Dean Joseph

IN THE ST PANCRAS CORONERS COURT 

INQUEST INTO THE DEATH OF: 

DEAN JOSEPH 

____________________________________________________________ 

NATIONAL POLICE CHIEFS’ COUNCIL and METROPOLITAN POLICE 
SERVICE RESPONSE 
TO THE PREVENTION OF FURTHER DEATHS REPORT 12.08.15 
____________________________________________________________ 

Introduction 

On  8  September  2014,  an  inquest  was  commenced  into  the  death  of  Dean 
Christian Joseph, who was shot by Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) armed 
officers  and  died  on  5  September  2014.  This  response  is  made  pursuant  to 
r29  Coroners  (Investigations)  Regulations  2013  following  the  Prevention  of 
Future Deaths Report of Coroner Hassell dated 12 August 2015 (PFD). 

This is a joint response from the MPS and the National Police Chief’s Council 
(NPCC)  which  aims  to  set  out  details  of action  which  has  or  will  be taken in 
relation to each of concerns raised in the PFD, or an explanation for why no 
action is proposed.  

Jury Findings 

On 12 August 2014, the jury found the following:    

  Dean  Joseph  was  shot  by  an  armed  police  officer  in  response  to  Dean  Joseph 

 

moving a knife towards a hostage’s throat. It was a lawful killing.  
 Communication  and  consideration  regarding  whether  the  firearms  operation  was 
covert  or  overt was  inadequate.  An  armed  challenge  was  not  given.  These  possibly 
had an effect on the outcome of the incident. 

  There  was  no  guidance  from  trained  police  negotiators,  either  on  site  or  via 
telecommunications,  when  there was  sufficient  time to  do  so.  This  possibly  affected 
the outcome of the incident.  

Coroner’s Concerns  

Coroner Hassell detailed the following concerns in the PFD:  

1. 

2. 

3. 

Different  officers  had  a  different  understanding  of  whether  the  armed  containment 
was overt or covert. 

As  you  will  see  from  the  narrative,  the  jury  noted  that  there  was  no  guidance  from 
trained hostage negotiators en route, for the local officer who was on scene. He was 
attempting  to  negotiate,  though  he  was  untrained  as  a  hostage  negotiator.  Such 
guidance might or might not have led to the issuing of an armed challenge. 

The  hostage  negotiator  co-ordinator  felt  that  it  would  be  useful  for  the  officer  in  her 
role  to  ask  when  first  contacted,  “Where  does  the  incident  commander  want  me  to 

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 meet them?” This is a point which could be included in training. The fact of not asking 
that  question  did  not  appear  to  have  a  material  impact  in  this  case,  but  it  might  in 
another. 

4. 

My  recollection  from  the  evidence  I  heard,  is  that  the  Armed  Policing  Policy  only 
describes the maximum range of a TASER, not the effective range. The inclusion of 
the latter might be helpful. 

5. 

The post incident management: 

  allowed police officers writing their detailed accounts to confer about matters 

other than simply timings, and 

  arranged  for  the  display  of  the  control  log  for  them,  which  included  matters 

outside the personal knowledge of some of the officers 

It  may  seem  that  this  is  not  a  matter  for  a  prevention  of  future  deaths  report. 
However,  it  will  always  be  the  case  that  we,  as  a  society,  try  to  learn  lessons  from 
deaths such as Mr Joseph’s, and the learning of any lessons is hampered if the post 
incident procedure is sub optimal. 

In this case, it was clear to me that the version of events given by police officers was 
doubted  to  a  degree  that  would  not  otherwise  have  been  the  case,  because  of  the 
post incident procedure. 

  That means that public confidence in the police is eroded, when there be no 

substantive reason for this. 

 

It  also  caused  me  to  exclude  some  officers  from  court  when  other  officers 
were giving evidence which, all other things being equal, I would much have 
preferred not to do, because it is generally less helpful in ensuring the most 
meaningful exploration of events. 

NPCC & MPS Response  

1.  The College of Policing Armed Policing Authorised Professional Practice 
(APP) recognises a distinction that can be made between types of armed 
containment:  

Containment is an option when the subject is believed to be in  a particular location. 
The  objective  of  this  is  to  isolate  the  subject  or  place  limits  on  their  permitted 
movement.  The  containment  can  be  either  static  or,  in  some  circumstances,  may 
move  with the  subject.  It may  also  allow  time for  more  detailed  planning  of  a  police 
response. 

In  certain  situations  containment  may  require  two  groups  of  officers.  These  are 
usually referred to as: 

  outer cordon 
  inner cordon. 

Depending  on  the  topography  of  the  scene,  it  may  be  possible  to  use  unarmed 
officers on the outer cordon. 

In  containing  a  subject,  armed  officers  should  take  into  account  ‘arcs  of  fire’  in  the 
event of them having to discharge a firearm, and have defined areas of responsibility. 
This  is  important  for  the  safety  of  everyone.  Officers  should  also  consider  the  area 

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 behind a given subject or object and the implications should any shots be discharged, 
including the potential for shots to ricochet. 

Containment may be overt or covert and may be used at any stage during the 
deployment of AFOs [Authorised Firearms Officers]1. 

The MPS considers that its curriculum2 is in line with this APP guidance. 
Officers  are  trained  that  armed  containments  can  be  either  “overt”  or 
“covert”  (now  termed  “discreet”)  with  respect  to  the  subject(s)  of  the 
containment.  Overt  containment  facilitates  deployment  that  is  not 
concealed  while  covert  containment  is  used  for  unseen  deployment.  In 
considering  the  option  or  combination  of  options  to  take,  commanders, 
tactical advisors and armed officers should consider whether an overt or 
covert/discreet  approach  (or  combination  of  both)  would  be  most 
appropriate and what resources are available within the time available.  

During  armed  operations,  MPS  armed  officers  (in  particular  Tactical 
Firearm  Commanders  (TFCs))  do  continually  assess  the  nature  of  any 
containment. This is particularly so in respect of the positioning of armed 
officers,  to  ensure  that  officers  are  placed  at  strategic  locations  outside 
the premises so they are in the best position to deal with any immediate 
threat posed (both to any innocent parties inside, and also to the armed 
subject themselves). TFCs will use the National Decision Making (NDM) 
model in assessing every part of the armed operation, which includes the 
overt or covert/discreet containment of the premises. 

The MPS, however,  will in future make clear in training to both firearms 
officers  and  commanders  what  is  meant  by  overt  and  covert/discreet 
containment  according  to  the  APP.  The  MPS  will  ensure  that TFCs  are 
aware of the need to communicate to containment officers what type of 
containment is being carried out. 

The NPCC will also work with the College of Policing to consider whether 
the APP and/or the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum needs 
to be more explicit in this area. 

2.  The APP recognises the utility in the consideration and use of specifically 

trained negotiators in armed operations: 

Negotiation- Officers are encouraged to try to reduce  the threat level or neutralise it 
through  early  negotiation. While  negotiating  skills  are  included  in  all  AFO  initial 
training,  ongoing  negotiations  should  be  undertaken  by  a  trained  negotiator.  This  is 
an officer trained to negotiate with subjects to resolve an operation peacefully, and to 
gather 
intelligence-gathering 
process. When  necessary  negotiators  should  be  deployed  as  soon  as 
practicable3. 

information  which  may  assist  as  part  of 

the 

1 APP Armed Deployment: 2.1.4.5 
2 SC&O19 Armed Response Firearms Course: Basic Principles of Tactics  
3 APP Armed Deployment: 2.4.6.1 

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 The  use  of  less  lethal  options, including  police  dogs  and  negotiators,  should  be 
considered, wherever possible,  in order to enable the  police officers at the scene to 
deal with any emerging situation4. 

Communication  issues-  Where  there  are  known  environmental  and  behavioural 
improving 
the 
involved 
influencers 
communication with the subject: 

following  may  assist 

in  a  situation, 

in 

  prior intelligence gathering 
  early use of interpreters for language or communication difficulties 
  early use of trained negotiators, either directly or to advise others. 

Defusing  the  situation-  The  following  actions  can  help  create  opportunities  for  the 
subject and officers to have more time and space to defuse the situation: 

  use of effective cover by police officers 
  evacuation of immediate area 
  being prepared to back off (if safe) 
  giving available space and time to the subject when considering containment 
  early negotiation or negotiation advice5. 

In  addition,  the  former  National  Policing  Improvement  Agency  (NPIA) 
provided guidance giving general direction to commanders of all types of 
incidents6. The guidance reiterates the point that negotiation is one of a 
number  of  tactical  options  available  to  “incident  commanders”,  who  are 
required to exercise professional judgment and discretion in responding 
to incidents that can be imprecise and dynamic in their nature.  

The  NPIA  guidance  suggests  that  once  negotiators  have  been  fully 
briefed  regarding  the  situation  and  behavioural  factors  in  an  incident,  it 
will then be possible for them to provide a more considered and mature 
assessment  of  the  incident,  which  should  be  reviewed  as  more 
information becomes available. 

MPS policy directly reflects the APP (and essence of the NPIA guidance) 
on this matter and states: 

Command support is a useful element of the command structure. Depending on 
the complexity of the operation, and the availability of support staff, all firearms 
commanders must consider the availability and necessity for; 

• Intelligence liaison; 
• Tactical Advisor; 
• Hostage and Crisis Negotiator; 
• Logistics Support; 
• Post Incident Manager(s); 
• Media Support7 

The  use  of  less  lethal  options,  including  police  dogs  and  negotiators,  should  be 
considered, wherever possible,  in order to enable the  police officers at the scene to 
deal with any emerging situation8. 

4 APP Armed Deployment: 4.1 
5 APP Armed Deployment: 4.2.1 
6 The Use of Negotiators by Incident Commanders 2011 
7 Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons v11.0 July 2014: 6.94 

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 Where there are known environmental and behavioural influencers involved in a 
situation, the following may assists in improving communication with the subject: 

• Prior intelligence gathering; 
• Early use of interpreters for language or communication difficulties; 
• Early use of trained negotiators, either directly or to advise others9. 

The following actions can help create opportunities for the subject and officers to 
have more time and space to defuse the situation: 
• Use of effective cover by police officers; 
• Evacuation of immediate area; 
• Being prepared to back off (if safe); 
• Giving available space and time to the subject when considering containment; 
• Early negotiation or negotiation advice10. 

The  MPS  will  in  future,  however,  highlight  in  training  to  TFCs  and 
incident commanders the need to consider the use and briefing of trained 
police  negotiators  and  negotiator  co-ordinators  at  an  early  stage  in 
incidents.  

The  incident  commander  is  responsible  for  requesting  and  authorising 
the deployment of trained negotiators.  They must also decide whether or 
not to deploy untrained responders.  The negotiator coordinator will give 
advice  and  guidance  to  the  incident  commander.  This  could  include 
briefing a first responder, or even a third party intermediary, as a holding 
position. The Negotiator Coordinator will always brief negotiators prior to 
their deployment. 

On  arrival  at  a  scene  a  negotiator  must  ensure  that  their  engagement/ 
participation has been authorised and this would normally necessitate an 
up to date briefing at the scene (be that from the incident commander or 
negotiator  coordinator),  unless  delay  would  involve  immediate  threat  to 
life or urgent risk of harm. 

3.  Armed  officers  are  trained  that  a  designated  rendezvous  point  (RVP) 
plays  a  major  role  in  an  incident  and  is  designed  to  be  a  safe  meeting 
location away from the incident scene where multi-agency resources are 
coordinated and marshalled prior to their attendance at the incident. The 
purpose of an RVP is to ensure that incident scene access is effectively 
managed and that all incident responders are able to attend the scene of 
the incident in a coordinated and effective manner. Incident commanders 
are accordingly trained to give careful consideration to the location of an 
RVP. 

Due  to  the  dynamic  nature  of  armed  incidents,  however,  an  RVP  may 
cease to remain safe or fit for purpose. Consequently an alternative RVP 
may be designated or a forward reception point may be appointed.  

8 Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons v11.0 July 2014: 7.81 
9 Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons v11.0 July 2014: 7.90 
10 Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons v11.0 July 2014: 7.92 

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 The MPS will highlight to TFCs and incident commanders in training the 
need  to  consider  communicating  the  final  desired  meeting  point  to 
persons  arriving  at  an  incident  (including  negotiator  coordinators)  if  a 
forward reception point has been designated alongside an RVP.  

4. 

In  respect  of  the  conducted  energy  device  (Taser),  the  APP  currently 
states that:  

The maximum range of the device is determined by the length of the wires that carry 
the  current  and  attach  the  barbs  to  the  weapon  (currently  this  is  21  feet  or  6.4 
metres).  The  effective  range  at  which  it  is  likely  that  the  two  barbs  will  attach 
themselves to the subject may be a lesser distance11. 

The MPS and NPCC consider this guidance is clear and adequate. The 
maximum distance is dictated by the length of the Taser cables (21 feet), 
so this is the maximum distance at which the weapon has the potential to 
be effective.  

However, is it not possible to prescriptively specify what is the ‘effective’ 
range  of  a  Taser  in  all  circumstances.  As  articulated  in  the  above 
guidance,    the  effective  range  of  the  Taser  is  not  precise  and  is 
contingent  on  a  number  of  factors,  such  as  the  physique  and  clothing 
worn by a suspect, the distance at which the weapon is discharged and 
the  weather  conditions.  This  list  of  factors  is  not  exhaustive  and  each 
potential use of this weapon must be assessed by an officer dependant 
on the prevailing conditions in line with training and the National Decision 
Making model.  

5.  The  APP  provides  detailed  guidance  in  relation  to  the  post  incident 
procedure to be followed in cases of death following police contact.  The 
guidance has been developed over several years and draws upon legal 
advice and learning from previous incidents.   

Conferring 

The  APP  has  been  subject  to  legal  challenge  on  this  matter  in  R 
(Saunders)  v  Independent  Police  Complaints  Commission  (2008)  and 
more recently in the Court of Appeal in an application for judicial review 
brought  by 
.  The  basis  of  the 
application  to  the  Court  of  Appeal  was  that  the  APP  was  insufficient  to 
prevent officers from conferring when providing their accounts. The Court 
of Appeal concluded that the APP  was sufficient in this regard and was 
not  unlawful;  however, 
the  guidance  were 
improvements 
recommended in order to strengthen it and provide greater clarity. As a 
result of the Court of Appeal’s findings, the guidance has been updated. 

  and 

to 

In relation to conferring, the APP has been clear for many years that: 

11 APP Conducted Energy Devices: 1.2 

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 As a matter of general practice, officers should not confer with others before making 
their  accounts  (whether  initial  or  subsequent  accounts).  There  may,  however,  be  a 
need  speak  to  one  another  following  the  discharge  of  a  police  firearm  in  order  to 
resolve an ongoing operational or safety matter. The important issue is to individually 
record what their honestly held belief of the situation was at the time force was used. 
There  should,  therefore,  be  no  need  for  an  officer  to  confer  with  others  about  what 
was in their mind at the time force was used. If, however, in a particular case a need 
to  confer  on  other  issues  does  arise,  then,  in  order  to  ensure  transparency  and 
maintain  public  confidence,  where  some  discussion  has  taken  place,  officers  must 
document the fact that this has taken place, highlighting: 

time, date and place where conferring took place 
the issues discussed 

 
 
  with whom 
 

the reasons for such discussion12 

The underlined words were added on 12 September 2014, however the 
basic aim of the guidance has remained the same: officers are explicitly 
discouraged from conferring, particularly in relation to their own honestly 
held  belief  which  led  them  to  a  decision to  use  force.    Other  conferring 
can  be  necessary  however,  for  example  to  impart  situational  or  safety 
critical information. The APP makes it clear that to ensure transparency, 
a record of any conferring must be kept. 

It is accepted by the NPCC that when applying national guidance across 
all  police  forces  and  agencies,  there is  some  risk  that  the guidance  will 
be subject to local interpretation. However, the NPCC has already taken 
steps  to  strengthen  the  guidance  (for  example,  in  relation  to  when 
separation of officers is necessary to prevent conferring) and to improve 
clarity  on its  application.  Individual  forces  are  responding positively  with 
training and amendments to local procedure. 

The  MPS  adopts  the  APP  guidance  in  its  post  incident  procedure,  but 
welcomes  NPCC  measures  to  improve  the  clarity  of  the  APP  on  this 
matter.  

Developing best practice has already lead the MPS to always invite the 
IPCC  and  DPS  (Directorate  of  Professional  Standards)  to  be  present 
throughout the time  when officers give their initial and detailed (Stage 3 
& 4) accounts to promote transparency. 

Reference Materials 

The  APP  recognises  that  officers  may  use  reference  material  when 
writing their post incident accounts. When reference materials are used, 
the APP suggests that: 

12 APP Post Deployment:8.1 

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   The appointed officer must fully record their observations and actions. The following 
support  may  be  appropriate…  ensuring  that  any  reference  material  used  by  the 
officers is secured and handed to investigators against a receipt/exhibit number…13  

The  MPS  recognises  the  importance  of  a  distinction  between  reference 
materials that refresh the memory of matters that were within an officer’s 
own  knowledge  at  the  time  of  an  incident,  and  materials  that  relate  to 
matters outside of this knowledge.  

The MPS accepts that ideally, officers should not be exposed to the latter 
and  in  the  interests  of  developing  best  practice,  we  are  currently  in  a 
dialogue  with  the  NPCC  regarding  this  matter.  The  NPCC  is  also 
considering  the  APP  guidance  on  this  issue,  particularly  in  relation  to 
body worn video (BWV) material. 

Further development of best practice has already lead the MPS to direct 
the post incident manager (PIM) to consult with the DPS and the IPCC to 
decide on what reference materials are proposed to be used by officers 
when giving their accounts. The PIM is also trained to record his or her 
decision and reasoning to further promote transparency.  

……

…….Signed 

…11th November 2015……Dated  

Commander David Musker 

Metropolitan Police Service 

………

….Signed 

…11th November 2015…Dated  

Deputy Chief Constable Simon Chesterman QPM 

National Police Chiefs’ Council 

13 APP Post Deployment: 8.2 

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8