Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2026
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2026-0041, written 23 Jan 2026. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 23 Jan 2026 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2026-0041 |
| Deceased | Roger Leadbeater |
| Coroner | Tanyka Rawden |
| Coroner area | South Yorkshire (West) |
| Category | Other related deaths |
| Organisation named | Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
REGULATION 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 1. 2. Northampton Rd, Manchester M40 5BP. , Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police, Central Park, Carbrook Hall Rd, Sheffield S9 2EG , Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police, Carbrook House, 5 1 CORONER I am Tanyka Rawden, Senior Coroner for the Coroner area of South Yorkshire (West). 2 CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made 3 INVESTIGATION AND INQUEST On 11 August 2023 I commenced an investigation into the death of Roger Gary Leadbeater aged 74. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 22 January 2026. The conclusion of the inquest was unlawful killing. 4 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Roger died on 9 August 2023 due to multiple stab wounds inflicted by a patient who was detained in hospital under the Mental Health Act and who had absconded from escorted leave. The patient had been known to Mental Health Services since 2008 and had experienced psychosis and command hallucinations telling her to hurt others. She had previously killed animals and assaulted people, and she presented a risk to animals and people. During her last admission to hospital between October 2022 and August 2023, the patient was violent to staff. She absconded nine times, attempted to abscond fifteen times, and failed to return from leave three times. Despite handovers between police forces and between the police and the Trust not being clearly recorded, there was evidence of the patient using drugs, carrying weapons and making threats to harm people during her periods of absence. On 7 August 2023 the patient’s care was transferred to a new inpatient Consultant Psychiatrist and Responsible Clinician. During a thirty-minute board round meeting that morning a period of escorted leave was authorised. This decision was made without clear documentation of the reasons for the decision, without consideration of a detailed risk assessment, and outside of the policies which stated that leave after a suspension should be reviewed face to face at the next Multi-Disciplinary Team Meeting. 1 The patient absconded whilst on escorted leave and two days later her actions brought about Roger’s death. 5 CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. – During the inquest evidence was given by both South Yorkshire Police and Greater Manchester Police that hand overs between police forces, and between Greater Manchester Police and the Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust were inadequate and not clearly recorded. This resulted in the Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust being unaware of, or unclear about, significant risk factors such as the patient assaulting others, making threats to harm others, using drugs and carrying weapons during her periods of absence. This impacted on their subsequent decision to grant the patient leave, including the granting of leave for the final time, two days before Roger died. The inquest heard that handover forms were being developed by both forces and policy changes were planned to support the new form, but this process had not been completed. The evidence provided to the Court on 7 January 2026 was that, as in August 2023, the content and quality of hand overs still relied on individual officers acting without guidance or documentation. On 22 January 2026 the Court was told both police forces now have a hand over form, but both forces have not updated the relevant policies to support its implementation or audit its use. I am concerned that without a robust handover process in place, key information about those detained under the Mental Health Act and being transported by police will not be appropriately communicated. This is turn may affect risk assessments and decisions around patients being granted leave. 6 ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe your organisation have the power to take such action. 7 YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 20 March 2026 I, the Coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise, you must explain why no action is proposed. 8 COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: The family of Roger Gary Leadbeater via their legal representative. Greater Manchester Mental Health Trust Foundation Trust. I have also sent it to: 2 Home Office Direct Communications Unit, 2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF. Royal College of Policing, College of Policing, Leamington Road, Ryton-on- Dunsmore, Coventry, CV8 3EN. The National Police Chiefs' Council, 50 Broadway, London, SW1H 0BL. Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, Lower Ground, 5-8 The Sanctuary, Westminster, London SW1P 3JS. who may find it useful or of interest. I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. She may send a copy of this report to any person who she believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 9 23 January 2026 3
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
GREATER MANCHESTER b POLICE Chief Constable Ms Tanyka Rawden His Majesty’s Senior Coroner for South Yorkshire (West) Office of HM Coroner, The Medico-Legal Centre, Watery Street, Sheffield, S3 7ES 16" March 2026 Dear Ms Rawden, RE: Regulation 28 Report Thank you for your correspondence dated 27" January 2026 regarding the tragic death of Mr Roger Leadbeater. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) acknowledge the concerns raised and extends its deepest sympathies to Mr Leadbeater’s’ family. GMP strives to provide the best possible service to members of the public. Where issues are identified which require action to be taken to improve the service we provide, | am committed to ensuring that the force makes appropriate changes. This letter will set out the immediate steps that have been taken to address the concerns raised and it will also explain the steps that GMP will continue to take to embed into daily practice the changes that have already been implemented. Concerns Highlighted The inquest heard evidence that there was a lack of a clear, documented process to record information sharing when officers were involved in the handover of individuals between Police forces and between Police forces and hospitals. The court expressed concern that without a robust handover process in place, key information about those detained under the Mental Health Act who were transported by police will not be appropriately communicated which in turn may affect subsequent risk assessments and decisions taken in respect of patient leave. On 22 January 2026 the Court was told that GMP has a handover form, but the relevant policies had not been updated to support its implementation or audit its use. Actions and Planned Response GMP recognises the importance of learning from the circumstances of this case and has implemented a series of measures to address the concerns raised by the coroner. | set out below the steps that have been taken by the force. (1) Amended Form 1157 GMP utilises Form 1157 (Mental Health and Monitoring Form) to record information when officers are deployed to deal with individuals presenting with mental health concerns. At the time of Mr Leadbeater’s death, the form was mandated for completion in the following circumstances: e When officers exercised their powers under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) e When a Section 135 MHA warrant was executed e When officers assisted with the voluntary attendance at hospital with an individual for a mental health concern e Where an officer was the decision-maker in a Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) encounter with an individual In Mr Leadbeater’s case, the individual being conveyed was subject to detention under Section 2 MHA and as such Form 1157 was not mandated for completion by the officers involved in the transfer and handover. As the coroner identified, this placed a reliance on individual officers providing relevant information at the point of handover with no structure in place to trigger, or document, that process. To address the issues that presented in Mr Leadbeater’s case, GMP has amended Form 1157 and moreover extended the circumstances in which the form is mandated for completion. The form must now be completed whenever officers take or convey (or assist in conveying) a person to hospital under any of the following circumstances: When officers utilise the following MHA powers: e Section 2 — when police assist in conveying a person liable to be detained — by exception as the hospital should ordinarily arrange transport e Section 18 — return of an absconded patient — by exception as the hospital should ordinarily arrange transport e Section 135(1) or 135(2) — where a warrant is executed to facilitate the assessment or return of a detained patient. e Section 136 — removal to a place of safety from a public place. Any other MHA detention, including: e Section 3 (treatment) e By exception, transfers between hospitals/prisons at the request of NHS partners/Courts and ratified by Force Critical Incident Commander or Duty Police Superintendent MCA Powers: e When Police or the Ambulance Service are the MCA decision maker and officers accompany someone for their safety. Voluntary Mental Health Attendance: e When officers convey a voluntary patient due to risk or vulnerability. Missing Persons from Mental Health Units: e When Police locate or return to hospital any person missing from a mental health unit, whether detained or voluntary. e This includes: o Individuals missing from Sections 2, 3, 4 or Section 17 leave failures o Missing voluntary patients o Section 17 MHA returned patients Section 6 of the amended Form 1157 requires officers to identify the presence (or absence) of a number of key risk factors and relevant history. Where a risk factor or relevant history is present the form requires detail of that to be provided. At the point of handover, a copy of the form is provided to the receiving agency. The effect of this change will be that whenever a person is conveyed by GMP officers in any of the circumstances outlined above, a form will require completing which documents relevant information known about that individual. This process creates an obligation on officers at handover and removes the reliance on individual officers proactively providing information. These changes have been reflected in amendments to GMP’s Mental Ill Health, Mental Incapacity & Learning Disabilities Policy & Procedure. (2) Communication of Changes The immediate changes implemented by GMP required a series of measures to be taken to bring the changes to the attention of officers who would be likely to be involved in the conveyance of individuals with mental health needs. The following steps were taken to ensure awareness across the force: e Intranet Article On 23'4 January 2026 the amended Form 1157 and the extended circumstances in which it is to be used was the subject of an article on the landing page of GMP’s intranet. All officers and staff accessing the force intranet were met with the article as a news story. The intranet article explained the changes and directed readers to the Mental Ill Health, Mental Incapacity & Learning Disabilities Policy & Procedure and the specific amendments that had been made to that document to reflect the changes to procedure set out above. e Officer Briefings The amended process was included as part of the morning briefing delivered to officers at the start of their shifts. This briefing program was in place for a seven-day period commencing on 20" January 2026. The program ran for seven days to ensure that it captured all shifts across the force. e Athoc Messaging The Athoc system is the method GMP uses to deliver messages to mobile devices to all its officers and staff. An Athoc message outlining the new process was delivered across the force on Tuesday 20th and Wednesday 21% January 2026. Again, the purpose of this messaging was to ensure that all officers received information about the changed process and additional requirements in respect of the amended Form 1157. e Chief Constable Orders The Chief Constable issues orders on a weekly basis. All officers and staff are required to read the orders as part of their duties. The amended form and process was included in Chief Constable’s Orders published on Monday 26" January 2026. The above steps represent the immediate action taken by GMP to undertake a force wide awareness campaign to ensure that the widest possible audience received the messaging in relation to the changed process. To refresh the awareness campaign that took place in January 2026 the amended Form 1157 process will be featured on the April 2026 newsletter published by GMP’s Organisational Learning Hub. The newsletter highlights the top three learning points for the month and is received by every police officer and staff member in GMP. (3) 1157 Mobile App Update To ensure the amended Form 1157 is fully embedded into frontline practice, GMP is also updating the digital version of the form used on officers’ mobile devices. An initial meeting to scope the required changes to the 1157 mobile app took place on 23 February 2026, during which the technical and operational requirements were agreed. The final sign off for the project is due to take place on 16" March 2026 after which development work will begin. It is estimated that it will take 3 months for the completion of testing and for full release of the app to take place. The updated app will replicate the revised structure of the new Form 1157 and will include mandatory fields to ensure that officers capture all risk-critical information before the form can be submitted. This enhancement will support greater consistency, reduce the possibility of omissions, and further strengthen the reliability of information provided to partner agencies at handover. The Missing Person Safeguarding Unit within the Public Protection Division will run a monthly report identifying all Missing Person episodes originating from hospitals. This will be shared with the Prevention Hub to compare against their 1157 submissions via the updated app, ensuring that the required documentation has been completed for every relevant incident. In addition, completion of the 1157 has now been incorporated into the new PRISM app used by District Safeguarding Teams (MASH). Officers and staff triaging Care Plans must confirm that the Form 1157 has been completed and attached before a Care Plan can be closed. This creates a clear check-and-balance within the system and prevents closure where the correct safeguarding paperwork has not been provided. (4) Training and CPD GMP is embedding the learning arising from this case into its wider professional development framework. The circumstances and lessons identified will be incorporated into Missing Person Continual Professional Development (CPD), ensuring that all officers receive consistent guidance on risk identification, documentation and effective information sharing. This learning will also be integrated into the Sergeants’, Inspectors’ and Superintendents’ Skills Courses delivered to all newly promoted officers. In addition, the Vulnerability CORE within the Public Protection Division is producing a short CPD training video focused on mental health considerations in Missing Person cases. The video will outline expectations around risk assessment, conveyance responsibilities, and the structured handover of pertinent risk information to receiving hospitals, including the completion of Form 1157. Once complete, the video will be published on the Force Learning and Skills Hub, accessible to all officers and staff, and supported by an intranet article to raise awareness. The anticipated timescale for completion for this product is the end of March 2026. It is also intended that this product will be incorporated into the training for all new Student Officers joining GMP, supplementing their College of Policing approved curriculum. Embedding this learning within both CPD and core training will support long-term cultural and behavioural change, strengthen professional curiosity, and reinforce the importance of comprehensive information sharing when responding to vulnerable individuals. This will ensure that the revised expectations around risk identification, documentation, conveyance responsibilities, and structured handovers are fully understood across the workforce. Embedding the learning within CPD will support long-term cultural and behavioural change and reinforce the importance of comprehensive information sharing when dealing with vulnerable individuals. GMP continually strives to improve its approach to public protection and is committed to delivering the best service to the public. | hope the detail set out in this letter is helpful in explaining the immediate and long-term changes that have been made by GMP to address the issues identified in the case of Mr Leadbeater. The changes will ensure that risk factors known to officers are documented and that the quality of information sharing at the point of handover of those with mental health difficulties is improved. Yours sincerely, Chief Constable
8th March 2026 Dear Madam Coroner, Response to Regulation 28 report in respect of deceased Roger Gary LEADBEATER Thank you for your letter dated 27th January 2026 and the corresponding Regulation 28 report where you raise one matter of concern. This matter is in relation to the arrangements for the physical handover of missing persons who are subsequently transferred to a medical facility or to another police force. South Yorkshire Police seek all opportunities to identify opportunities to learn and improve its response to those we serve. Whilst work had already been ongoing to improve this response, upon receipt of this Regulation 28 preventing future deaths notice I directed a thorough review around the actions of South Yorkshire Police. I wish to provide you with a detailed account of the actions we have taken to strengthen our procedures, the governance now in place to ensure compliance and the steps we are taking to support wider learning beyond this force. Implementation of the Revised Handover Process Several substantive measures have now been introduced: • Dedicated Handover form — A new, purpose-designed form has been created to record the transfer of responsibility for a missing person. This form has been uploaded to the central repository on the Missing from Home (MFH) SharePoint portal to ensure universal accessibility and version control. • System-Integrated prompts — A mandatory task has been embedded within Compact, our MFH management system. This provides officers with an automatic prompt at the relevant stage of the investigation and includes a direct link to the new form, reducing the risk of omission and ensuring a consistent workflow. • Force-Wide communications — A comprehensive communication has been circulated across the organisation, outlining the new process, the rationale for its introduction and the tragic circumstances that brought the issue to light. This has ensured that all officers and staff understand both the procedural requirements and the moral imperative underpinning them. • Governance-Level briefing — The thematic lead for MFH briefed the Missing Governance Meeting, comprising of Inspectors and Sergeants, to ensure that supervisory leaders are fully sighted on the new arrangements and are equipped to drive compliance at a local level. • Tactical-Level briefing —Further briefings have been conducted at the tactical meeting attended by MFH officers. This has reinforced operational understanding and provided an opportunity for officers to seek clarification and raise practical considerations. Assurance, Monitoring and Embedding To ensure that the revised process becomes fully embedded and consistently applied, the following assurance mechanisms have been established: • MFH Officer quality assurance — as part of their existing responsibilities, MFH officers will review the Compact tasks associated with each case. Where the handover form has not been completed, they will escalate the matter in line with the established VA/VC escalation process. • Supervisory review by Inspectors and Sergeants — supervisors will check the completion of the handover form during their routine review of MFH cases. This ensures that compliance is monitored at multiple levels and that any gaps are identified promptly. • Audit of documentation quality — MFH officers will assess the quality and completeness of the information recorded on the form to ensure it meets the required standard and provides an accurate and reliable record of the handover. • Structured Feedback Loop — ongoing feedback will be gathered from team leads and operational officers to identify any areas of misunderstanding, procedural friction, or opportunities for refinement. • Governance Review — the revised process was reviewed at the governance meeting to confirm it is operating as intended and to agree any further improvements that may be necessary. National Learning Initial benchmarking undertaken by the force suggests this may represent a wider national gap in practice. In the interests of supporting broader learning and improving safeguarding arrangements across policing, the thematic lead has contacted the national Lead Staff Officer and will be presenting this work at a forthcoming national MFH quarterly meeting. The intention is to encourage consideration of this process as a potential model for national best practice. I hope this update provides reassurance that the force has taken the issues raised during the inquest with the utmost seriousness and has acted to address them. Yours faithfully Detective Chief Superintendent Head of Crime South Yorkshire Police
See every Prevention of Future Deaths report matching Greater Manchester Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust, and how often a new one appears.
What would an alert for this have sent me? Search the full text
Free to try — the preview shows the real matches and how many arrived in the last 12 months. Your first email alert is free.
These reports are published by the Chief Coroner's office at judiciary.uk and are © Crown copyright. The text here is reproduced from the published PDF so it can be searched. If something on this page is wrong, or you are a person named in it and want it reviewed, email drcjar@gmail.com and we will act promptly.