Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2018
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2018-0307, written 29 Oct 2018. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 29 Oct 2018 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2018-0307 |
| Deceased | Rosario Cordero-Sanz |
| Coroner | Mary Hassell |
| Coroner area | Inner North London |
| Category | Community health care and emergency services related deaths |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
Regulation 28: Prevention of Future Deaths report
Rosario CORDERO-SANZ (died 14.08.18)
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
1. Commander David Musker
Metropolitan Police Service
New Scotland Yard
Victoria Embankment
London SW1A 2JL
1
CORONER
I am: Coroner ME Hassell
Senior Coroner
Inner North London
St Pancras Coroner’s Court
Camley Street
London N1C 4PP
2
CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013,
regulations 28 and 29.
3
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On 17 July 2018, one of my assistant coroners, Sarah Bourke,
commenced an investigation into the death of Rosario (known as Charo)
Cordero-Sanz. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on
22 October 2018.
At inquest, the jury made a narrative determination, which I attach. The
medical cause of death recorded was:
1a multiple injuries
1b blunt force trauma
1
4
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
Charo Cordero-Sanz jumped in front of a train at Bethnal Green
Underground Station at around noon on Saturday, 14 July 2018. The
jury determined that she was at the time acutely unwell.
On Wednesday, 11 July 2018, London Ambulance Service had attended
her home, following a concern for her mental health. However, she
declined hospital admission and so was advised to sign on with a general
practitioner and to access mental health services via the GP surgery.
In the early hours of Friday, 13 July, she was reported to the Metropolitan
Police Service as a missing person. Friends had not seen her since late
Wednesday evening. She was graded as a high risk missing person and
police made considerable efforts to locate her.
Late that Friday evening, Ms Cordero-Sanz returned to her friends, but
did not seem to be well. They called police again and three special police
officers attended that night. After the officers left, Ms Cordero-Sanz ran
away. Despite a search, her friends could not find her.
Later that day she jumped in front of the train.
5
CORONER’S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving
rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur
unless action is taken. In the circumstances, it is my statutory duty to
report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.
1. MPS special police officers are not issued with tablets as regular
officers are, yet the three on duty who attended on Friday night /
Saturday morning were given one of the police vans that is not
equipped with an on board computer. This meant that they could
not check details on police computer systems themselves. Instead,
they had to radio for assistance.
2.
In addition, the jury heard as follows.
- The three police officers did not appear to have an in depth
understanding of the misper process.
2
- They did not (save for one who had attended such calls before)
appear to have an in depth understanding of the s136 Mental
Health Act / mental health potential issues.
- They did not consider using language line to assist them in
obtaining information from the non native English speaking
friend, with whom they spoke outside the building where Ms
Cordero-Sanz was staying with a friend. Being able to speak in
his native language might have facilitated the informant to give
fuller details, such as the fact that Ms Cordero-Sanz was by now
hearing voices.
- Having been told that she would be upset by their uniforms, they
did not insist on seeing Ms Cordero-Sanz to assess her for
themselves, or call for the assistance of a plain clothes
colleague, or suggest that they speak to the friend who was
sitting inside with her.
- Nobody thought of calling an ambulance that night, save for the
CAD (computer aided despatch) operator who took the call in the
first place, but he did not mention he had done so to anyone else.
I wonder whether this suggests a training need, and/or whether,
given the difficulties in maintaining skills on only 15 hours a month,
consideration could be given to teaming special officers with
regulars?
3. The three special police officers who attended late that Friday
evening / early Saturday morning were described as kind, and
clearly demonstrated concern, but ultimately they did not know that
they were dealing with a high risk missing person. Without tablets
or a mobile data terminal, they had no means of checking this
themselves.
The jury found that the special sergeant and the CAD operator did
not actively listen to one another. This meant that the Merlin system
was not checked again after officers had obtained Ms Cordero-
Sanz’s full name, missing the opportunity to match her details with
those reported earlier and to identify her as a high risk misper.
4. There was not a full understanding among the CAD operators of
how to search with only part of a name e.g. CORDERO* as a wild
card. This seems a significant omission in the understanding of
those fulfilling that role.
6
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion, action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I
believe that you have the power to take such action.
3
7
YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date
of this report, namely by 24 December 2018. I, the coroner, may extend
the period.
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain
why no action is proposed.
8
COPIES and PUBLICATION
I have sent a copy of my report to the following.
HHJ Mark Lucraft QC, the Chief Coroner of England & Wales
, sister of Charo Cordero-Sanz
I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your
response.
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who
he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make
representations to me, the Senior Coroner, at the time of your response,
about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief
Coroner.
9
DATE SIGNED BY SENIOR CORONER
29.10.18
4
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
DIRECTORATE OF PROFESSIONALISM Ms Mary Hassell, Senior Coroner, Inner North London St Pancras Coroner’s Court, Camley Street, London, N1C 4PP Tel.: 020 7974 4545 Richard Martin Deputy Assistant Commissioner 6th Floor New Scotland Yard Victoria Embankment London SW1A 2JL Email: R Tel: 020 7230 1417 Your ref: Our ref: IX/52/18 & 1901_02 Date: 22nd January 2019 Dear Ms Hassell, I am the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Professionalism in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). I write in response to your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 29th October 2018. Your report was sent following the conclusion of the inquest into the death of Ms Rosario Cordero- Sanz. In drafting our response we have consulted with the relevant subject matter experts, principally: , Citizens in Policing Metropolitan Special Constabulary (MSC) - Continuous Policing Inspector Improvement, Detective Constable , Directorate of Professional Standards’ Specialist , Head of Support Met Command & Control (Met CC) and Inspector Investigations; , Central East Borough Command Unit (CE BCU). Response to Matters of Concern 1. MPS special police officers are not issued with tablets as regular officers are, yet the three on duty who attended on Friday night/ Saturday morning were given one of the police vans that is not equipped with an on board computer. This meant that they could not check details on police computer systems themselves. Instead, they had to radio for assistance. In September 2018, the MPS committed to the purchase and issuing of one hundred tablet devices, to be used as pool devices for MSC officers. The allocation of tablets across the MPS has been designated according to budgetary and operational demands. The roll out of these devices was completed in November 2018 and they have now been evenly distributed within frontline policing across the footprint of the MPS. Data usage is currently being collated, with the intention of increasing the pool size in the future. It is to be highlighted that the use of a tablet in an operational situation may benefit officers, however this is a relatively recent addition and officers are expected to use their police radios where tablets are not available. We have addressed this issue with the officers directly. 1 2. In addition, the jury heard as follows. The three police officers did not appear to have an in depth understanding of the misper process. On their initial foundation course, all MSC officers receive training on how to deal with a missing person and are expected to be conversant with changes in legislation and policy. The MPS is satisfied that the level of training provided is sufficient for MSC officers. If a MSC officer, or indeed any police officer, is unsure of how to deal with an incident they should seek supervisory advice at the scene. In light of this incident, all MSC coordinators who are experienced police constables supporting the MSC, have been tasked to review the support of MSC practical learning. The failures identified within this matter of concern represent individual failings which have been addressed directly with the officers concerned. They did not (save for one who had attended such calls before) appear to have an in depth understanding of the s136 Mental Health Act / mental health potential issues. S136 Mental Health Act would not have assisted the MSC officers in this particular situation because it does not apply to a person inside a private dwelling. In general terms the MPS response to incidents involving people with mental illness has evolved significantly over the last few years and continues to do so. We are committed to continual training and partnership working which has been incorporated into the annual officer safety training programme for all officers, including MSC. MSC officers are provided with mental health training in their foundation course which includes awareness of signs, symptoms and legislation. The MPS has launched a mental health and wellbeing campaign, which includes training, awareness and support for all officers. MSC are also incorporated into the Home Office funded MIND Blue Light Champion Programme, whereby selected MSC officers, alongside regular officers, are trained as mental health champions. The role of these champions is to raise awareness of mental health across the wider organisation, both in a personal and professional capacity. They did not consider using language line to assist them in obtaining information from the non native English speaking friend, with whom they spoke outside the building where Ms Cordero-Sanz was staying with a friend. Being able to speak in his native language might have facilitated the informant to give fuller details, such as the fact that Ms Cordero-Sanz was by now hearing voices. Language Line can be accessed via police Airwave radios at any time and full instructions on how to access this service is readily available on the MPS intranet. Instructions on how to use this and its benefits have been recirculated to the MSC via the duty sheet messaging system. The failures identified within this matter of concern represent individual failings which have been addressed directly with the officers concerned. 2 Having been told that she would be upset by their uniforms, they did not insist on seeing Ms Cordero-Sanz to assess her for themselves, or call for the assistance of a plain clothes colleague, or suggest that they speak to the friend who was sitting inside with her. It has been established that the MSC officers who attended the address were not provided with the full details of the call. The informants whom they spoke to did not indicate that Ms Cordero-Sanz was in immediate danger. However it is recognised that if they had obtained more information at the scene utilising Language Line they may have altered their risk assessment and seen her in person. Whilst the suggested considerations have merit, we would not seek to make them mandatory actions as they may not be appropriate or practicable in all circumstances. Had the MSC officers known Ms Cordero-Sanz was a high risk missing person, MPS policy would have required them to physically see her and ensure she was safe and of no danger to herself or others. The failure to physically see Ms Cordero-Sanz is a collective failing by the MSC officers and has been addressed as previously detailed. Nobody thought of calling an ambulance that night, save for the CAD (computer aided despatch) operator who took the call in the first place, but he did not mention he had done so to anyone else. The MSC officers did not consider that an ambulance was necessary based on the limited amount of information they had when dealing with the incident. The initial CAD operator (call receipt) requested an ambulance attend, based on the information given to him by the informant over the telephone and by asking relevant questions. The MSC officers did not have access to the CAD and were unaware an ambulance had been requested. They were told at the scene that she was safe and well inside the premises with friends and her family were en route. I wonder whether this suggests a training need, and/or whether, given the difficulties in maintaining skills on only 15 hours a month, consideration could be given to teaming special officers with regulars? The MPS has supported the dissemination of the learning opportunities presented by your report and is reviewing training in the context of both the MSC and the regular service. The MPS identifies that an aspiration to patrol MSC officers with regular officers on a regular basis would be unachievable due to competing demands, as well as MSC availability. As a direct result of this incident, CE BCU has put processes in place to ensure that MSC officers are briefed and debriefed at the start and end of their tours of duty and have supervisory support throughout. Commander Musker, the lead for frontline policing, has directed that this process be implemented across all other BCUs. 3. The three special police officers who attended late that Friday evening / early Saturday morning were described as kind, and clearly demonstrated concern, but ultimately they did not know that they were dealing with a high risk missing person. Without tablets or a mobile data terminal, they had no means of checking this themselves. The jury found that the special sergeant and the CAD operator did not actively listen to one another. This meant that the Merlin system was not checked again after officers had 3 obtained Ms Cordero-Sanz’s full name, missing the opportunity to match her details with those reported earlier and to identify her as a high risk misper. The issue relating to availability of tablets and mobile data terminals has been addressed in matter of concern 1. The failures identified within this matter of concern represent individual failings, which have been addressed directly with the officers/staff concerned. The opportunity was missed to provide the CAD operator with Ms Cordero-Sanz’s full name as the MSC officers at the scene assumed the CAD operator already had this information. In relation to checking the Merlin system, this will be dealt with under matter of concern 4. The expectation is that officers update the CAD fully once details have been obtained at the scene. The MPS accepts that if the MSC officers had access to a tablet on the night, then they could have carried out their own PNC check on the full name they had written down, which in turn would have informed them Ms Cordero-Sanz was a high risk missing person, however a PNC check should still have been carried out on their MPS Airwave radio. 4. There was not a full understanding among the CAD operators of how to search with only part of a name e.g. CORDERO* as a wild card. This seems a significant omission in the understanding of those fulfilling that role. Two issues arise from this matter of concern, which are detailed below: Merlin has limited capacity to perform ‘wild card’ searches. It has no Boolean capability and cannot perform searches of terms within a certain distance of other terms; it is the system, and not the operators, that is limited in this way. More importantly, no wild card searches could have assisted in this case, since the CAD operator (call receipt) only had the first name to search on and therefore had no reason to contemplate a wild card search. The spelling was provided phonetically and the CAD operator could not have known that it was wrongly spelled. In any event, it would not have been reasonable to search for ‘Rosareo’ multiple times with every letter in turn replaced with an *. The second CAD operator’s (call despatch) mistake was not related to wild card searches either. His error was not to check Ms Cordero-Sanz’s name and its phonetic spelling with the officers at the scene. However it is acknowledged that CAD operators have numerous demands placed on them at any one time and are generally dealing with multiple calls. This was a failure of communication and active listening, and has been dealt with by way of local learning for the MSC officers and the second CAD operator. Conclusion The MPS believe there was not one defining moment but rather a series of errors or omissions that were contributing factors towards not identifying Ms Cordero-Sanz as a high risk missing person. As detailed within this response, the responsibilities and actions expected of officers in relation to many of the matters of concern raised are all covered by a framework of guidelines, policy or legislation. They are also provided in foundation training and refresher training. The errors and omissions identified within your report mostly represent individual failings or lack of understanding. 4 All officers have a duty to maintain their professional knowledge under the College of Policing’s Code of Ethics (Duties and Responsibilities); training and reference materials are readily available to support officers and staff. Following the inquest, these matters were dealt with under a gold group governance structure, chaired by Commander Musker, to address and implement a plan of action both at CE BCU and across all other BCUs regarding the identified issues. The critical need to have effective ongoing supervision for MSC officers was recognised and implemented as part of the action plan. This process is influenced by learning from day to day operations and vulnerabilities highlighted from investigations including inquests. Yours sincerely, Richard Martin Deputy Assistant Commissioner 5
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