Prevention of Future Deaths reports
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2021-0243. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Reference | 2021-0243 |
|---|---|
| Deceased | Alan Griffin |
| Coroner | Mary Hassell |
| Coroner area | Inner North London |
| Category | Suicide (from 2015) · Other related deaths |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 2 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
Regulation 28: Prevention of Future Deaths report
Alan Howard Foster GRIFFIN (died 08.11.20)
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
1. Most Reverend Justin Welby
Archbishop of Canterbury
Church of England
Lambeth Palace
London SE1 7JU
1
CORONER
I am: Coroner ME Hassell
Senior Coroner
Inner North London
St Pancras Coroner’s Court
Camley Street
London N1C 4PP
2
CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013,
regulations 28 and 29.
3
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On 12 November 2020, one of my assistant coroners, Sarah Bourke,
commenced an investigation into the death of Alan Howard Foster
Griffin, aged 76 years. The investigation concluded at the end of the
inquest on 2 July 2021. I made a narrative determination as follows.
“Alan Griffin hanged himself at home on Sunday, 8 November 2020.
He killed himself because he could not cope with an investigation into his
conduct, the detail of and the source for which he had never been told.
The investigation had been ongoing for over a year and was being
conducted by his former Church of England diocese and subsequently
also by his current Roman Catholic diocese (to whom the Church of
England had passed a short, written summary of allegations that
contained inaccuracies and omitted mention of Father Griffin’s earlier
suicide attempt on learning of his HIV status).
1
Father Griffin did not abuse children. He did not have sex with young
people under the age of 18. He did not visit prostitutes. He did not
endanger the lives of others by having sex with people whilst an HIV risk.
And there was no evidence that he did any of these things. He was an
HIV positive (viral load undetectable) gay priest.
Death by suicide.”
4
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
The investigation into Father Griffin began because the head of
operations of the Anglican Diocese of London & Westminster was retiring
in 2019, and suggested to his archdeacon that he undertake a “brain
dump” of information he had acquired over the preceding 20 years. The
archdeacon agreed.
The two met in early February 2019, and then subsequently with the
director of human resources (HR) & safeguarding, and a note taker. The
head of operations’ recollections were used to create a document called
the Two Cities audit report 2019, describing 42 members of the clergy of
the London & Westminster Diocese of the Church of England (CofE).
5
CORONER’S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving
rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur
unless action is taken. In the circumstances, it is my statutory duty to
report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.
1. The purpose of the meetings with the head of operations was not
made clear to all who attended. The 42 entries ranged from
descriptions of past convictions that had been dealt with and
recorded, through current safeguarding concerns that might or
might not have been acted upon, to what witnesses described as
gossip.
These 42 entries were not accompanied by signed statements
setting out distinct allegations. The origin of the information in the
entries was in places obvious and factual, but in places entirely
nebulous.
2. The head of operations’ allegations were never clearly listed at
the outset and appropriately verified with him.
2
He told me in evidence that he had never alleged that Father
Griffin had abused children. He said that he had never alleged
that Father Griffin had sex with minors. And he said that he had
never alleged that Father Griffin had sex whilst HIV+ and believing
himself to be an infection risk. His recollection was confirmed by
others who were present.
Nevertheless, these were the allegations that were passed on to
the Roman Catholic (RC) Church by the CofE.
The head of operations told me that no safeguarding concern ever
came to his attention regarding Father Griffin. His only concern
for Father Griffin, he said, was that he was being bullied by
parishioners. However, he did not mention this bullying in the
meetings that formed the basis of the Two Cities report.
3. What the head of operations did say in his meetings in 2019 was
that Father Griffin had told him he had “used rent boys”, which the
head of operations understood to mean he had visited adult male
prostitutes. The archdeacon emphasised the importance of this
being Father Griffin’s phrase. The phrase appeared repeatedly
throughout 2019/20 church documents relating to Father Griffin’s
actions. Notwithstanding the view expressed to me by the head
of operations that the phrase related to visiting adult male
prostitutes, it formed the basis of the allegation of sex with minors.
I put it to the director of HR & safeguarding that it is an unusual
phrase to hear in 2021, and yet the term rent boys appeared
elsewhere in the Two Cities report. She told me that the head of
operations had used the phrase from start to finish in the meetings
that led to the entries in respect of the 42 members of the clergy
in London & Westminster. However, she said in court that, as
there was no record anywhere that the head of operations had
described Father Griffin himself using this term, she now
concluded that the head of operations had not actually said this.
I recalled the head of operations on the last day of inquest to ask
if it was possible that this had in fact been his own term rather than
Father Griffin’s. He immediately said yes, the term was his term
and Father Griffin had not used it. He said that Father Griffin had
never used the term rent boys. He thought that Father Griffin was
generous with hospitality and paid for meals out and perhaps he
had misinterpreted that. He said that Father Griffin had never
actually said that he had paid for sex. Yet in an investigation
lasting over a year, the head of operations did not volunteer these
details and nobody obtained them from him.
I made a finding of fact at inquest that Father Griffin did not pay
for sex.
3
4. The archdeacon told me that he had not wanted to ask questions
of the head of operations in the meetings, even to check the
source of the information he gave, for fear of interrupting his flow.
The archdeacon was emphatic that he wanted the head of
operations to get everything out.
The way the archdeacon described the head of operations’ brain
dump meetings, seemed to me more akin to a description of the
disclosures of a victim, rather than the recollections of a twenty
year career by a retiree.
The archdeacon seemed to envisage that others might interview
the head of operations at a later stage, but nobody thought that
was needed.
Thus nobody fully explored what the head of operations actually
meant when he volunteered his recollections; what he was
actually alleging; and the source for his disclosures and any
allegations.
5. The head of operations said in evidence that he was simply giving
information, it was not his decision what information was
recorded, rather he left that to the archdeacon and the director of
HR & safeguarding.
The archdeacon told me that it was not his call to decide what was
and what was not gossip, and so he had asked the director of HR
& safeguarding to be present at subsequent meetings with the
head of operations.
The director of HR & safeguarding told me that it was not for her,
but for the safeguarding professionals to make an independent
assessment and to decide what allegations were investigated and
how.
The safeguarding manager said that she was invited to the
meetings simply as a note taker and that she had recorded
“Allegation is this person has HIV and with knowledge continued
to sleep with people” because that is what the archdeacon wrote
in his note of the first meeting with the head of operations, not
because she had made an independent assessment of this.
The archdeacon said that the first note was inaccurate, he knew
it was inaccurate because it was hastily taken down, and that is
why he had asked for a formal notetaker to attend subsequent
meetings.
However, the safeguarding manager said that nobody told her
this, and on receipt of the document describing the allegation that
he knew had not been made, the archdeacon did not correct the
document, nor did the director of HR & safeguarding.
The former police officer investigating said that the validity of
allegations should be assessed, but that he was not at the original
meetings.
4
The safeguarding adviser said that decisions about how to
proceed, such as engaging an investigator, had already been
made by the time she was brought in to take action.
Thus nobody took responsibility for steering the direction of the
process from start to finish and for making coherent, reasoned,
evidence based decisions that made sense in the context of the
information that was available to the team as a whole.
6. As I have indicated, the archdeacon told me that he placed great
weight on the information given by the head of operations that
Father Griffin had told the head of operations that he had used
rent boys. However, regarding the record of “concerns of possible
child exploitation”, the safeguarding manager told me that she had
made a mistake, and that this phrase had been mistakenly copied
and pasted from another entry.
She did not believe that there was any evidence of sexual activity
with a minor, nor any reason to investigate that, but her
typographical error was never noted and corrected, either by her
or by anyone else.
7. The safeguarding manager recommended in the same document
that legal advice should be sought before proceeding, but her
recommendation was not acted upon.
There was no record made of why this was not acted upon and
the director of HR & safeguarding told me that legal advice should
have been sought. There seemed no overarching, coherent
strategy.
8. The safeguarding adviser who was tasked by the safeguarding
manager with dealing with investigation, thought that an approach
should be made to Father Griffin by a member of the clergy on a
welfare basis. She told me she had thought that the church’s
involvement should simply be about supporting a vulnerable man.
She emailed the archdeacon asking him if the clergy could make
an approach to Father Griffin, but such an approach did not take
place, and so she herself spoke briefly to Father Griffin to make
initial contact.
During this brief conversation, Father Griffin explained that he was
now a Roman Catholic priest, so the safeguarding adviser sent an
email to her Roman Catholic safeguarding counterpart. The email
disclosed Father Griffin’s HIV status; it was inaccurate as to detail;
it did not properly represent her view of the allegations; and it did
not include reference to the fact that Father Griffin had attempted
suicide when diagnosed as HIV+ approximately nine years earlier.
5
She told me that the errors she made within this email were the
consequence of her concurrent very difficult personal
circumstances, in the context of short staffing.
The email was seen by the archdeacon and the safeguarding
manager before it was sent, but neither made any substantive
amendment.
Insufficient regard was paid to ensuring scrupulous accuracy, and
completeness of relevant information, in the communication with
a different organisation. There seemed almost to be a lack of
recognition that the Roman Catholic Church was a different
organisation.
9. The safeguarding adviser who contacted the Roman Catholic
Church told me that she viewed Father Griffin’s situation purely in
terms of welfare and supporting a vulnerable man. She said she
did not consider that there was any substance whatsoever to the
allegations.
However, she was a safeguarding officer and she contacted
another safeguarding officer, disclosing confidential information,
so this was treated as a safeguarding referral. If it was not meant
to be a safeguarding referral, then the professionals dealing with
the matter were the wrong people.
10. Thus, the allegations against Father Griffin passed on to the
Roman Catholic Church were supported by no complainant, no
witness and no accuser.
There was no concern raised by a victim of abuse, by a child,
parent, teacher, youth worker or other witness.
No person said they had been the subject of or had witnessed any
concerning behaviour, save that Father Griffin had been seen to
have dinner with men in an Italian restaurant, for which he might
have paid the bill.
The CofE safeguarding adviser finally tasked with dealing with the
matter did not consider that there was any safeguarding concern.
And yet on this basis, Alan Griffin found himself to be under
investigation for over a year, without ever having the allegations
and their source plainly set out for him.
It is rare that I write at such length in a prevention of future deaths report.
6
Usually, I find that I am able to summarise matters of concern succinctly.
However, in this instance I find that I am unable to convey the breadth of
the systemic and individual failings that have come to light during the
course of this inquest without such a level of detail, and I am worried that
if I do not include this detail then learning will be lost.
This is particularly in the context of the lack of full engagement by the
Church of England in the inquest process until June 2021.
It is often the case that organisations have already themselves
recognised their errors and have undertaken meaningful attempts at
improvement by the time of the inquest. This was not the case here.
It was only after the inquest had been resumed and part heard in May
2021, and witnesses from the Church of England had been called to give
evidence in late June 2021, that the Church of England decided that a
learning lessons review would be worthwhile.
With the notable exception of the safeguarding advisor who was finally
tasked with the investigation into Father Griffin, I found in the main that
a lack of appropriately meaningful reflection had been undertaken by the
witnesses from the Church of England.
I then received submissions on behalf of the Church of England
regarding any prevention of future deaths report. These submissions
impressed upon me that referrals to child protection and safeguarding
professionals must not be reduced and urged me not to include any
concerns that may be taken as a criticism of clerics or staff for not filtering
or verifying allegations.
It seems to me that a duty of care and competence in a situation such as
this one is not in any way incompatible with the moral duty we all have,
and the legal duty that bodies such as the church have, to try to keep
children and the vulnerable safe. That this appears to be in issue for the
Church of England confirmed my preliminary view that, reluctantly and
unusually, I should write in the detail that I have in this report.
6
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion, action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I
believe that you have the power to take such action.
7
YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date
of this report, namely by 3 September 2021. I, the coroner, may extend
the period.
7
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain
why no action is proposed.
8
COPIES and PUBLICATION
I have sent a copy of my report to the following.
, sister in law of Father Griffin
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
, chair, Charity Commission for England & Wales
• HHJ Thomas Teague QC, Chief Coroner of England & Wales
, partner of Father Griffin
, friends
, formerly of the CofE Diocese
, formerly of the CofE Diocese
, chair, Catholic Standards Safeguarding Agency
I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief
Coroner and all interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.
I may also send a copy of your response to any other person who I
believe may find it useful or of interest.
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who
he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make
representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about
the release or the publication of your response.
9
DATE SIGNED BY SENIOR CORONER
09.07.21 ME Hassell
8
Regulation 28: Prevention of Future Deaths report
Alan Howard Foster GRIFFIN (died 08.11.20)
THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:
1.
Chair
Catholic Standards Safeguarding Agency
39 Eccleston Square
London SW1V 1BX
1
CORONER
I am: Coroner ME Hassell
Senior Coroner
Inner North London
St Pancras Coroner’s Court
Camley Street
London N1C 4PP
2
CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS
I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013,
regulations 28 and 29.
3
INVESTIGATION and INQUEST
On 12 November 2020, one of my assistant coroners, Sarah Bourke,
commenced an investigation into the death of Alan Howard Foster
Griffin, aged 76 years. The investigation concluded at the end of the
inquest on 2 July 2021. I made a narrative determination as follows.
“Alan Griffin hanged himself at home on Sunday, 8 November 2020.
He killed himself because he could not cope with an investigation into his
conduct, the detail of and the source for which he had never been told.
The investigation had been ongoing for over a year and was being
conducted by his former Church of England diocese and subsequently
also by his current Roman Catholic diocese (to whom the Church of
England had passed a short, written summary of allegations that
contained inaccuracies and omitted mention of Father Griffin’s earlier
suicide attempt on learning of his HIV status).
1
Father Griffin did not abuse children. He did not have sex with young
people under the age of 18. He did not visit prostitutes. He did not
endanger the lives of others by having sex with people whilst an HIV risk.
And there was no evidence that he did any of these things. He was an
HIV positive (viral load undetectable) gay priest.
Death by suicide.”
4
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH
Information was passed to a diocesan safeguarding adviser of the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster, by a diocesan safeguarding
adviser of the Church of England Diocese of London & Westminster,
regarding Alan Griffin. Father Griffin had previously left the Church of
England and had taken holy orders in the Roman Catholic Church. After
receipt of some information, the Roman Catholic safeguarding team
investigated.
5
CORONER’S CONCERNS
During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving
rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur
unless action is taken. In the circumstances, it is my statutory duty to
report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.
1. The safeguarding team of the Roman Catholic Diocese of
Westminster did not exercise sufficient professional scrutiny of the
allegations that came to them from the Anglican safeguarding
team. This was partly because they gained a false sense of
security from the fact that the allegations came from the Church
of England.
However, there was more that could have been done to establish
the exact nature of the allegations and whether these were
credible. The Catholic safeguarding team asked for disclosure
from the Anglican safeguarding team and most particularly for the
source of the allegations. When they did not receive either of
these, they should have insisted.
2. The Catholic safeguarding team met with Father Griffin on 23
June 2020 to discuss his DBS check. That would have been an
ideal opportunity to discuss the Church of England allegations that
the
would have shortened
opportunity was lost.
the process considerably and
2
3. Father Griffin then asked to know the allegations against him
before he attended another meeting with
the Catholic
safeguarding team. The safeguarding team felt that the
information was not theirs to give because it came from the
Church of England, but Father Griffin should have been provided
with a note of the allegations promptly.
4. The Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster was unaware of
Father Griffin’s attempted suicide nine years earlier. However, it
could still have been more proactive than it was in ensuring that
he had maximum pastoral support.
5. The Catholic safeguarding team volunteered at inquest that they
did not deal with the investigation into Father Griffin promptly and
they apologised for this. The very first telephone call was placed
to the Catholic safeguarding adviser on 30 October 2019. The
delay was therefore significant and it was harmful.
This was in part because the Catholic safeguarding team were
waiting for the engagement of the Anglican safeguarding team to
enable a joint approach to be taken. When it was clear that such
engagement was not forthcoming (whether for reasons of
sickness or anything else), the Catholic safeguarding team should
have gone back to the local authority designated officer (the
LADO) and recommended that they continue without further input
from the Church of England.
6
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN
In my opinion, action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I
believe that you have the power to take such action.
7
YOUR RESPONSE
You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date
of this report, namely by 3 September 2021. I, the coroner, may extend
the period.
Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain
why no action is proposed.
8
COPIES and PUBLICATION
I have sent a copy of my report to the following.
3
, sister in law of Father Griffin
, partner of Father Griffin
, friends
•
•
•
• Most Revd Justin Welby, CofE Archbishop of Canterbury
•
•
• Cardinal Vincent Nichols, RC Archbishop of Westminster
• HHJ Thomas Teague QC, Chief Coroner of England & Wales
, formerly of the CofE Diocese
, formerly of the CofE Diocese
I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief
Coroner and all interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.
I may also send a copy of your response to any other person who I
believe may find it useful or of interest.
The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who
he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make
representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about
the release or the publication of your response.
9
DATE SIGNED BY SENIOR CORONER
09.07.21 ME Hassell
4
2 responses published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Coroner ME Hassell Senior Coroner Inner North London St Pancras Coroner’s Court Camley Street London N1C 4PP Dear Madam 29th November 2021 This letter is sent in response to the Regulation 28: Prevention of Future Deaths report, regarding Father Alan Howard Foster Griffin, issued on 9th July 2021. You will recall I wrote on 26th August 2021 to explain the process that the CSSA would follow to review this case and respond to your report, and you kindly agreed to an extension to 30th November 2021 to submit the CSSA’s response. We have reviewed a range of documentary evidence, held interviews with key persons, and are in the process of producing a report of our review. Our review will also take into account the findings of an internal review being undertaken by the Archdiocese of Westminster and those of an independent review commissioned by the Church of England. At the outset, I must state that the CSSA shares the concerns you have raised and, as the newly established safeguarding regulator for Catholic dioceses and religious life groups in England and Wales, we are determined to do all we can to prevent similar situations from occurring in the future. I summarise below the action we have taken, or are intending to take, specifically to address your concerns. Area of Concern 1: Professional Scrutiny of Allegations The safeguarding team of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster did not exercise sufficient professional scrutiny of the allegations that came to them from the Anglican safeguarding team. Response of the CSSA National Safeguarding Policy and Practice Guidance a. Whilst national safeguarding policies and practice guidance are issued by the CSSA, these do not remove the need for safeguarding practitioners to exercise proper scrutiny and to apply professional Catholic Safeguarding Agency Ltd www.catholicsafeguarding.org.uk 39 Eccleston Square London, SW1V 1BX Catholic Safeguarding Standards Agency is a trading name of Catholic Safeguarding Agency Ltd. Registered in England & Wales, Company Reg 13182385 judgement in responding to allegations or concerns that are raised. To support the training being developed the CSSA is producing professional development resources. b. To support reflection and critical thinking in intra-agency or inter-agency meetings, the CSSA is developing a template form to be used in casework meetings. The template will include all areas that need to be considered and addressed and will act as a prompt to safeguarding practitioners. c. The CSSA is updating its practice guidance on the management of allegations and concerns, to provide for situations where concerns are raised but the information cannot immediately be clarified or verified. The guidance will give a timescale within which the information must be clarified or verified, what action must be taken if this cannot be achieved (i.e., escalation to the Safeguarding Sub-Committee for consideration and decision as to next steps). The practice guidance developed in each of these areas will be considered by the CSSA Board in December 2021 and February 2022 with a view to being issued to Church bodies by the end of March 2022. Training The CSSA national training lead is developing a suite of training for those in leadership and management in safeguarding roles within Church bodies. Work has commenced and the training modules, which will include mandatory modules on reflection and professional curiosity and on the provision of support to those about whom allegations or concerns have been raised, and they will be rolled out over the course of 2022. Area of Concern 2: Management of allegations and support for those against whom allegations have been made ▪ Father Griffin should have been provided with a note of the allegations promptly. ▪ The Catholic safeguarding team did not deal with the investigation into Father Griffin promptly. The delay was significant, and it was harmful. ▪ The Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster could have been more proactive than it was in ensuring that Father Griffin had maximum pastoral support. Response of the CSSA National Safeguarding Standards On 27th October 2021, the CSSA launched its new national Safeguarding Standards, which can be viewed at: https://www.catholicsafeguarding.org.uk/national-safeguarding-standards/the-standards/ Standard 5 relates specifically to the management and support of those who are the subject of allegations and concerns, and requires church bodies to: ▪ Adhere to national policies and/or practice guidance that set out how a respondent is to be informed when an allegation has been made and supported thereafter; ▪ Be mindful of the impact on the wellbeing of the respondent and appoint a support person with the responsibility for listening to and addressing the pastoral needs of the respondent; Catholic Safeguarding Agency Ltd www.catholicsafeguarding.org.uk 39 Eccleston Square London, SW1V 1BX Catholic Safeguarding Standards Agency is a trading name of Catholic Safeguarding Agency Ltd. Registered in England & Wales, Company Reg 13182385 ▪ Access suitably accredited professionals to deliver professional mental health and other appropriate support when required; ▪ Ensure that the respondent has access to suitable legal representation when subject to statutory/canonical investigation. CSSA Audit Programme The CSSA is preparing its audit programme for 2022, and the Diocese of Westminster will be audited during the year. Compliance with Standard 5 will be tested through robust audit processes. Where it is found that improvements need to be made, the CSSA will ensure that action plans are implemented, and progress will be monitored. National Safeguarding Policy and Practice Guidance There is considerable existing practice guidance on Church bodies’ responsibilities towards clergy and religious against whom allegations have been made, including on conducting an initial meeting with an individual against whom allegations have been made. In view of this case, that guidance will be updated to emphasise the importance of promptly informing individuals of allegations made against them, of completing safeguarding investigations in a timely manner, and of ensuring that support needs are identified and met throughout. Training Training on Mental Health First Aid will be made available as part of the national training programme, to teach safeguarding personnel how to spot signs and symptoms of mental ill health and feel confident in guiding them to the appropriate support. This training will be part of the national training programme rolled out throughout 2022. Additional Areas of Concern and CSSA Actions During our review, we have identified some additional areas of concern relating to the outcome of inter- agency meetings and the supervision of casework. I set out below the actions we are taking to address these concerns. Inter-agency working The CSSA has consulted with the Church of England National Safeguarding Team and agreed that we will collaborate on creating and implementing an Information Sharing Agreement between the two denominations, and a process for escalation of concerns where matters cannot be resolved by the respective safeguarding teams. Case supervision There is already national practice guidance in relation to induction, supervision, and support. Currently, the requirement is for case management supervision to be undertaken regularly. The standard will be changed to monthly (pro-rata for non-full-time roles) as a minimum with the requirement for more frequently if there are obstacles or changes that require resolution. Catholic Safeguarding Agency Ltd www.catholicsafeguarding.org.uk 39 Eccleston Square London, SW1V 1BX Catholic Safeguarding Standards Agency is a trading name of Catholic Safeguarding Agency Ltd. Registered in England & Wales, Company Reg 13182385 Casework oversight Already in progress is the development of a formal Case Consultation Committee (CCC). This has always been part of the remit of the CSSA and the proposal for it is based on a recognition of the benefits that can result from accessing high quality advice when faced with unusually challenging cases. The CCC will enable the CSSA to provide a range of expert advice on complex cases and will represent a formal means by which advice and guidance can be provided to Church bodies who wish to seek it from the CSSA. The CCC will be made up of professionals with specific expertise who meet to review a case and offer recommendations as to how it should be managed. The CCC will create a record of the advice which will be provided to the referring body along with details of the assessment of the case and the recommendations for future management. The CCC may agree a date to review progress in the case if this is considered necessary. Learning lessons Once our review is completed, the CSSA will arrange events to share learning across the Church bodies. I hope this response demonstrates the seriousness with which the CSSA has taken your report, and importance that we place on supporting safeguarding practice improvements to ensure that allegations and concerns are subjected to proper scrutiny, safeguarding investigations are conducted promptly and professionally; and that appropriate support is put in place for those who are the subject of allegations to prevent future deaths. Yours sincerely Chair Catholic Safeguarding Agency Ltd www.catholicsafeguarding.org.uk 39 Eccleston Square London, SW1V 1BX Catholic Safeguarding Standards Agency is a trading name of Catholic Safeguarding Agency Ltd. Registered in England & Wales, Company Reg 13182385
Response by the Diocese of London and Lambeth Palace to the Regulation 28 Report (9 July 2021) to the Church of England in relation to the death by suicide of Fr Alan Griffin on 8 November 2020. 1. Introduction The Diocese of London and Lambeth Palace wish to thank the Coroner for writing to the Archbishop of Canterbury and bringing to our attention the various matters of concern that were prompted by her investigation into the tragic death of Father Alan Griffin. Those concerns have been shared with and considered carefully by the various Church Institutions. We have formed a Case Steering Group, with representatives including the Diocese of London, the National Safeguarding Team (NST), Lambeth Palace, and an independent professional member of the Diocese of London’s Safeguarding Steering Group to oversee both this response and our next steps. This report is our collective response on behalf of the Church of England to your Report to Prevent Future Deaths dated 9 July 2021, in accordance with the provisions of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 2. Aims The Diocese of London and Lambeth Palace express their deep regret and sorrow at the death of Fr Alan Griffin. We acknowledge that there were either poor processes or systems, or mistakes, that led to unreasonable pressures on Fr Alan and we take responsibility for what went wrong. This response is prepared to assure the Chief Coroner of the Diocese’s commitment to change, ongoing learning and improvement. We will seek to respond to the key points that have been raised by the Coroner in criticism of the Diocese of London’s handling of the concerns relating to Fr Alan, to set out current and future actions to improve our handling of conduct and safeguarding concerns, and to set out measures to mitigate the risk of any future suicide by someone who is the subject of such concerns within the Church of England. We are also committed to undertaking a Lessons Learned Review and implementing any necessary actions (see section 5). 3. Other parties We are committed to doing whatever we can in partnership with our colleagues in the Roman Catholic Church to improve our joint management of matters that affect people within both our Churches. 4. Immediate first steps We had already made a Serious Incident Report to the Charity Commission, and this has been updated since the publication of the R28 Report. As a result of the concerns that the Coroner raised in her report, we have revised the terms of reference initially proposed for the Lessons Learned Review and have taken steps towards appointing 1 an experienced, independent reviewer,1 not previously known to or associated with the Diocese of London, who is able to give rigorous external scrutiny to the safeguarding systems and processes of the Diocese of London as applied in this case. To ensure good process, we have consulted the independent professional members of the Diocese of London’s Safeguarding Steering Group (part of the governance of the Diocese of London) and are engaging with the close family and friends of Fr Griffin who were registered as Interested Parties for the purposes of the Inquest, about these Terms of Reference. 5. Lessons Learned Review We aim to agree the Terms of Reference by early September with the intention of the Lessons Learned Review (“the Review”) beginning in September 2021. The purpose and objectives of the Review are currently as follows: 5.1 This Review will examine the Diocese of London’s handling of information relating to the late Fr Alan Griffin in the light of the ten specific concerns and three further issues set out in Section 5 of the Coroner’s Regulation 28 Report. The Review will set out a simple and accessible chronology of events. It will identify lessons to be learned and how they should be acted on, which will enable the Diocese of London and the Church of England to take steps to enhance and improve their handling of matters relating to conduct and safeguarding. 5.2 5.3 The Review will consider the effectiveness of procedures, areas of service improvement and development needs and will establish what lessons can be learned regarding the way in which information is responded to, recorded, assessed, shared, and managed. 5.4 The overall purpose of the Review is to promote learning and improve practice, not to 5.5 apportion blame. It will make recommendations about what could be done better in the Church of England to help prevent such a death taking place again. 5.6 With the cooperation of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster, it will seek to understand how information was shared and acted upon between the Diocese of London and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster and set out lessons that should be learned to improve this. The full Terms of Reference (subject to consultation) will be published on the Diocese of London website when consultations are complete (anticipated early September 2021). 6. Initial actions Although we do not wish to pre-empt the findings of the independent Lessons Learned Review, and appreciate that we will need to make decisions about any recommendations that the Reviewer makes, we have recognized and are making the following early improvements to our capacity, capability, and practice: In the Diocese of London: • The newly appointed Head of Safeguarding began in post at the beginning of August. He has over 30 years policing experience and extensive experience of safeguarding, multi-agency working, leadership and systems and performance improvement. • In September 2021 a new Diocesan Safeguarding Advisor (DSA) will begin, filling the remaining vacant post. An additional Safeguarding Advisor has also been appointed who will begin in October, taking our DSA headcount from 3.6 to 4.6 FTE. 1 This will not now be the Independent Chair of the Diocese of Exeter Safeguarding Steering Group as set out in the Diocese’s legal submissions of 28 June 2021 to the Coroner. 2 • Our new Head of Safeguarding has already started working with the team to design and implement new systems of information capture, triage, recording, assessment and appropriate sharing of safeguarding and conduct matters. These issues will form part of our overarching improvement plan. • Specific initial actions include: 1. Ensuring a single safeguarding referral line and inbox, to enable capture and triage of information. 2. The development of a referral/triage system, with supervision from the Head of Safeguarding, to ensure that matters are separated out into safeguarding, non- safeguarding conduct, and “other” issues, ensuring an initial and ongoing assessment of risk (including mental health) and with appropriate follow up action by a designated case holder. 3. The development of a casework management tracking system for all referrals into the safeguarding team to record timely progress against key milestones and ensure a structured review process (including risk and mental health) during the lifetime of a case. 4. Delivering additional GDPR training specific to safeguarding to ensure staff in the Diocesan Safeguarding Team are competent and confident to ensure information that is shared is recorded and audited, and that the principles of information sharing are applied lawfully and proportionately. In due course this will be delivered to senior staff involved in handling personal and safeguarding related data to support their practice and decision making. 5. A protocol for the management of possible serious incidents, both by the Diocesan Safeguarding Team and the Diocese as a whole. • • • • The Head of Safeguarding will also be working with the Director of HR and Safeguarding to identify additional resource requirements to ensure necessary support for these areas of activity and improvement. The role of Head of Operations for the Two Cities Area was restructured prior to the appointment of a new Operations Manager. This now ensures that the post holder relates only to financial and property matters, with clear accountability and supervision. Informed by these initiatives and by our own experience, the Diocese of London has continued to develop our approach to clergy wellbeing. A range of support groups, sources of therapeutic support, (and grants to pay for it) have been made available, and we have developed web resources relating to physical and mental wellbeing for clergy and their households https://www.london.anglican.org/clergy-wellbeing/. In addition to diocesan support, the Diocese has offered parishes a framework for supporting their clergy https://www.london.anglican.org/clergy- wellbeing/#2_Tools_for_Reflection_and_Action_on_Clergy_Wellbeing. This has been communicated via focussed messages from the Bishop to her clergy, and via training events, especially during the pandemic. We know that we have more to do and recognise the need to develop these tools with our clergy. Our website invites those making use of the resources to suggest additions and amendments. The specific circumstances of this case were such that Fr Griffin no longer considered himself to be a member of the Church of England and had retired from the Diocese of London in 2011. As a result, is it is hard to say whether these improvements would have been accessed by Fr Alan, nevertheless, the wider Church has instigated a number of support tools which are accessible to all clergy. We will continue to work with clergy to improve our support for clergy about whom concerns are raised. 3 • Over the last two years, the Diocese of London, along with all other dioceses in the Church of England, have been undertaking a Past Cases Review of safeguarding cases in line with the House of Bishop’s Practice Guidance. In total, over 5000 files have been reviewed in the Diocese of London: in parishes, in diocesan offices, and those held by the Diocesan Safeguarding Team. We are investigating any information or allegations that appear not to have been dealt with satisfactorily in the past, and, where possible, providing support for both those about whom concerns have been raised and those who are survivors of or complainants about historic abuse. Following implementation of the initial actions by the new Head of Safeguarding relating to this matter, we aim to ensure good management of these cases. Our project team, working with an Independent Reviewer, has gathered data about casework management and practice and has made recommendations that will be reviewed by the new Head of Safeguarding as we develop an Improvement Plan. Key areas for improvement include consistency of practice, ongoing risk management and oversight, and ensuring ongoing timely progress regarding the management of cases. In and with the National Safeguarding Team: The National Safeguarding Team (NST) has responsibility for delivering and improving safeguarding across the Church of England. The NST is leading on several projects which will address some of the issues raised in the R28 report. • National Casework Management System A national case management system which has a wide range of specifications which will bring the following benefits to how safeguarding information/investigations are recorded and managed. o A consistent approach to quality case work practice and recording in line with agreed House of Bishops’ expectations. o Identify and record risks and support required for victims/survivors and those that have been accused. o Integration with the clergy data from the HR system to ensure accurate records. o The ability to improve the information available to key safeguarding professionals in relation to individuals and any risk issues that are identified. The pilot phase for this project starts in November 2021 and will be implemented across the Church of England in 2022. • Information Sharing Project This project seeks to strengthen information sharing arrangements by putting in place an information sharing protocol and information sharing agreement in place for safeguarding information. The project was established as a result of a recommendation from the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) to focus on sharing information with the Church of Wales and statutory agencies. We will work with the Roman Catholic Church to implement a similar information sharing agreement. • Engagement with Diocesan Safeguarding Advisors Learning from Fr Griffin’s death has been shared with Diocesan Safeguarding Advisors along with a reminder of the House of Bishops’ Safeguarding guidance and support that is available for people who are vulnerable or at risk of suicide. 4 • Engagement with Diocesan Bishops The National Safeguarding Team will write to all Diocesan Bishops and Chairs of Diocesan Independent Safeguarding Panels in England to remind them that they should be meeting together at least once a year and, among other matters, receiving assurance that safeguarding processes are working well. • Policy Review The NST is in the process of reviewing the suite of safeguarding policies which includes the policy covering the management of actions to be taken when safeguarding concerns are received. The current managing allegation policy does detail the support offered to a respondent in a safeguarding investigation Responding PG V2.pdf (churchofengland.org) 7. A note on IICSA and our response in the context of its findings The Independent Inquiry Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) was a wide-ranging inquiry into many British Institutions. Its conclusions pertain not only to the protection of children but to all aspects of the safeguarding of children and vulnerable adults. It reported in October 2020 in relation to Safeguarding in the Church of England and Church in Wales The Anglican Church - Safeguarding in the Church of England and the Church in Wales - Investigation Report | IICSA Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. The Church of England accepted the recommendations made by the inquiry in full. The Church of England has published a detailed response to the recommendations focusing on response to victims and survivors including redress, structure and independence, information sharing, revision of the Clergy Discipline Measure and external audits. 15.04 IICSA - Response to recommendations FINAL AC Council.pdf (churchofengland.org) 2 To deliver these recommendations successfully, an IICSA safeguarding programme has been set up by the National Safeguarding Team. The implications of these recommendations for the matters considered in this response are important. Both the IICSA recommendations and the existing House of Bishop’s Guidance to clergy are strong and clear in their instruction that all safeguarding concerns or allegations should be reported to the Diocesan Safeguarding Team in the first instance and in any event within 24 hours, and that it is those professionals who should decide, independently, whether investigation or action needs to follow. This is to ensure untrained clergy are not investigating or using their own judgement, and to establish consistency of process. Although elements of our response to and handling of the concerns about Fr Griffin fell well short of good practice and need improvement, the principle of reporting, without investigation or filtering, of safeguarding concerns to qualified professionals, is one which is well established and one which we defend. See also section 7, additional matters. 2 IICSA Response: Recommendation 1, Part 1, role of the Diocesan Safeguarding Officer. P1. Responding to Safeguarding Concerns or Allegations that relate to Children, Young People and Vulnerable Adults 2018. “Inform DSA/nominated safeguarding officer and seek advice within 24 hours. Record all conversations and actions taken and retain securely.” P19 5 8. Initial responses to the Coroner’s Criticisms Although we do not wish to pre-empt the findings of the Lessons Learned Review as we are committed to learning from the Reviewer’s findings and recommendations, it is important that we offer an initial factual response to the Coroner’s findings, both to acknowledge obvious failings and to correct any misperceptions which may be barriers to full learning. The Coroner’s key points are summarized here, and the full table can be found in her Regulation 28 Report. Action already completed Action proposed We have created a single safeguarding referral line and inbox, to enable capture and triage of information and to ensure that these are the single points of entry for referrals into the safeguarding team. The concern reporting form is being updated and will be reissued shortly. This will prompt full disclosures including pointing to relevant evidence and witnesses. We will identify additional training and communications for the safeguarding team and senior staff regarding the handling of safeguarding disclosures or receipt of safeguarding concerns. Further actions will be informed by the Review and will be developed by the new Head of Safeguarding, who has extensive experience of managing allegations, supervising staff, and keeping track of casework. We now make sole use of the safeguarding inbox for referrals, preventing information being sent to individual recipient’s inboxes. Both of these actions will ensure better oversight of any potential safeguarding referral, and ensure appropriate handling, including seeking evidence and witnesses. Coroner’s finding - summary 1. The purpose of the meetings with the Head of Operations was not made clear to all who attended. The nature and origin of the allegations was not clear, and they were not evidenced/ witnessed. Response The purpose of the meetings was stated in the meetings and the notes of those meetings. However, it is accepted that not all those present may have understood this. Although some of the concerns relating to other people were evidenced and had been dealt with, we accept that the concerns raised in respect of Fr Griffin were unsubstantiated. 6 2. The Head of Operations’ allegations were never clearly listed at the outset or appropriately verified with him, yet were passed on to the Roman Catholic Church We accept that the information shared by the Head of Operations was not verified with him. We accept that good practice around evidence gathering, verification, and evaluation of information prior to action was lacking. We have recruited a new Head of Safeguarding with high level experience of investigation, supervision, and quality assurance. Legal advice has been taken on Data Protection issues arising. GDPR training is being given to the safeguarding team in September 2021 by the National Church Institutions. 3. Lack of clarity about the use of the term “rent boys”. Whilst this was the term used in the initial disclosure, it is unacceptable for it to have been used in subsequent communications; we should have challenged and corrected its use. We accept that there was clarification neither of the term used nor of its origin (ie by whom it was used) in the meetings that took place. The single referral form for all safeguarding concerns will prompt those recording disclosures to be clear, as much as is practicably possible, as to the origin of information and to take steps to ensure that it is appropriately verified or investigated by the safeguarding team. We will also ensure that appropriate terminology is used. The Head of Safeguarding will ensure staff are competent and confident to risk assess any information to be shared and that future decisions are recorded and audited. The National Safeguarding Team have been developing formal information sharing protocols for all dioceses. These will be implemented in the Diocese of London once completed and will facilitate appropriate sharing of information with statutory services and also other trusted partners, such as faith organisations. Further actions will be informed by the Review and will be developed by the new Head of Safeguarding. We will continue to ensure that any relevant background information stored on clergy blue (HR) files is made available to members of the safeguarding team, that DBS and safeguarding training records are up to date and accessible, and that we have better systems for tracking file access and transfer. 7 4. Lack of interrogation of the Head of Operations’ recollections, leading to lack of clarity about allegations, sources, or evidence. 5. No one took responsibility for triaging, verifying, or assessing the allegations and deciding how they should be acted upon. 6. The introduction of an error recording “concerns of possible child exploitation.” 7. That no one took legal advice before proceeding and that no one developed an overarching, coherent strategy for dealing with the concerns relating to Father Alan. New Leadership and Senior Leadership Development Pathway training equips leaders better for handling disclosures and discerning how professional judgement might best be exercised. This is currently being delivered in the Diocese of London as part of the delivery across all dioceses. This process will be further commented on by the Review but is informed by the Church of England’s response to IICSA findings and remains wider Church of England policy. In addition, see above re skillset of new Head of Safeguarding. A case work tracking system has been developed for all referrals into the safeguarding team. This includes a clear process for the receipt and triage of allegations and concerns, and for recording timely progress against key milestones. It is not possible to quality assure all internal documents; however, we will ensure good working practices and closer supervision are established. We acknowledge the inherent challenge in deciding what is a safeguarding concern, and what degree of evidence is needed in order to investigate. However, the Diocese of London and Church of England is bound by House of Bishops’ Guidance which signposts all safeguarding concerns to the Diocesan Safeguarding Team (DST). The presumption in favour of reporting to a safeguarding professional is strong. We fully accept that there was no subsequent verification of the information shared by/with the Head of Operations. We agree there was not a clear system for tracking progress or assigning responsibility for oversight. This must be corrected. We agree this was mistake and is a matter of regret. This description was entered into the spreadsheet referred to above as part of the Two Cities report, which was an internal document. It was not shared with the RC church as part of the referral. We agree that this did not happen. It had been recommended that legal advice should be taken, but this was not followed up. 8 Further actions will be informed by the Review and will be developed by the new Head of Safeguarding. We will further develop systems for tracking and monitoring actions. Further actions will be informed by the Review and will be developed by the new Head of Safeguarding. We will ensure the appropriate resourcing of the safeguarding team to enable this to take place. See section 2 above This will also prompt the offer/provision of support for those about whom concerns have been raised. We will further develop systems for tracking and monitoring actions. 8. That the Diocese of London DSA referred information about Fr Griffin to the Roman Catholic Church, including disclosure of his HIV status. That checking of this referral took place by the Safeguarding Manager and Archdeacon, but no one recognized this passing on of information as inappropriate. 9. That welfare and investigation were confused in the DSA’s referral to the Roman Catholic Church. Legal advice has been taken on Data Protection issues arising and learning from this has been identified. GDPR training is being given to the safeguarding team in October 2021 by the data protection lead from the National Church Institutions (NCIs). The National Safeguarding Team has been developing information sharing protocols between dioceses, statutory services, and other faith organisations which will form a basis for practice across the Church of England including the Diocese of London. We have recruited a new Head of Safeguarding with high level experience of investigation, supervision, and quality assurance. Oversight from the Head of Safeguarding will ensure that DSAs are more closely supervised, and clear case management strategies are put in place. We fully accept that further steps should have been taken to verify this Information before it was shared, even though it was being shared with a trusted safeguarding professional in the Roman Catholic Church. We accept that there was no written record of a risk assessment or of the wellbeing issues arising. Legal advice was not taken regarding the detail of the disclosure, and we also recognize that no information sharing protocol was in place that would have prompted further reflection. Whilst planning conversations did take place between the Diocese of London and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster prior to the proposed meeting with Fr Griffin to agree the nature of that meeting (which was in part to verify the information which had been passed on), this was not recorded. Opportunities to establish a clear plan for joint investigation and pastoral care between the two denominations were missed. We will ensure development of a Diocesan Suicide Action Plan and ensure that this is actioned as appropriate. Agreement to be developed about good practice for joint investigations between denominations. Record keeping needs to be further improved and practices will be overseen by the new Head of Safeguarding. Improved plans developed for ensuring pastoral care 9 10. That the allegations passed on had no complainant, no witness, and no accuser; that no concern had been raised by a victim of abuse, a child, parent, teacher, youth worker, or other witness; and that these led to an investigation lasting over a year, with the allegations and their source never being plainly put to Fr Griffin. Case management and tracking need to be further improved to ensure timely handling, communications, and resolution. Further actions will be informed by the Review and will be developed by the new Head of Safeguarding. We are further reviewing resource requirements to ensure future resilience. The way the information was documented and passed to the Roman Catholic church is a matter of deep regret for the Diocese of London. Whilst initial actions were completed in a timely way, we recognise the contribution of the Diocese of London to subsequent delays once Father Alan had been made aware of this matter. We also recognise that the strategy for managing the case was not clear. The single Referral Form coupled with the process for triage and safeguarding verification will support improvement, together with the information sharing protocols and training referred to above See above comments in section 9. There have been resilience and capacity issues in the Diocesan Safeguarding Team, relating to illness, bereavement, and the pandemic, which are being addressed. Once the new Diocesan Safeguarding Advisors begin in September and October, there will be increased safeguarding team capacity. Additional matters In addition to the ten matters of concern set out above, the coroner made specific criticisms in respect of the following matters to which the Diocese of London offers responses as follows: • The Diocese of London’s lack of engagement with the inquest process until June 2021 We apologise for the delay and for the points at which we did not engage as effectively as we could have done. Whilst we had initially confirmed to the Coroner’s office that a legal representative was being instructed, we now recognise that the details were not subsequently confirmed to them. This was an oversight. As a result, we did not request Interested Party status until 3 June 2021. Despite this, we were actively engaged in preparation for the Inquest. We will ensure that learning is drawn from this, and appropriate actions taken. • Lack of any meaningful attempt at improvement until later June 2021. It is a matter of significant regret that, even following the death of Father Griffin, there were a number of lost opportunities to review learning from the handling of this case prior to the Inquest. By the time of the inquest, the Diocese of London had agreed a Lessons Learned Review and had begun the process of drafting Terms of Reference. The scope of that review has now been extended and the Diocese of London has taken steps towards appointing an experienced, independent reviewer who is able to give rigorous external scrutiny both to this case and to any attendant issues within the safeguarding systems and processes of the Diocese of London. • Finally, the coroner responded to the legal submissions made on 28 June 2021 in these terms: I then received submissions on behalf of the Church of England regarding any prevention of future deaths report. These submissions impressed upon me that referrals to child protection and safeguarding professionals must not be reduced and urged me not to include any 10 concerns that may be taken as a criticism of clerics or staff for not filtering or verifying allegation. The aim of making this submission to the Coroner was not to deflect criticism away from clergy or staff if they had acted inappropriately. It was made in the context of the IICSA recommendations and in the light of existing House of Bishop’s Guidance to the clergy that state that clergy must refer all safeguarding concerns or allegations to the Diocesan Safeguarding Team in the first instance and in any event within 24 hours (see 6, above). This is to ensure untrained clergy are not investigating or using their own judgement, and to establish consistency of process. We believe that our clergy and staff acted in accordance with this Guidance and we were concerned that any criticism of them for following it might deter others from the appropriate reporting of safeguarding concerns Our submission, therefore, was intended to ask the Coroner to bear in mind when making her findings that all clergy and staff are obliged to follow this Guidance. The Guidance is clear that it is inappropriate for clergy and staff to filter or investigate any apparent or alleged safeguarding related concerns and instructs them to refer these directly to safeguarding professionals. The Church of England has worked hard to ensure that all clergy and staff are clear about their reporting obligations. We were and are keen that this good work is not undermined. For completeness the relevant Diocese of London submission is included here: If, despite these submissions, the learned coroner remains minded to issue a regulation 28 report, she is urged not to include any concerns that may be taken as a criticism of clerics or staff for not filtering or verifying allegations. The learned Coroner has heard that the events in question took place in the context of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA). The purpose of the Inquiry, as set out in its terms of reference, is to consider the extent to which State and non-State institutions have failed in their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation. The Diocese of London is deeply committed to child protection and wishes to avoid anything that may have the unintended consequences of reducing referrals to child protection and safeguarding professionals. Case Steering Group: , General Secretary of the Diocese of London , Bishop of Stepney , Interim National Director of Safeguarding , Bishop at Lambeth (alternate ) , independent member of the London Diocesan Safeguarding Steering Group Date: 24 August 2021 11 Appendix 1 Church of England Structures and Safeguarding Policy This information is offered to demonstrate the Church of England and each individual diocese’s framework for dealing with safeguarding and conduct matters. It explains how leadership is exercised in the Church and sets individual actions in Fr Griffin’s case in the light of church structures and policies. The Church of England is made up of 42 dioceses. Each diocese has a lead bishop, known as a diocesan bishop, who works alongside a diocesan synod and a structure of boards and councils responsible for different aspects of the diocese’s work including ministry, mission, and education. Each diocese, including the Diocese of London, is a separate structure. The London Diocesan Fund (LDF) exists as the legal entity for the management of the assets and operations of the Diocese and is an independent charity. The General Synod is an assembly of bishops, clergy, and laity, which meets at least twice a year to debate and decide the Church’s laws and to discuss matters of public interest. The General Synod is a legislative body whose Measures when passed by the Ecclesiastical Committee of Parliament become statute. The House of Bishops is one of the three houses of the General Synod. All diocesan bishops are members of the House of Bishops, along with a small number of other elected bishops. Seven National Church Institutions work together to support the mission and ministries of the Church. See https://www.churchofengland.org/about/leadership-and-governance/national-church-institutions and https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/NCI%20structure%20chart%20- %20Jan%202021%20-%20website.jpg. Safeguarding in the Church of England centrally is led by the NST, under the oversight of the Archbishops’ Council. See https://www.churchofengland.org/safeguarding/reporting-abuse-and- finding-support. The NST plays a key role in developing strategy, policy, and training, and overseeing casework which has national implications, crosses diocesan boundaries, or involves bishops. They work in supportive partnership with dioceses as they manage their own casework. Safeguarding policy and practice guidance is developed by the NST but is approved by the House of Bishops and must, where relevant, be followed by all church bodies and church officers. In particular, all clergy have a duty to operate within and pay due regard to the policy and practice guidance and to disclose any safeguarding related concerns to diocesan or national safeguarding staff. Indeed, failure to do so by a member of clergy could be considered grounds for a complaint under the Clergy Disciplinary Measure. Each diocese has its own Safeguarding Team, made up of professionals with appropriate safeguarding experience, drawn from social work, police, probation services, or similar backgrounds, and with administrative support. It is the Safeguarding Team that handles all safeguarding related case work. Senior clergy, e.g. Bishops of a diocese have oversight of ministry generally and specific clergy such as Archdeacons work closely with the team on matters of safeguarding and potential clergy misconduct. However, it is the safeguarding team (along with a Core Group where appropriate) that has operational responsibility for cases and would make decisions/form judgements about the progression of safeguarding matters with appropriate consultation with senior staff. 12
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