022. The conclusion of the inquest was a narrative conclusion:  

Oli Hoque died as a result of a very rare complication of a COVID-19 vaccination. 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

Oli Hoque received his first dose of the Astra Zeneca Covid-19 vaccination on the 19 
March 2021.  On or around the 1 April 2021 he began to suffer from headaches.  These 
became progressively worse and on the evening of the 4 April 2021 he attended A&E at 
King Georges Hospital.  Oli did not present with any symptoms at this time which would 
have required assessment in the emergency department.  In the late evening of the 5 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 April 2021, Oli was suffering from a severe headache.  His sister took him to the Royal 
London Hospital.  A general practitioner assessed Oli and found no signs of raised 
intracranial pressure.   The general practitioner did not consider that Oli required further 
assessment in the emergency department.  At around 11am on the 6 April 2021 Oli's 
condition declined significantly and an ambulance was called.  Oli was suffering from 
seizures at this time and was taken urgently to Queen's Hospital.  In hospital, 
radiological investigations revealed a cerebral venous sinus thrombosis.  Oli received 
care from a multi-disciplinary team and the agreed impression was that the cerebral 
venous sinus thrombosis was vaccine induced.  Sadly, despite all attempts to provide 
treatment to Oli, he passed away at Queen's Hospital on the 15 April 2021.   

On the 7 April 2021 the MHRA issued new advice to healthcare professionals on a 
possible link between the Astra Zeneca COVID-19 vaccine and specific types of blood 
clot.     

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows: 

The Inquest heard evidence from a senior medical assessor from the Medicines and 
Healthcare Regulatory Agency (MHRA).  The Inquest heard that from the 25th February 
2021 the MHRA investigated the potential signal of immune thrombocytopenia.  This 
identified three cases of cerebral venous sinus thrombosis which could possibly be 
associated with the Astra Zeneca Covid 19 vaccine.  The MHRA could not fully consider 
these cases as they did not receive all of the necessary clinical information.  The Inquest 
heard that the MHRA do not have the power to compel relevant clinical information, to 
assist them with safety investigations. 

In light of the clear public interest in ensuring that the MHRA are able to carry out robust 
safety investigations, it is a matter of concern that the MHRA are unable to compel the 
timely production of relevant clinical data. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you 
[AND/OR your organisation] have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 8th December 2022. I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise, you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
Persons to the Inquest, family of Mr Hoque to the Care Quality Commission and to the 
local Director of Public Health who may find it useful or of interest. 

I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all 
interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.   

I may also send a copy of your response to any other person who I believe may find it 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 useful or of interest.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary 
form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful 
or of interest.  

You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about 
the release or the publication of your response. 

9 

 13/10/2022      

Typographical error of date in section 5 amended 25 October 2022                                      

3

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Department of Health and Social Care (PDF)
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29 JU~ 2023 
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From Maria Caulfield MP 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State 
Department of Health & Social Care 

39  Victoria Street 
London 
SW1H0EU 

12 June 2023 

•Department 

of Health & 
Social Care 

Ms Nadia Persuad 

Walthamstow Coroner's Court 

Queens Road 

Waltham stow 

E17 8QP 

Dear Ms Persaud, 

Thank you  for your letter of 13 October 2022, to the then  Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Care,  Therese  Coffey,  about the  death of Oli Hoque.  I am  replying  as  Minister with  responsibility 
for Social Care, and thank you for the additional time allowed. 

Firstly,  I  would  like  to  begin  by  saying  how saddened  I  was  to  read  of the  circumstances  of Mr 
Hoque's death and I offer my sincere condolences to his family and loved ones.  It is of course vital 
that we take learnings where they are identified to  improve NHS care, and  I am grateful to you for 
bringing these matters to my attention. 

In  preparing  this  response,  Departmental  officials  have  made  enquiries  with  the  Medicines  and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). 

You  may  wish  to  know  that  whilst  significant  progress  has  been  made  in  the  scientific 
understanding  of vaccine-induced  thrombosis  with  thrombocytopenia,  at  the  time  of Mr Hoque's 
death  in  April  2021 ,  diagnostic criteria  had  only  recently  been  established  and  communicated  to 
healthcare professionals.  It is therefore  not surprising  that cases  reported  were  of variable  detail 
and were reclassified over time as more evidence emerged.  A Yellow Card  report was  voluntarily 
made  for  Mr  Hoque  the  day  after  his  admission  to  hospital.  Furthermore,  the  hospital  doctor 
provided the requested clinical information and test results within two days of the initial report being 
submitted. 

MHRA  conducted  daily,  proactive  follow  up  and  utilised  a  Data  Sharing  Agreement  (DSA)  with 
Public Health England (now UK Health Security Agency,  UKHSA) for additional case details where 
needed.  MHRA sought the advice of its COVID-19 Expert Working Group and the Commission on 
Human  Medicines on emerging evidence of thrombosis with thrombocytopenia and  issued regular 
press releases as evidence continued to amass. 

 MHRA do not have jurisdiction  over healthcare  professionals, and  therefore  did  not  comment on 
your consideration of whether issuance of this  Regulation 28 report regarding legislative powers to 
access  NHS  case  notes  would  assist  the  MHRA.  There  are  professional  guidelines  in  place  for 
health  care  professionals  to  report  safety  issues,  however,  the  Department  is  not aware  of any 
jurisdiction globally that compels relevant clinical follow up information. 

MHRA recognises the importance  of access to  relevant clinical  information  for pharmacovigilance 
and  ensured  that  relevant  data  flows  were  in  place  prior  to  commencement  of vaccinations  in 
December  2020  to  support  its  four-stranded  proactive  vigilance  strategy  - 1) Enhanced  passive 
surveillance  -
'observed  vs  expected'  analysis;  2) Rapid  Cycle  Analysis  and  Ecological  analysis 
(analysing  anonymised  healthcare  for  pre-defined  events  as  well  as  monitoring  trends);  3) 
Targeted active monitoring;  and  4) Formal epidemiological studies. It is the view of the MHRA that 
focus  should  be  placed  on  encouraging  reporting  and  working  across  the  health  family  to 
streamline processes and reduce barriers to reporting. 

Steps taken to enable this include working with  the NHS to enable interoperability and connectivity 
of reporting system such as the new Learning from  Patient Safety Events System (LPSE) to allow 
automatic electronic  upload  into  MHRA databases  in  a  timely  manner.  The  NHS  Digital  Clinical 
Safety Strategy1  covers integration of LPSE with the Yellow Card system; improvement of adverse 
events  and  incident  reporting  is  a  commitment  made  by NHSE  and  MHRA with  a  clear  strategy 
and  shared  responsibilities.  A  recently  published  NHS  standard  contract  (NHS England  "2023/24 
NHS Standard Contract) has a focus on interoperability which will help achieve those aims.2 

Finally,  MHRA  continues  to  educate  and  promote  the  Yellow  Card  scheme  with  healthcare 
professionals  through  its  five  Yellow  Card  Centres  and  campaigns  such  as  the  MHRA's  annual 
#MedSafetyWeek. 

I hope this response is helpful. Thank you for bringing these concerns to my attention. 

Yours sincerely,

MARIA CAULFIELD 

1  https://transform.england.nhs.uk/key-tools-and-info/digital-clinical-safety-strategy/ 
2  https://www.england.nhs.uk/nhs-standard-contracl/23-24/

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