Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2016

Margaret Tuck

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2016-0273, written 26 Jul 2016. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report26 Jul 2016
Reference2016-0273
DeceasedMargaret Tuck
CoronerMary Hassell
Coroner areaInner North London
CategoryHospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths
Organisation namedBarts Health NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Regulation 28:  Prevention of Future Deaths report 

Margaret Emily TUCK (died 26.10.15) 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

1. 

Chief Medical Officer 
Barts Health 
Royal London Hospital 
Whitechapel Road 
London   
E1 1BB 

1 

CORONER 

I am:   Coroner ME Hassell 
           Senior Coroner  
           Inner North London 
           St Pancras Coroner’s Court 
           Camley Street 
           London  N1C 4PP 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,  
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and  
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, 
regulations 28 and 29. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On  3  November  2015,  one  of  my  assistant  coroners,  Jacqueline 
Devonish, commenced an investigation into the death of  Margaret Emily 
Tuck,  aged  88  years.  The  investigation  concluded  at  the  end  of  the 
inquest  earlier  today.    The  jury  made  a  determination  at  inquest  that 
Margaret  Tuck’s  death  was  caused  by  a  combination  of  accident  and 
illness. 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

Already  diagnosed  with  multiple  myeloma,  Margaret  Tuck  fell  on  13 
October  2015  in  her  home  and  again  on  15  October  2015  in  the  Royal 
London Hospital.   

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During  the  course  of  the  inquest,  the  evidence  revealed  matters  giving 
rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur 
unless  action  is  taken.  In  the  circumstances,  it  is  my  statutory  duty  to 
report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.   

(I  appreciate  that  the  trust  has  attempted  to  deal  with  some  of  these 
issues  already,  most  particularly  by  way  of  new  documentation  and 
training.    However,  I  think  that  they  nevertheless  bear  articulating,  most 
especially in the context of the concerns as yet unaddressed.)  

1.  Although  a  falls  risk  assessment  was  conducted  upon  Margaret 
Tuck’s admission to hospital, when it demonstrated an increased risk 
of falling no falls prevention care plan was drafted.   

And, whilst most of the preventative measures that would have been 
detailed  on  such  a  care  plan  were  implemented  in  any  event,  Mrs 
Tuck  was  described  on  the  risk  assessment  as  having  no  walking 
aids.  In fact, she had a zimmer frame, and it was while reaching for 
this zimmer frame that she fell on the acute admissions unit.   

2.  There was confusion about which nurse had primary responsibility for 
Margaret Tuck.  Recourse was had to the bed diaries, but there was 
further discussion in court about whether the nurses had been sharing 
care.  Such a lack of clarity seems undesirable. 

3.  After her fall, Mrs Tuck was seen by a junior doctor who examined her 
thoroughly and filled in the medical portion of the post falls checklist.  
However, the nursing aspect of this form was never completed.   

The  FY1  had  wanted a  neurological  observation to be  undertaken  in 
addition to the protocol neurological observations of every 30 minutes, 
but her note was not wholly clear, and could have been interpreted as 
seeking only one neurological observation in total.   

In fact, no neurological observations at all were conducted on the day 
that Mrs Tuck fell, nor the day after.   

The  FY1  doctor  had  wanted  to  speak  to  the  primary  nurse  before 
leaving  the  bedside,  but  had  been  unable  to  find  her.    The  twin 
nursing  failures  of  documentation  and  observation  might  have  been 
avoided  if  such  a  conversation  had  been  mandatory,  and  there  had 
been a simple way of achieving this. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.  Mrs  Tuck  had  been  alert  and  orientated  upon  admission  on  13 
October,  and  remained  so  until  the  afternoon  of  16  October,  despite 
her persistently low sodium.  When a haematology registrar found her 
to be confused however, an assumption was made that this confusion 
was the result of low sodium.   

It  may  be  that  this  doctor  was  unaware  of  the  falls  and  as  a 
consequence  did  not  consider  the  possibility  that  the  confusion  had 
been caused by a bleed, but this was the time when a CT scan was 
indicated. 

5.  The  consultant  in  charge  of  Mrs  Tuck’s  care  did  not  learn  of  the  15 
October fall until 17 October.  It seems that the junior doctors on her 
ward did not bring this to her attention.   

Mrs  Tuck’s  nephew,  however,  was  gravely  concerned  to  find  his 
auntie unable to communicate and brought this to the attention of the 
consultant.   The  consultant asked  him  “What  do  you  want  me to do, 
scan  her  brain?”  and  he  replied  “I  think  that  would  be  a  very  good 
idea”.    Hence  a  CT  scan  was  conducted  on  the  afternoon  of  17 
October. 

6.  I heard at inquest that agency nurses are unable to input into the trust 
reporting  system  (Datix).    Bearing  in  mind  that  at  times  50%  of  the 
ward  staff  are  agency  nurses,  the  matron  who  gave  evidence 
suggested  that  agency  nurses  could  be  given  a  card  similar  to  that 
given  to  locum  doctors,  so  that  they  would  not  have  to  trouble  their 
colleagues to help them make such reports.   

She was unsure whether this idea was going to be taken forward. 

7.  The  hospital  investigation  into  the  circumstances  surrounding  the 
death  was  conducted  by  a  ward  manager.    The  thinking  behind 
having  a  senior  nurse  explore  questions  of  nursing  care  is  obvious.  
However, the report also commented on aspects of medical care that 
the  report  author  freely  admitted  in  court  were  outside  her  area  of 
expertise.  In terms of learning lessons for the future, this seems sub 
optimal.   

Clinicians  giving  evidence  disagreed  with  some  of  the  report’s 
conclusions,  but  I  was  not  able  to  explore  those  areas  with  the  true 
originator,  because  the  views  had  come  from  a  consultant  who  the 
author had consulted informally.  

The  report  was  not  recorded  as  being  co-authored,  and  the  doctor 
who had been asked for his view was not an oncologist.  The author 
thought  on  reflection  that  an  oncologist  would  have  been  better 
placed to comment on the medical management. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In  my  opinion,  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  future  deaths  and  I 
believe that you have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date 
of this report, namely by 26 September 2016.  I, the coroner, may extend 
the period. 

Your  response  must  contain  details  of  action  taken  or  proposed  to  be 
taken,  setting  out  the  timetable  for  action.  Otherwise  you  must  explain 
why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the following. 

, nephew of Margaret Tuck 

  HHJ Peter Thornton QC, the Chief Coroner of England & Wales 
  Care Quality Commission for England  
 
 
 
 
 
 

, foundation year 1 doctor 
 AAU ward manager 
, ward manager and investigation report author 

 locum consultant in care of the elderly 

 matron 

I  am  also  under  a  duty  to  send  the  Chief  Coroner  a  copy  of  your 
response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted 
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who 
interest.  You  may  make 
he  believes  may 
representations to me, the Senior Coroner, at the time of your response, 
about  the  release  or  the  publication  of  your  response  by  the  Chief 
Coroner. 

it  useful  or  of 

find 

9 

DATE                                                   SIGNED BY SENIOR CORONER 

26.07.16 

4

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Barths Health NHS Trust (PDF)
Barts Health NHS Trust 
Trust Executive Offices 
Ground floor, Pathology Block 
The Royal London Hospital 
 London, E1 2ES 
Telephone: 020 32460632 
www.bartshealth.nhs.uk 

Ms Mary Elizabeth Hassell 
Senior Coroner for Inner North London 
St Pancras Coroner’s Court 
Camley Street 
London 
N1C 4PP 

26 August 2016 

By Special Delivery 

Dear Ma’am, 

Inquest touching the death of Margaret Emily Tuck 

I write in response to a Regulation 28, Report to Prevent Future Deaths, dated 26 
July 2016, which was made at the conclusion of the inquest into the death of 
Margaret Emily Tuck. Barts Health NHS Trust takes Coronial investigations very 
seriously and I am sorry you have had to make Preventing Future Death 
recommendations and I am grateful to you for highlighting your concerns. 

The concerns you have raised in the Preventing Future Death report are: 

1. Although a falls risk assessment was conducted upon Margaret Tuck’s admission 
to hospital, when it demonstrated an increased risk of falling no falls prevention care 
plan was drafted.  

And, whilst most of the preventative measures that would have been detailed on 
such a care plan were implemented in any event, Mrs Tuck was described on the risk 
assessment as having no walking aids. In fact, she had a zimmer frame, and it was 
while reaching for this zimmer frame that she fell on the acute admissions unit.  

2. There was confusion about which nurse had primary responsibility for Margaret 
Tuck. Recourse was had to the bed diaries, but there was further discussion in court 
about whether the nurses had been sharing care. Such a lack of clarity seems 
undesirable.  

3. After her fall, Mrs Tuck was seen by a junior doctor who examined her thoroughly 
and filled in the medical portion of the post falls checklist. However, the nursing 
aspect of this form was never completed.  

The FY1 had wanted a neurological observation to be undertaken in addition to the 
protocol neurological observations of every 30 minutes, but her note was not wholly  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 clear, and could have been interpreted as seeking only one neurological observation 
in total.  

In fact, no neurological observations at all were conducted on the day that Mrs Tuck 
fell, nor the day after.  

The FY1 doctor had wanted to speak to the primary nurse before leaving the 
bedside, but had been unable to find her. The twin nursing failures of documentation 
and observation might have been avoided if such a conversation had been 
mandatory, and there had been a simple way of achieving this. 

4. Mrs Tuck had been alert and orientated upon admission on 13 October, and 
remained so until the afternoon of 16 October, despite her persistently low sodium. 
When a haematology registrar found her to be confused however, an assumption 
was made that this confusion was the result of low sodium.  

It may be that this doctor was unaware of the falls and as a consequence did not 
consider the possibility that the confusion had been caused by a bleed, but this was 
the time when a CT scan was indicated.  

5. The consultant in charge of Mrs Tuck’s care did not learn of the 15 October fall 
until 17 October. It seems that the junior doctors on her ward did not bring this to her 
attention.  

Mrs Tuck’s nephew, however, was gravely concerned to find his auntie unable to 
communicate and brought this to the attention of the consultant. The consultant 
asked him “What do you want me to do, scan her brain?” and he replied “I think that 
would be a very good idea”. Hence a CT scan was conducted on the afternoon of 17 
October.  

6. I heard at inquest that agency nurses are unable to input into the trust reporting 
system (Datix). Bearing in mind that at times 50% of the ward staff are agency 
nurses, the matron who gave evidence suggested that agency nurses could be given 
a card similar to that given to locum doctors, so that they would not have to trouble 
their colleagues to help them make such reports.  

She was unsure whether this idea was going to be taken forward.  

7. The hospital investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death was 
conducted by a ward manager. The thinking behind having a senior nurse explore 
questions of nursing care is obvious. However, the report also commented on 
aspects of medical care that the report author freely admitted in court were outside 
her area of expertise. In terms of learning lessons for the future, this seems sub 
optimal.  

Clinicians giving evidence disagreed with some of the report’s conclusions, but I was 
not able to explore those areas with the true originator, because the views had come 
from a consultant who the author had consulted informally.  

The report was not recorded as being co-authored, and the doctor who had been 
asked for his view was not an oncologist. The author thought on reflection that an 
oncologist would have been better placed to comment on the medical management. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We have investigated the above concerns and I can confirm: 

The Hospital has undertaken a major piece of work to ensure vulnerable 

1. 
patients are identified and cared for, ensuring their risk of falling is minimised. A falls 
working group meets monthly, with each clinical area having to present their 
incidence of falls and work in progress around reduction of these incidents. On the 
AAU (representative of most clinical areas) all patients are assessed using the Trust 
falls assessment paperwork (which has been newly amalgamated into a nursing 
documentation admissions booklet), and any patient identified as a high risk, is then 
issued with a brightly coloured wrist band with the words ‘HIGH RISK OF FALLS’ 
printed on it. This signals to all staff, whether regular or agency, that this patient is at 
risk. All our high risk patients are now nursed within a bay that allows direct 
observation by nurses at the nurses’ station. There are plans for a Frail Elders Unit 
(FEU) in the near future, and this should allow better care of these highly vulnerable 
individuals. 

2. 
Since this incident the staff allocation has been revised, all patients admitted 
to the AAU now have a clearly identified, named nurse. Patients and their carers are 
made aware of this nurse on admission to the ward. All nurses on the unit, whether 
they are regular or agency nursing staff, will be made aware of the nurse in charge at 
the beginning of each shift.  In April 2016 we increased the number of senior sister 
charge nurse posts to increase the presence of senior nursing leadership across the 
24 hour period. This has led to far better leadership and care. 

Our Nurse Educator has been instrumental in setting up and delivering a new 

3. 
multi-disciplinary training programme around important issues, that includes falls 
prevention awareness and post falls care. As part of the Band 7 role regular 
assessment during the shift of care planned and delivered, is undertaken. All of our 
medical staff, including FY1’s, are invited to participate. Falls prevention and 
awareness is also included in the FY1 mandatory education programme. With the 
increased presence of Band 6 and 7 nurses on each shift all the clinical staff now 
have a first contact who they can handover important issues to, even when the 
named nurse is not on the ward. There are now four multidisciplinary board / 
handover meetings per 24-hours and these are focussed around patient safety and 
handover. This use of the named nurse and the increase in substantive fill rate, 
improves continuity of care and communication. 

and 5. There was breakdown in communication between the ward doctors, 

4. 
the Health Care of the Elderly (HCoE) team, and the Haematology team. These 
issues will be dealt with in one or more of our four daily handover meetings. 

As with all staff (medical, nursing and allied healthcare professionals), no-one 

6. 
needs a card of any description to log on and write a Datix. All our computers have 
generic log-ins that are given to all staff that need to access the computers and once 
logged in they can use the intranet to access the Datix system. The senior nurse on 
duty has been re-instructed to allow agency nurses to use their email address in the 
reporting system. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All Serious Incidents and Morbidity and Mortality issues are discussed at our 

7. 
monthly and quarterly unit Governance meetings. All learning points are discussed 
and disseminated to all members of the AAU team, including all grades of nursing 
and medical staff. During the investigation the author of the report sought medical 
advice from the Clinical Director in Neurosciences. Both AAU and HCoE teams see 
such cases on a near daily basis, and are expert in dealing with the acutely unwell 
medical patient. We regret that miscommunication led to the delay in obtaining the 
relevant scan and believe the measures outlined will address such communication 
barriers.  

The hospital is adopting a process of round table discussions to investigate serious 
incidents. This will ensure that relevant expertise is obtained and the expert is named 
in the report. We regret that such expertise was not available to you first hand at the 
inquest and will in future ensure better representation from our clinical staff. 

I am once again grateful to you for bringing this case to my attention and I hope this 
letter fully answers the concerns you have raised. 

Yours faithfully 

Chief Medical Officer 
Barts Health NHS Trust

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