Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2015

Paul McGuigan

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2015-0185, written 12 May 2015. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report12 May 2015
Reference2015-0185
DeceasedPaul McGuigan
CoronerJoanne Kearsley
Coroner areaManchester South
CategoryOther related deaths
Organisation namedPennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published3

The report

Text recovered by OCR from a scanned PDF. OCR is imperfect: check anything you rely on against the source PDF. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:

National Offender Management Service

Greater Manchester Police

Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust

National Police Chiefs Council

Security Industry Authority

Ministry of Defence — Minister of State for Defence,
Personnel, Welfare and Veterans

Home Office - Home Secretary Theresa May MP
Ministry of Justice

PAPwna

dn

CORONER

| am Joanne Kearsley Area Coroner, for the coroner area of Manchester South.

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS

| make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice
Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations
2013.

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST

On the 10" September 2009 | commenced an investigation into the death of
Paul Mc Guigan. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 11"
May 2015.

The conclusion of the inquest was that the deceased Paul John McGuigan died
as a result of gunshot wounds.

On the 9" August 2009 he was unlawfully killed by a close protection work
colleague. There were missed opportunities and failings by the Probation
Service to manage the escalating offending behaviour and risk presented by the
offender prior to his deployment abroad.

In addition G4S did not ensure that he was adequately vetted prior to being
deployed to work as an armed close protection officer.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH

Paul Mc Guigan was shot by Daniel Fitzsimmons at the RT| compound where
both were working as armed private security contractors for G4S. Daniel
Fitzsimmons also shot and killed other colleagues, Darren Hoare an Australian
national who was killed (MJ an lragi_national who was seriously

injured.

Daniel Fitzsimmons was deployed on the contract from the UK on the 7'" August
2009 and arrived on the ground in Baghdad on the 8" August 2009. Less than
12 hours later the fatal incident occurred. His weapon was the Glock pistol
which was, quite properly, issued to him on his arrival in Baghdad.

At the time of being deployed Daniel Fitzsimmons was subject to Probation
supervision and was awaiting sentence at the Crown Court for breach of three
suspended sentences [12 months imprisonment] for offences of robbery and two
offences of possession of ammunition and sentence for a s 4 public Order
offence of discharging flares towards children and awaiting trial for a racially
aggravated public order offence and assault. Daniel Fitzsimmons was also on
bail with a condition of residence and condition of weekly reporting to the police
station.

There had been a multi-agency meeting on the 12 May 2009 due to the
increasing concerns of his Offender Manager (a newly qualified Probation
Officer). At this stage it was her view that he was becoming, “unstable and
could not be managed in the community’. The Court heard evidence as to this
meeting and the fact that no other agencies provided any further information
despite having intelligence which would have assisted.

The Court also heard evidence on a large number of other matters which
caused concern in this case which | will set out below.

CORONER’S CONCERNS

In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken.
In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. Please note | have
set out these concerns in no particular order, they are addressed to each of the
relevant agencies, although please note a number of concerns overlap
significantly:-

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. —

CONCERN NUMBER 1

TO _: - Greater Manchester Police, Home Office, National Police Chiefs
Council, NOMS and Security Industry Authority

(i)
| heard detailed evidence from a number of GMP Police officers and civilian staff
with responsibility in respect of the Notifiable Occupation Scheme.

In my judgment there was a complete misunderstanding by GMP in respect of
the operation of the Notifiable Occupation Scheme HOC 6/2006.

Of immense concern also the complete failure for a period of approximately 18
months to make any post conviction notifications under the Notifiable
Occupation Scheme, which was it transpired, formally withdrawn by the Home

Secretary Theresa May MP in March 2015.

| heard and had evidence from the SIA that they were not aware that a
regulatory gap existed in respect of the Police's understanding of the scheme
and notifications to themselves. The evidence | heard suggests that such a gap
exists at GMP and has done so for in excess of 18 months.

(ii)

It is clear that within GMP there was no recording anywhere as to when / if any
pre convictions disclosures were made. It is important that there is a system of
recording in this scenario and also to whom the disclosure is made. At present
no-one can provide any information as to the number of detail of pre-conviction
disclosures. In addition this means that officers who may be dealing with
someone who has been arrested have no way of knowing if such a pre-
conviction disclosure has ever been made.

(iii)

In respect of the period of time when Post conviction disclosures were made
[before this “back office” function ceased 18 months ago] these were only ever
disclosures made to the Regulatory Body and consideration never appears to
have been given within GMP to disclosure to employers. Given the lack of
understanding as to whom some regulatory bodies have responsibility for, this is
important.

(iv)

It concerns me that if GMP completely misunderstood the operation of a
notifiable occupations scheme then such confusion and lack of guidance to
officers would exist within other forces and in respect of the position now the
HOC 6/2006 has been withdrawn earlier this year. This was discussed at the
Chief Officers Council in 2014.

(v)

At present in respect of a replacement scheme in respect of clarifying the
Common Law Police Disclosure Scheme | heard evidence as to the process
GMP are undergoing in respect of a revised Procedure relating to Notifiable
Occupations but this is far from complete and less than clear as to how it will
operate and the training that will be given to officers / GMP civilian employees.
The Court was also advised that at no stage has legal advice been taken from
the force in-house legal team on the proposed scheme, even though this is a
difficult legal area.

It is important that GMP and all forces have a recognised procedure in respect
of having a scheme but also training officers to operate that scheme. It is
imperative also that the SIA understand how and when each police force will be
making disclosures under the Common Law Police Disclosure Scheme.

(vi)

In respect of the GMP computer system and in respect of occupations that are
regulated and require licensing by the SIA, there is no categorisation on the
computer for “CLOSE PROTECTION”. Indeed the Court heard that there was
some confusion and lack of understanding from many people as to what this
occupation actually meant. Close protection work is a separate category of
employment within the UK that the SIA regulates and the police system should
reflect the occupations subject to regulation. It is important that the police and

NOMS have a clear understanding as to what close protection work is to inform
risk and risk assessment.

(vii)

In addition | have a concern that there is a complete lack of understanding by
the Police and Probation / NOMS as to what close protection work overseas
involves and in particular when this involves work on armed contracts. | heard
evidence that this type of work is a common route of employment for former
service personnel.

This close protection work overseas, is_not regulated by the SIA. In this
scenario this would need to be known by the police and NOMS to inform risk

assessment but also as to whether under any common law disclosure scheme
consideration would need to be given to making a disclosure directly to an
employer to best protect the public.

Given the above points made as to whom disclosures would be sent in GMP (ie
the regulator) this distinction becomes important.

(viii)

| also have a concern that an employer on a private security contract at home
[as regulated by the SIA] and a private security employed overseas [unregulated
save for voluntary schemes such as International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers 2010 [ICoC] and accredited certification to the
standard ANSI/ SSIS PSC. 1-2012] is not entitled or able to obtain an enhanced
CRB and would only ever receive a Standard disclosure on a pre employment
check.

It concerns me in particular that in respect of employing on individual on an
armed contract then consideration should be given to enabling Private Security
Companies a route to obtaining an enhanced disclosure. To illustrate the point |
heard and saw evidence that in respect of an occupation of Casino staff, an
occupation regulated by the Gambling Commissions, for example Casino
Dealers, Casino Cashiers and Bingo Managers they would be entitled or require
an enhanced disclosure by way of pre employment check.

It is concerning that such an enhanced disclosure is available for this line of
work and yet not for someone who is being required to be armed.

CONCERN NUMBER 2

TO: GMP

(i)
Recording of bail conditions:

| heard evidence that Daniel Fitzsimmons was on Bail with conditions of
residence and weekly reporting. The Offender Manager had failed to appreciate
that Daniel Fitzsimmons was subject to a residence condition and in addition
Police representatives had failed to provide details of the bail conditions and in
particular the residence condition to a Multi Agency meeting held on 12.5.09 to

discuss concerns relating to Daniel Fitzsimmon. | heard evidence that in
respect of GMP systems and processes there was nowhere on the GMP
computer system where bail conditions are recorded, although this used to be
possible. It is of concern that there is no system of recording on the GMP
computer of offenders bail conditions so that this information can be known by
officers and appropriately shared.

(ii)

Bail Conditions with Residence:

| also heard evidence that a GMP officer believed that Bail with a condition of
residence was different to “bail live and sleep each night”. It is of concern that
there is a misunderstanding within GMP as to what a condition of residence
means and how this relates to the monitoring of offenders.

CONCERN NUMBER 3

TO : Ministry of Defence and NOMS:

(i)

! heard evidence from the Offender Manager as to efforts she had tried to make
to get information from the military in respect of Daniel Fitzsimmons service
history with no success. These included making contact with the barracks at
Colchester and Fulwood but with no success. It was clear that the military may
have held important information which would have informed the Offender
Managers assessment of risk.

The Offender Manager told me that this incident was a catalyst within Greater
Manchester Probation Trust for better systems in respect of obtaining military
information and her being a point of contact to obtain information relating to
veterans. My concern is to ensure that there is a system, protocol and point of
contact for every offender manager nationally [including the private rehabilitation
companies now operating as offender managers] that is well known as to who to
contact to within the Ministry of Defence to obtain military information.

CONCERN NUMBER 4

TO: NOMS and Ministry of Justice

(i)

| heard evidence that the Offender Manager was newly qualified and her formal
supervision was inadequate and infrequent. This concerns me. It is important
that newly qualified offender managers receive appropriate formal supervision.
This was particularly the case as | heard evidence that offenders classed as
“medium risk” were more likely to be discussed in informal supervision rather
than formal supervision.

My concern is heightened in respect of the evidence | heard as to the allocation
of offenders to be managed since the changes brought about under the
Transforming the Rehabilitation of Offenders and the allocation of offenders
between the National Probation Service and the Community Rehabilitation

Companies — it is important that all Offender manager staff are appropriately
trained and supervised so as to best assess risk posed by Offenders.

(ii)
| also heard evidence that all MAPPA offenders even under MAPPA level 1 will
be supervised still by the National Probation Service and would not be allocated

to the private Community Rehabilitation Companies.

It concerns me to ensure that there is clear guidance given by NOMS to the
private community rehabilitation companies [e.g. in Manchester Purple Futures]
as to assessment of risk and for offenders who then do trigger MAPPA concerns
that should be being supervised or assessed for eligibility under MAPPA to be
transferred to be supervised by the National Probation Service.

(iii)

The court heard evidence that it was the view of the professionals at the Multi
agency meeting on the 12 May 2009 that an Independent court forensic
psychiatric report was required to inform on the question of the risk posed by Mr

Fitzsimmons.

In fact such a report was never ordered by the Court and a Defence Psychiatric
report was obtained. Clearly the instructions to this Psychiatrist were limited as
the defence would not have had access to all the information held by Probation
and other agencies and would not have been able to instruct the Psychiatrist
with the concerns probation wished to have addressed. In addition there wold
be no duty on the defence to disclose this report in due course.

| heard evidence that in reality and in the main due to funding issues the reality
is that Independent forensic reports are really only ever generated when a
defendant is in Prison and the reason there is sometimes a desire to remand
someone is so that this process can be triggered. Independent Court Forensic
Psychiatric Reports are rare and | heard evidence from Senior Probation officers
that they had never known them be obtained.

It concerns me that there is not a clear practice and procedure operating within
the Court or probation system, including funding responsibility, for obtaining an
Independent Forensic Psychiatric Report, particularly in circumstances where a
defendant is remanded on bail in the community.

This is necessary to ensure that the Court and other agencies have the clearest
and most accurate independent assessment to inform in respect of the question
of risk which has considered the correct and complete inforamtion.

CONCERN NUMBER 5

TO: GMP, NOMS, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
(i)

| heard evidence in respect of a Multi Agency Meeting on 12.5.09 and the failure
of the police to take any relevant information to the meeting including a failure to
check police systems and intelligence in advance of attendance. Relying on an
assumption that other agencies know as much as the police was concerning.

In addition the CPN who attended from the Mentally Disordered Offenders Team
did not provide the meeting with up-to-date information as to a referral when this
information was available within documentation held but not checked in advance
of the meeting.

It is important irrespective of who is the lead agency at a Multi Agency Meeting
that each agency invited to attend checks information held on systems and
records to which they have access and provides all this information to a multi
agency meeting to ensure that a full and informed assessment of risk takes
place and the fullest possible informed information sharing.

It concerns me in respect of the failings by each agency that attended the
meeting on 12.5.09 to provide key and important information to which they had
access, as the information that was available would have informed issues
relating to Public Protection but also as to an appropriate action plan.

(ii)

In addition | heard evidence and it concerns me that in advance of the Multi
Agency meeting convened due to concerns as to the Offenders risk, key
professionals had had discussions, telephone calls and meetings and | was
concerned by the failure to record and document these important discussions, to
ensure clarity, understanding and consistency. It is important when key
professionals have discussions that these are documented and recorded.

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and | believe:
NOMS
Greater Manchester Police
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust
National Police Chiefs Council
Security Industry Authority
Ministry of Defence — Minister of State for Defence, personnel,
Welfare and Veterans
7. Home Office - Home Secretary Theresa May MP
Have the power to take such action.

a dale a Noone

YOUR RESPONSE

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this
report, namely by 6" July 2015. |, the coroner, may extend the period.

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken,
setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is
proposed.

COPIES and PUBLICATION

| have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to all the following
Interested Persons (in addition to those to whom this Regulation 28 Report is

Mr Daniel Fitzsimmons

| am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or
summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he
believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me,
the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of
your response by the Chief Coroner.

DATE /2KMay 2015

IGNED BY MISS {OANNE KEARSLEY
AREA CORONER
MANCHESTER SOUTH

Responses

3 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Greater Manchester Police Noms Sia (PDF)
GREATER MANCHESTER

Sir Peter Fahy Q.P.M., M.A. PO L it E

Chief Constable

Area Coroner Kearsley
Coroner’s Court

1 Mount Tabor Street
Stockport

SK1 3AG

RECEIVEL | 06 July 2015
40 JUL 2015 |

Ras Ws Meosslous

Re: Regulation 28 letter Inquest of Paul McGuigan

Thank you for your letter of 11th May to which | set out my response as below.

Notifications to employers

| do acknowledge that at the Inquest we, in GMP, were unable to articulate a coherent
position in relation to notifications in respect of investigations and convictions. | do not,
though, believe it is the case that GMP completely misunderstood the Notifiable Occupation
Scheme of 2006. Rather it was the case that GMP acted upon national advice by ending
notification upon convictions, not only without properly assuring itself that its officers were
fully using the pressing social need test for notifications but also without any means of

recording and monitoring our processes.

| completely accept that there needs to be a common checkable standard for recording
notifications. This will, in future, be entered and held on the intelligence file of offenders.

We will be training officers in understanding their responsibilities under the pressing social
need test. This will include classroom and NCALT training. This will address the issue of to
whom the disclosures need to be made i.e. the employers and/or the regulatory body.

Our lawyers are aware of the complexity of issues in this difficult area as they deal with
enquiries from officers and also legal challenges. Indeed their experience of this issue is that
officers do exercise good judgement but that the issues are very finely balanced.

Our lawyers also, as matter of course, advise us on all our policies. | am anxious, however,
that GMP stays within the national framework advice provided by the ACPO document
Common Law Police Disclosure Guidance which was based on expert legal advice. As you
have rightly pointed out it is important all forces behave in a similar way.

You will be aware that the SIA is not in the Common Law Police Disclosure Scheme but that
discussions are taking place to improve this position. We have met with the SIA in relation to
the concerns you have raised in relation to the definition of the occupation of close

protection.

Location address: GMP Force Headquarters, Central Park, Northampton Road, Manchester M40 5BP
Postal address: Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11 2NS
Tel: 101

Bail conditions

| am entirely satisfied with the current process in GMP. It is clear that the Official reference
point for bail conditions is the PNC. Whilst there will always be errors in human systems, we

have a tried and tested reliable system.

Similarly | am satisfied that Custody Sergeants are applying bail conditions proportionately
and can layer the amount of contro! to the risk faced. Custody officers are clear in the
important distinction between a "condition of residence" and " live and sleep". It is almost
inevitable that, on rare occasions, a constable may misinterpret this or other bail conditions.
However this would be rectified quickly as the Custody officer would refuse to accept
detention on such occasions. This has never been a significant issue in the organisation.

Information sharing at Multi Agency meetings

We have raised your concerns at the Strategic Management Board responsible for all Multi
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs). These are very similar to the conclusion
of the Serious Case Review. These concerns have formed part of an action plan which will
be overseen by the Strategic Management Board. One particular action is to present this
case at a MAPPA learning event to be held later this year.

The importance of record keeping will form part of this presentation. | acknowledge the
failings of recording of information. | believe, however, the situation has already significantly
improved within GMP. In particular we have a Public Protection Investigation handbook,
issued in 2012, which outlines the requirements and expectations of proper record keeping.
! trust this letter addresses your concerns. Should you require any further information please
contact me.

Yun ancardyy ,

one

Sir Peter Fahy
Chief Constable

Location address: GMP Force Headquarters, Central Park, Northampton Road, Manchester M40 5BP
Postal address: Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11 2NS
Tel: 101

National Offender
Management Service

Michael Spurr

Chief Executive

National Offender Management Service
7" Floor Clive House

70 Petty France

London SW1H 9EX

Telephone: 0300 047 5163
Email: ceonoms@noms.gsi.gov.uk

Miss J Kearsley

HM Coroner

1 Mount Tabor Street
Stockport

SK1 3AG

Your reference: JK/KN/02070-2009

Date: 1 July 2015

Dear Miss Kearsley,

Thank you for your letter of 11 May, enclosing your Regulation 28 report following the
inquest into the death of Paul John McGuigan.

We are grateful for your comments and recommendations for improvement, which we
have considered in detail. As you know, the probation service has recently
undergone a fundamental reform, with the new National Probation Service and 21
Community Rehabilitation Companies taking the place of the former Probation
Trusts. Since the events of 2009 that were the subject of the inquest, a number of
other changes have taken place which have helped to address some of the issues
you have raised, including improved use of information technology.

As part of the transition process, following the introduction of the new structure, we
have put in place a major programme to promote consistency and good practice
across the National Probation Service. This programme, known as E3, is looking at
the whole range of practice issues and provides us with a mechanism for

implementing the required changes.

A major lesson from the inquest is the need for more effective inter-agency working,
particularly between the police and the probation service, in the context of the MAPP
arrangements. Work to address the issues you have highlighted is being taken
forward by the National MAPPA team, which will issue guidance to all MAPPA
agencies shortly. This will cover the need to prepare for MAPP meetings carefully,
including obtaining full case details, and to record in full all actions agreed and taken
and all communications in individual cases.

You identified a lack of understanding, on the part of the agencies involved with the
supervision of as to what close protection work overseas may
involve — notably a requirement to be armed. You also noted that offender managers
need to be aware that overseas work is not regulated by the Security Industry

Authority.

Close protection work is a form of employment to which former service personnel are
likely to be attracted and we have looked at the issue particularly in that context. In its
response to the independent review by EEE! into the rehabilitation
needs of ex-armed service personnel in the criminal justice system (December
2014), the Government emphasised its commitment to working with other
organisations to deliver the best outcomes for ex-service offenders. We will be
issuing updated guidance for staff on working with ex-armed service personnel in
custody and the community later this year. This guidance will incorporate a definition
of close protection work overseas and make clear that overseas work is not regulated
by the Security Industry Authority. We will also work with the Ministry of Defence to
set out protocols on obtaining and sharing information with the military to be included

in the guidance.

You recommended that consideration should be given as to whether disclosure of
details of offending should be made direct to potential overseas employers. The
Common Law Disclosure Scheme, which has replaced the Notifiable Occupations
Scheme, may be a suitable mechanism for doing this. The National MAPPA team will
liaise with the police and seek legal advice on the scope for using the Scheme in this

way.

As you may be aware, any offender on licensed supervision is subject to standard
licence conditions, one of which is that he or she will be permitted to travel abroad
only with the permission of his supervising officer. The national policy is that only in
wholly exceptional circumstances would such permission be given. In
HE <2se, of course, since he did not seek the permission of his
supervising officer, there was no opportunity to enquire about the nature of the work
that G4S had offered to him.

You also comment on the need for a clear procedure to identify when an independent
psychiatric report is needed, and to ensure that one is provided. In criminal cases,
judges or magistrates can decide to commission an independent psychiatric report as
part of the trial and sentencing processes. The cost of preparing such a report is met
from central funds. It is frequently the case that the defence or prosecution will
commission a psychiatric report, but this does not limit the powers of the court to
order its own report. The Ministry of Justice has produced a good practice procedural

guide for psychiatrists, the judiciary and court staff on handling requests for court-
ordered psychiatric reports and this is subject to periodic review.

A major contributory factor to the tragic sequence of events that resulted in the

murder of Paul McGuigan was the failure by agencies involved properly to record and
share information about the residence condition in a order. In

2009, bail conditj ere recorded manually. This proved to be problematic in

a as his bail conditions were not recorded accurately or
consistently and were overlooked by the offender manager as well as by partner
organisations and additionally by the court at a subsequent appearance. We have
taken steps to ensure accurate recording of conditions by introducing two nationwide
ICT systems — Libra for magistrates’ courts and Portal for the Crown Court. Staff

. have been trained in the use of these systems and we will remind them of the
importance of accurate recording of bail conditions on these systems in all cases.

You also point to the need for Community Rehabilitation Companies to be provided
with guidance to enable them to identify emerging risks that may trigger MAPPA
concerns and require transfer to the National Probation Service. The National
Offender Management Service’s contracts with the Community Rehabilitation
Companies specify the process that is to be followed in cases where a company
believes the risk posed by the offender has increased to a level where responsibility
for his or her management should transfer to the National Probation Service. The
company must provide the National Probation Service with a completed risk
escalation referral form, together with any additional information requested, to enable
the National Probation Service to conduct a full assessment of risk and to decide
whether offender management should transfer.

It is recognised that, particularly following the changes brought about by the
Transforming Rehabilitation reforms and the large number of post-graduate learners
recently recruited, there is a need for a revised framework to ensure that newly-
qualified officers are adequately supported as they build their experience in the role.
A period of additional support, consolidation of practice and learning is essential, and
a National Probation Service framework has now been put in place to ensure this is
achieved, through control of workload, mentoring support and formal supervision

sessions.

| hope that this letter provides the assurance you are seeking that action is being
taken to address your concerns. We are determined to learn the lessons from this

tragic case.

Yours sincerely,

MICHAEL SPURR

Hake
e

Sia

Security Industry Authority

RECEIVED
30 JUN 2015

Your ref: JK/KN/02070-2009

Joanne Kearsley, Area Coroner
Coroner’s Court

1 Mount Tabor Street
Stockport

SK1 3AG

29th June 2015

Dear Ms Kearsley,
RE: Paul John MCGUIGAN (Deceased)

| write in response to your letter to my predecessor fll dated 11" May 2015, which
enclosed your Regulation 28 Report about the inquest into the death of Paul John

McGuigan. | note that the SIA provided two formal statements from Legal
Advisor at the SIA, and thatillilattended and gave evidence at the inquest. | hope that

you found this useful.

For ease of reference, | have set out below the extracts from your letter which relate to the
SIA, which are then followed by our response. The issues raised in concerns 2 to 5 of your
letter relate to other parties and as such we have not commented on those matters in the

responses below.

! heard detailed evidence from a number of GMP Police Officers and civilian staff
with responsibility in respect of the Notifiable Occupation Scheme.

In my judgement there was a complete misunderstanding by GMP in respect of the
operation of the Notifiable Occupation Scheme HOC 6/2006.

Of immense concern also the complete failure for a Period of approximately 18
months to make any post conviction notifications under the Notifiable Occupation
Scheme, which was it transpired, formally withdrawn b 'y the Home Secretary Theresa

May MP in March 2015.

| heard and had evidence from the SIA that they were not aware that a regulatory gap
existed in respect of the police’s understanding of the scheme and notifications to
themselves. The evidence | heard suggests that such a gap exists at GMP and has
done so for in excess of 18 months.

As mentioned above, the Notifiable Occupations Scheme (NOS) has now been withdrawn
and replaced by the Common Law Police Disclosure Scheme. The SIA is not able to
comment on GMP’s understanding of the NOS, however we can confirm that there have

Security Industry Authority PO Box 49768 London WC1V 6WY
Phone 020 7025 4100 Fax 020 7025 4101 E-mail info@sia homeoffice gov.uk
www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk

Sid

Security Industry Authority

historically been, and continue to be, very good partner relations between the SIA and
GMP, particularly in respect of enforcement matters. Collaboration on several joint
initiatives has made a positive contribution to the protection of the public in the Greater

Manchester area.

At present in respect of a replacement scheme in respect of clarifying the Common
Law Police Disclosure Scheme | heard evidence as to the process GMP are
undergoing in respect of a revised Procedure relating to Notifiable Occupations but
this is far from complete and less than clear as to how it will operate and the training
that will be given to officers / GMP civilian employees. The Court was also advised
that at no stage has legal advice been taken from the force in-house legal team on
the proposed scheme, even though this is a difficult legal area.

It is important that GMP and all forces have a recognised procedure in respect of
having a scheme but also training officers to operate that scheme. It is imperative
also that the SIA understand how and when each police force will be making
disclosures under the Common Law Police Disclosure Scheme.

As at today’s date, the SIA is not included in the Common Law Police Disclosure
Scheme. However, recognising the importance of the information available under the
scheme to the SIA’s decision making, we are currently in discussions with the National
Police Chiefs’ Council, in order to seek inclusion as soon as possible. If it would be helpful
to you I can write further on this point when | have further information.

In respect of the GMP computer system and in respect of occupations that are
regulated and require licensing by the SIA, there is no categorisation on the
computer for “CLOSE PROTECTION”. Indeed the Court heard that there was some
confusion and lack of understanding from many people as to what this occupation
actually meant. Close protection work is a separate category of employment within
the UK that the SIA regulates and the police system should reflect the occupations
subject to regulation. It is important that the police and NOMS have a clear
understanding as to what close protection work is to inform risk and risk

assessment.

In addition I have a concern that there is a complete lack of understanding by the
police and Probation / NOMS as to what close protection work overseas involves
and in particular when this involves work on armed contracts. | heard evidence that
this type of work is a common route of employment for former service personnel.

This close protection work overseas is not regulated by the SIA. In this scenario this
would need to be known by the police and NOMS to inform risk assessment but also

as to whether under any common law disclosure scheme consideration would need
to be given to making a disclosure directly to an employer to best protect the public.

Given the above points made as to whom disclosures would be sent in GMP (i.e. the
regulator) this distinction becomes important.

Page 2

Sid

Security Industry Authority

The SIA has recently met with GMP to discuss these matters. We have offered training
and guidance in relation to —

the meaning of “close protection” work in the context of SIA licensing;

who would require an SIA Close Protection licence, and in what
circumstances;

the distinctions between the various categories of licensable conduct that
are regulated by the SIA (e.g. the difference between close protection
officers, door supervisors, security guards, etc);

the extent of the SIA’s jurisdiction;

any other areas relating to SIA regulation about which GMP feels its staff
would benefit from further information.

We will also be sharing guidance on these matters with all UK police forces.

| hope that this letter adequately addresses the concerns raised in your Regulation 28
Report. Should you require anything further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

|, 20am

Alan Clamp, Chief Executive
Security Industry Authority

Page 3
Response from Home Office (PDF)
ain

Rt Hon Mike Penning MP
Minister of State for Policing,
El 3) Crime, Criminal Justice and Victims

Home Office

2 Marsham Street,
London SW1P 4DF
www.gov.uk/home-office

Miss J Kearsley
Area Coroner
Manchester South

Coroner's Court 29 JUN 2015
1 Mount Tabor Street

Stockport

SK1 3AG

Your ref: JK/KN/02070-2009

INQUEST INTO THE DEATH OF PAUL JOHN MCGUIGAN — REGULATION 28
REPORT

Thank you for your letter of 11 May to the Home Secretary about the tragic death of
Paul John McGuigan, who was unlawfully killed by one of his close protection work
colleagues in Iraq. | am replying as the Minister for Policing, Crime, Criminal Justice

and Victims.

Your thorough report raises a number of important issues which touch on the work of
a range of departments and agencies. The concerns which are directed towards the
Home Office relate to the Notifiable Occupations Scheme (NOS) and to the type of
criminal record certificate available in relation to those employed on private security
contracts at home and abroad.

As you will know the events concerned took place in 2009. At that time the NOS was
the mechanism through which information on the conviction of an individual working
in a sensitive area could be disclosed by the police. The Home Secretary recognised
tial discicsure on conviction aid only exceptionally on arrest could present a public
protection risk and asked for a review. The review involved extensive consultation
and was informed by legal advice focused on ensuring that any changes took proper
account of proportionality and human rights considerations in reaching decisions on
disclosure. In March 2015, the Home Secretary decided to withdraw the NOS in
favour of a new police-led scheme which provides greater consistency across forces
in the disclosure of information.

You are already aware of the new scheme, the Common Law Police Disclosure
(CLPD) scheme, which is intended to serve the needs of public protection more
effectively. It provides a framework for disclosure of information under police
common law powers where the relevant Chief Officer considers there to be a risk to
public safety. The new arrangements provide the police with greater flexibility in
relation to what should be disclosed, to whom, and when. For example, information
now goes directly to employers where the police consider that appropriate.

An individual applying for an SIA licence is eligible for a standard criminal record
certificate from the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) under the legislative
provisions in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975.

It is mainly posts requiring close and regular working with children or vulnerable
adults that are eligible for an enhanced disclosure under The Police Act 1997
(Criminal Records) Regulations 2002. Roles covered by SIA licences do not fall into
this category with one exception. Where an applicant for an SIA licence is required to
handle prohibited weapons as part of a role inside the UK, section 5 of the Firearms
Act 1968 applies and that individual will be eligible for an enhanced certificate.

You may be aware that the employment of security or close protection personnel for
posts outside the United Kingdom is governed by an International Code of Conduct
for Private Security Providers (which the UK joined as a founding member) setting
out obligations for the providers, particularly with regard to international humanitarian
law and human rights law. However, neither the SIA nor the Home Office has
jurisdiction over the employment of security or close protection personnel for posts

outside the United Kingdom.

Finally, you raise a concern in relation to the recording and sharing of the bail
conditions imposed on Daniel Fitzwilliam in May 2009. Greater Manchester Police
will need to respond specifically in relation to their handling of this. More generally,
all bail conditions are recorded by the court. Where necessary, agencies are
informed immediately of the nature of such conditions. The conditions and their
practical effect should be made clear to the defendant.

hve

ao
RT HON MIKE PENNING MP
Response from Pennine Care NHS Trust (PDF)
6" July 2015

Miss J Kearsley
Area Coroner, Manchester South

Coroner’s Court

Was | Kate

Pennine Care
NHS Foundation Trust

Trust Headquarters
225 Old Street
Ashton-under-Lyne
Lancashire

OL6 7SR

Telephone: 0161 716 3000

Our Ref: MMcC/KB/PU
Your Ref:

1 Mount Tabor Street Department: Trust Headquarters
Ask for:

SK1 3AG
Dear Miss Kearsley

Re: John Paul McGuigan (Deceased)

Thank you for your letter of the 11" May 2015, enclosing your Regulation 28
report. At page 6, concern number 5, you have identified issues relating to
Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust, in relation to information sharing and

documentation.

At the time of this incident (2009) the Mentally Disordered Offenders (MDO) team
across the footprint of Pennine Care all operated as separate teams, and as such
had little shared policy and practice. Following the Bradley Report (2009), the
MDO teams transferred into single line management and a Trust wide
operational policy and approved documentation for assessment of needs and
risks specific to this particular service user group, was implemented. Work has
been undertaken by the MDO teams to standardise practice and protocols. This
work has been led by Greater Manchester Police (GMP). The new Mentally
Vulnerable Offenders Panel (MVOP) is now operational and is being
implemented across all of GMP’s divisions. This change on practice is an
ongoing piece of work and is welcomed by the Criminal Justice Mental Health
Team, as it defines the procedures particularly for the diversion panel and
provides a joint mechanism for joint recording of decision making.

Clinical staff who are required to attend multi-agency meetings now have
adequate time to access and assimilate pertinent information from case notes to
be able to effectively contribute to the discussion and any subsequent action

planning.

In addition to the above, Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust, is currently
‘rolling’ out a comprehensive electronic clinical record (PARIS) which will better
enable practitioners to access a single source of information, to record and share

information.

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Visit us on www.penninecare.nhs.uk

The Trust accepts the concerns that have been raised by you, and | hope you
are assured that we have taken steps to minimise the risk of similar problems

arising in the future.

Yours sincerely

“Michael McCourt

: Chief Executive

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