Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023

Christopher Smith

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2023-0420, written 7 Jul 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report7 Jul 2023
Reference2023-0420
DeceasedChristopher Smith
CoronerLaurinda Bower
Coroner areaNottingham City and Nottinghamshire
CategoryState Custody related deaths · Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Organisation namedNottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

NOTE:  This form is to be used after an inquest. 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:  

1  Chief Executive of Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust 

1  CORONER 

I am Miss Laurinda Bower, HM Area Coroner for the coroner area of Nottingham City and 
Nottinghamshire 

2  CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and 
regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 06 June 2019 I commenced an investigation into the death of Christopher Howard SMITH.  
The investigation concluded at the end of an Article 2 compliant inquest, conducted before a 
jury, between 12 December 2022 and 19 January 2023.  The conclusion of the jury was that: 

Christopher Howard Smith, was a 35-year-old gentleman who was a serving prisoner at HMP 
Lowdham Grange, Nottinghamshire. Christopher died on the 19th of May 2019, at Queen’s 
Medical Centre, Nottingham, from a cardiac arrest, due to a massive Pulmonary Embolism, 
predisposed by Deep Vein Thrombosis. In spite of prolonged efforts to resuscitate him, 
Christopher passed away. He had a severe and enduring Mental Health condition known as 
Schizo-affective disorder which was controlled with anti-psychotic medication (Promethazine 
and Olanzapine).  

The jury found multiple failings in the care and treatment provided by prison and healthcare 
staff. His death was contributed to by neglect. 

4  CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

The jury reached the following findings of fact –  

On the 23rd April 2019, Christopher was transferred to the segregation unit (known as the 
RIU). He was seen and recorded to be behaving strangely from the 1st of May and was 
recorded in the observation log by a PCO as being "off his head". A variety of staff from the 
1st of May onwards, thought his presentation was due to him being under the influence of an 
NPS. This unusual behaviour included smashing up his cell, not engaging in the daily regime 
or with staff, and shadow boxing.    
His condition deteriorated over the course of the following days since the cessation of his 
mental health medication on the 1st of May. His presentation included an inability to 
communicate, drooling, vomiting, difficulty breathing, jerking of his limbs and inability to 
mobilise. This progressive deterioration was noted by both prison and healthcare staff over 
the following days up to the 8th May when Christopher was hospitalised.  
Christopher was also not eating or drinking adequately, and concerns were raised in this 
regard as of the 3rd of May.    
There were insufficient checks and inadequate record keeping by prison staff and the 
concerns that Christopher’s presentation raised were not thoroughly escalated through the 
correct channels between the 1st and the 6th of May.  

Regulation 28 – After Inquest 
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 Prison officers were reluctant to challenge Healthcare staff regarding the lack of clinical 
assessments being carried out.  

His progressive deterioration was recorded by both prison and healthcare staff in their 
respective logs and in spite of this and in spite of the stipulations of rule 45 and PSO 1700, 
his assessments were inadequate, and his healthcare needs were not met. His failure to take 
his medication was not adequately assessed nor was his mental capacity questioned. The 
food and fluid log was not opened until the 7th May and an NPS not opened until the 6th of 
May. Consequently, there were significant missed opportunities to help Christopher. A NEWS2 
score was not calculated until the 8th of May, as which point it was 8.  
Healthcare staff were not refused or prevented from entering Christopher's cell, although 
there were occasions of reluctance from prison staff to open the cell door due his 
presentation and behaviour. Healthcare staff had adopted the unsafe practice of conducting 
clinical observations through the observation hatch.  

On the 6th of May, Christopher was moved from his cell for hygiene reasons and to facilitate 
observations via CCTV. An NPS log was opened on that day for the first time but 
opportunities to examine him were missed. Further opportunities were missed on the 7th of 
May, when a food and fluid log was opened. There was confusion between physical and 
mental healthcare staff as to who was responsible for assessing Christopher’s health condition 
and providing appropriate care. There was insufficient communication between healthcare 
departments which was exacerbated by chronic understaffing.  

On the 8th of May, the GP round was inadequate being conducted quickly through the 
observation hatch. Once again, opportunities for appropriate clinical observations were 
missed.  

Clinical observations were eventually made by nursing staff for the first time shortly after 
1PM on the 8th of May 2019, but there was further significant delay before the ambulance 
was called via contacting 999 and a code blue was not called at this time.  

The 999 call was made at 1:57pm but inaccurate and insufficient information was conveyed 
to the call centre. A further assumption was made that Christopher was displaying symptoms 
due to exposure to spice.  

On arrival at QMC accident and emergency department, there was no written handover given 
to hospital staff as per healthcare policy.  

On admission, Christopher was very unwell, and hospital staff took the decision to sedate him 
and put him on artificial ventilation, in order that they could investigate him further. He was 
rehydrated and was given prophylactic treatment for DVT. There are conflicting accounts as 
to whether Christopher had swollen foot or feet, but this was not conveyed to the medics at 
QMC. Based on the fact that a fellow prisoner on RIU and prison staff at Lowdham Grange 
witnessed Christopher having a swollen foot or feet, we believe that on the balance of 
probability, Christopher did have swelling of his foot or feet.  

Christopher remained on ventilation for 5 days, after which there was an improvement in his 
condition, but he remained unwell. He was subsequently transferred to the neurology ward 
on the 17th of May and a diagnosis of probable Neuroleptic Malignant Syndrome was made. 
This diagnosis was not considered by healthcare staff at HMP Lowdham Grange. 

The probable cause of NMS could not be firmly determined based on a lack of clear 
understanding of the condition, which is rare. We are unable to say whether the condition 
was caused by either the taking or the cessation of anti-psychotic medication.  

Christopher’s extended immobility in his cell resulting from NMS, in combination with his 
dehydration, predisposed him to the development of DVT which ultimately lead to his death 
due to Pulmonary Embolism. 

Regulation 28 – After Inquest 
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021 

 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 5  CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the investigation my inquiries revealed matters giving rise to concern. In 
my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken.  In the 
circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows:  
(brief summary of matters of concern) 

The accounts detailing Christopher’s decline over the course of a week; from a young, fit, 
engaging and polite gentleman, to a man who could not speak, eat, or properly stand, were 
harrowing for all to hear, not least his family. These accounts were supported by CCTV 
footage demonstrating Christopher’s extreme vulnerability on account of his acute ill health. 

I remain unable to comprehend how, in the face of Christopher’s clear need for urgent 
medical assistance, this was not facilitated for him by those charged with the responsibility 
for his care, at a time when Christopher was unable through illness to ask for help. This was a 
clear case of the most serious neglect contributing to Christopher’ tragic death. 

1.  An inability to provide prisoners at HMP Lowdham Grange with safe clinical 

care 

I heard evidence, and the jury reached findings, that there was an unsafe practice of staff 
conducting important healthcare and wellbeing observations via the cell door observation 
hatch. Observing an unwell prisoner through a hatch slightly larger than a letterbox 
undermines the safety of the clinical assessment. 

Healthcare staff did not utilise the NEWS2 system of monitoring the condition of an acutely 
unwell prisoner, despite the Trust having adopted this recognised healthcare tool many years 
prior. The Forensic Directorate has continued to lag behind other areas of the Trust where 
NEWS2 is fully embedded and this has previously been identified as an issue linked to other 
deaths. 

There was a lack of robust GP visits, despite such being mandated by the Prison Rules. When 
visits did take place, they were often via the cell door observation hatch and conducted as 
“fleeting glances” rather than robust clinical assessments. Again, this is unsafe. 

There was a lack of effective leadership of the healthcare department to ensure that staff had 
created a safe plan of care for Christopher. Senior personnel were not aware of Christopher’s 
week-long deterioration in the segregation unit until very late in the chronology of events, 
nor were they aware of a dispute between the mental health and physical health teams as to 
the differential diagnoses that might be causing his concerning symptoms and deterioration. 
Despite daily lunch time meetings, there was a stark lack of professional curiosity from senior 
staff as to the plan of care for Christopher and what safety netting, if any, was in place. 

2.  An inability to record, retain and supply HM Coroner with material relevant 

to the inquest 

The progress of this inquest, taking places years after Christopher’s death, was halted many 
times due to the late disclosure of material relevant to the inquest. Policies and procedures 
said to exist at the time were produced mid-hearing. 

Despite the Trust having conducted their own review of the case, being provided with ample 
notice of the inquest hearing, and having attended multiple pre-inquest review hearings, 
there was an inability to identify key material and to supply that to the court in good time.  

The ability to reflect on the care provided in advance of a prisoner’s death is dependant on 
the Trust’s ability to isolate the relevant evidence, and to analyse it. Without the appropriate 
professional curiosity to understand exactly what happened, the Trust will repeatedly miss 
opportunities to learn from deaths and to take action to seek to prevent future deaths.  

Regulation 28 – After Inquest 
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 An example of this, is the issue of a lack of safe system for NEWS2 monitoring of acutely 
unwell patients. This issue has repeatedly been raised at inquests involving the Trust’s 
forensic division.  

3.  A complete lack of candour, openness and honesty when engaging in post 

death investigations. 

Without exception, each witness from the healthcare trust accepted some level of failing in 
the care they provided to Christopher. Yet none of the witness statements submitted in 
advance of the inquest contained any such reflection of what went wrong or what should 
have happened. Despite a Direction from the court that the Head of Healthcare was to submit 
a statement “nailing colours to the mast” as to what the genuine issues of care were i.e. what 
policies were in place at the material time and whether care had departed from those policies, 
a candid statement satisfying this Direction was not forthcoming. This left the Coroner and 
the other Interested Persons, especially Christopher’s family, at a distinct disadvantage in 
identifying the actual issues, because of an overwhelming unwillingness to act in an open and 
honest manner, contrary to the expectations of a state agency when engaging in an inquest. 

If staff are either unwilling, or are not given the opportunity, to reflect on what went wrong in 
an open and honest manner, then the Trust cannot seek to learn from events at the earliest 
opportunity, and these issues of concern will persist, leading to further deaths. 

6  ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have the 
power to take such action. 

7  YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report,  
namely by September 26, 2023.  I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the 
timetable for action.  Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8  COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the Interested Persons including: 

Christopher’s family 
The Governor of HMP Lowdham Grange  
HMPPS – The Minister for Prisons and Probation 
CQC 

I have also sent a copy to NHS England (who commission prison healthcare services) and to 
Sodexo – Sodexo did not manage the prison at the time of Christopher’s death, but have 
subsequently taken over management of the prison from Serco and I consider it important 
that they are aware of these historic issues.   

I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all 
interested persons who in my opinion should receive it. 

I may also send a copy of your response to any person who I believe may find it useful or of 
interest. 

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form.  
He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of 
interest.   

Regulation 28 – After Inquest 
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response about the 
release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 

9 

 Dated: 7 July 2023 

Miss Laurinda Bower 
HM Area Coroner for  
Nottingham City and Nottinghamshire 

Regulation 28 – After Inquest 
Document Template Updated 30/07/2021

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust (PDF)
Chief Executive 
The Resource 
Duncan Macmillan House 
Mapperley  
Nottingham 
NG3 6AA 

27 September 2023 

Private and Confidential 

Dear HMC Bower 

Further  to  the  Inquest  into  the  death  of  Christopher  Howard  Smith  I  write  in  response  to  the 
Prevention of Future Deaths order Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust were issued on 1st August 
2023.   

Mr Smith died on 19th May 2019 at the Queens Medical Centre having been a serving Prisoner at 
HMP Lowdham Grange.   

We accept the findings from the Inquest and would like to assure you that we take the findings and 
actions very seriously and will provide the updates below:   

1.  An inability to provide Christopher with safe clinical care:  

Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust has undertaken a number of improvements 
which have been implemented by the Trust and Offender Health Care Group on NEWS 2.  This 
includes the quality and delivery of the training (drill base) and expectations of the Trust of its 
attending GPs.  The segreation pathway and clear escalation pathways have been implemented 
and are being reviewed to support safe patient care.   

As a result of identifying a need to develop a training programme and approach that would ensure 
our staff have a greater understanding of NEWS 2 and the application of NEWS2 in a patient 
setting, a number of actions have been undertaken in order to address this: 

•  The Offender Health Care Unit brought in specific resource to support the rollout of NEWS2 
training. This was in the form of the Trust’s Resus Lead who is seconded into Offender Health 
for  two  days  a  week  for  six  months  initially  (June-December),  with  a  view  to  potentially 
securing  this  resource  long  term  to  ensure  there  is  an  all-year-round  training  programme 
providing support, training, and coaching to staff on Hospital Life Support and assessing, and 
managing deteriorating patients. This means Offender Health have dedicated support that 

The Resource, Duncan Macmillan House, Porchester Road, Nottingham NG3 6AA 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 will  train  staff  on  site  and  will  shadow  live  situations  within  the  prison  and  provide  onsite 
support, training and guidance / debriefs as necessary.  

•  Additionally,  training  has  been  made  available  online  to  provide  ease  of  access  for  staff 

members.   

•  NEWS2 training package was developed by the Clinical Leads (includes Sepsis and SBAR) 
which was delivered to all staff including GPs back in April 2023. Additionally, this now forms 
part  of  the  local  induction  undertaken  by  the  Clinical  Leads  for  all  new  starters.  This  is 
delivered every month to capture any new starters during that period.  

•  As part of the onsite training delivered by the Trust Resus Lead, recognising deteriorating 
patient scenario drills are undertaken with staff. Weekly reports on the training such as any 
further identified training needs, are provided on a weekly basis into the Head of Nursing / 
Area Managers. Additionally, as an aide, a patient assessment form has been developed and 
put in place for staff to use in clinical situations. This now forms part of the core Emergency 
Response Kit and has been incorporated into the Emergency Response policy.  

•  The  Resus  Lead  is  attending  code  calls  with  staff  on  site  so  that  he  can  shadow,  assess 
competencies, and staff response, and provide feedback via a hot de-brief (one undertaken 
19th July 2023).  

•  Escalation flow chart has been developed to assist staff and provide scenarios / context of 
when this might apply and what to do if unable to access an unwell patient. This has been 
ratified and disseminated to staff.  

•  There has been extensive work with the prison provider to develop relationships and clearer 
lines of communication. It is recognised that where there are issues around escalation or an 
emergency, this should be escalated to Victor 2 and / or Deputy Director or Prison Director.  
Incidents are being monitored weekly and shared with commissioners and prison provider to 
enable better sharing of concerns and development of joint responses to issues.  

• 

•  Development of an audit programme relating to NEWS2, latest audit undertaken in August 
2023, report and recommendations being compiled which will feed into internal governance 
infrastructures and be disseminated.  

•  Prison provider has changed its practice relating to the Segregation and will endeavour to 
ensure  two  staff  members  and  a  senior  experienced  member  of  staff  are  available  in 
Segregation  at  all  times.  Where  this  is  not  happening,  this  is  incident  reported  and  /  or 
escalated to the Prison Provider for action.  

•  Amendments have been made to the SystmOne Unit to ensure it is easier for staff to capture 

and record observations relating to NEWS2.  

•  A SOP describing the process of:  
o  Admission to segregation 
o  Healthcare review 
o  Medication administration 
o  Assessments from Neuro Diversion 
o  Assessments from Substance Misuse 
o  Assessment from Mental Health 
o  Transfer to a secure Mental Health Unit 
o  Assessment of access and patient risk 
o  Management of food  
o  ACCT 
o  Access to GP  
o  Complex cases and review  

The Resource, Duncan Macmillan House, Porchester Road, Nottingham NG3 6AA 

 
 
 
 
 
 As of September 2023, all staff were 100% trained in NEWS 2 across Lowdham Grange. As a 
Care Unit, we have 223 staff trained out of 231 which translates as 97% compliant. The 
outstanding staff will be trained as a priority.  

Segregation training is also being delivered as an ongoing programme by Clinical Leads, this has 
been done via specific, tailored sessions and forms part of the staff induction programme in both 
the face-to-face induction element and the physical induction pack. Additionally, Clinical Leads are 
also conducting spot checks on a recurring basis to ensure Segregation processes are being 
conducted in line with the SOP.  

2.  An  inability  to  record,  retain  and  supply  HM  Coroner  with  material  relevant  to  the 

inquest 

It is with deep regret that we were not able to supply you with the relevant materials to support the 
Coronial proces.  We recognise the impact this had on your investigation but also the distress to 
the family, which is not acceptable.  We are committed to improving this process across the Trust 
to ensure you and your team are provided with all relevant information to support your enquiries, 
and that there is support for Clinical Teams post serious incident, including where a death has 
occurred.  

We recognise that post serious incident it can be difficult for the clinical areas to be clear on what 
information needs to be collected and stored to support both the investigation process and 
importantly, the HM Coronial process.  We have therefore agreed a checklist of core information 
that must be collated.  This will be supported by a weekly oversight group led by a senior team to 
both support the team but to oversee the Trust’s process for collating and storing the correct 
information.   

We recognise that across Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust, Care Groups and 
Units have developed numerous policies in isolation.  We introduced a Trust wide Clinical Policy 
Group (CPPG) approximately 3 years ago to review and amend the oversight and governance of 
Policies.  The CPPG continue to work towards reducing the quantity of clinical policies and 
procedures to support ease of access and clarity for staff and also to eliminate individual Care 
Group Policies.  To date, reduction has been achieved by producing single combined Trustwide 
clinical policy/procedure documents via Topic Expert Groups relating to specific areas of clinical 
practice, and archiving all related local clinical procedures. The CPPG has also expanded its 
activities to include oversight of the processes governing the creation of any new local clinical 
procedures and now requires approval from the group before any new policy can be implemented.  
Further improvements include: 

•  Attendee to include Learning and Development Lead to join up the training requirements form 

each policy.   

•  Production  of  concise  and  accessible  Clinical  Policies  Bulletins  providing  information 

regarding clinical policy/procedure activity.   

•  Explore  possibility  of  the  addition  of  QR  codes  to  Trust  clinical  policies/procedures  for 

increased colleague accessibility. 

•  To produce a one page brief per policy to support understanding the key information. 

The Resource, Duncan Macmillan House, Porchester Road, Nottingham NG3 6AA 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 •  CPPG  will  ensure  that  the  nominated  writer  has  liaised  with  the  Clinical  Audit  Team  to 
determine how, when and by whom monitoring will take place to determine compliance and 
performance against the requirements of the policy. 

•  CPPG  will  determine  that  the  nominated  writer  has  identified  any  necessary  training  and 

agreed this with Learning and Organisational Development.  

3.  A  complete  lack  of  candour,  openness  and  honesty  when  engaging  in  post  death 

investigations 

We recognise and regret that we did not undertake our duty of Candour with Mr Smith’s family on 
this occission.  We have reviewed the process of how we embed a meaningful culture of candour 
in the Offender Health Care Group.  This includes access to support and training from the Family 
Liason Team specifically in relation to Duty of Candour.   

You will be aware that we have undertaken a formal review of all Offender Health cases which are 
due to be heard as a Coronial process and this has idetifed a number of cases where further 
review is required.  This review recognised that not all investigations unfortunately met the Trust’s 
high standards of quality, candour and reflection.  The further infomration provided as part of these 
reviews aims to strengthen our evidence and understand more about the required learning.   

I can confirm that moving forward, I have bought in two indepndant investigators to support and 
work alongside Offender Health and they will also be allocated new Serious Incident Investigations 
with the aim of improving, supporting and providing leadership in this area of practice.   

The Trust’s Medico Legal Team have worked hard to review their processes in terms of preparing 
staff members for inquests, particularly those carried out in line with Article 2. As part of this 
review, the Trust witness statement template has been improved upon, with clear and specific 
guidance included in a number of areas, including relevant training and policies, reflections and 
duty of professional candour. 

The  Medico  Legal  Team  and  senior  managers  now  hold  a  weekly  Inquest  Oversight  Meeting 
whereby the  specific  requirements  of  each  case are reviewed  and  updated  to  ensure  documents 
and staff members required are identified and located at an earlier stage of the process. Discussions 
are held in terms of any witness conflict concerns, noting the important learning that came from Mr 
Smith’s  inquest  in  this  regard.  In  addition,  any  staff  members  not  engaging  with  the  process  are 
identified and this  is  escalated  appropriately,  with clear  guidance  that  the Trust cannot represent 
staff  members  who  do  not  engage  with  the  Trust  support  in  terms  of  statement  provision  and 
preparation for the inquest itself. During the pre-inquest preparation meetings with the Medico Legal 
Team, and where relevant any legal representative, provide a further opportunity for staff members 
to  raise  concerns  as  a  group  or  individually  in  terms  of  their  professional  duty  of  candour,  and 
addendum statements will be supported in any case whereby staff raise their concerns or reflections 
at a later date than their initial statements were made. 

There have been four Inquest Training Days within the last 18 months, with another two planned, 
which have equipped attendees with the information required to fully understand and engage with 
the  coronial  process.  In  addition,  the  Medico  Legal  Team  have  been  providing  bespoke  training 

The Resource, Duncan Macmillan House, Porchester Road, Nottingham NG3 6AA 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 sessions to smaller groups in person and via MS teams and will continue to do so in order to share 
the  important  message  regarding  inquest  requirements.  These  have  been  with  team  groups  in 
general  upon  request  but  also  at  a  relatively  early  stage  following  a  death  with  the  care  team(s) 
involved  in  order  to  introduce  the  coronial  process  and  requirements,  answer  any  immediate 
questions and importantly, to ensure the messages regarding being open and reflective within their 
statements for the inquest and during other processes such as the serious incident investigation are 
shared and staff are live to their obligations and the fact they will be supported by the Medico Legal 
Team and Trust management in doing so. 

I hope that the information contained within this response provides assurance to you and Mr Smith’s 
family that we, as a Trust have heard and understood the significant concerns raised throughout and 
as a consequence of this inquest, and that we are committed to continuing to make these important 
improvements to services and processes for future patient care. 

Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require any further information.   

Yours Sincerely 

Chief Executive 

The Resource, Duncan Macmillan House, Porchester Road, Nottingham NG3 6AA

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