Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2022
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2022-0110, written 11 Apr 2022. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 11 Apr 2022 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2022-0110 |
| Deceased | Tracy Wood |
| Coroner | Jacqueline Lake |
| Coroner area | Norfolk |
| Category | Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths · Mental Health related deaths |
| Organisation named | Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS . REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: Chief Executive Norfolk & Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust Hellesdon Hospital Drayton High Road Hellesdon Norwich NR6 5BE 1. CORONER I am Jacqueline LAKE, Senior Coroner for the area of Norfolk 2. CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 3. INVESTIGATION and INQUEST On 14/06/2021 I commenced an investigation into the death of Tracy Dawn WOOD aged 40. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 07/04/2022. The medical cause of death was: 1a) 1b) 1c) 1d) 2 Hypoxic Brain Injury Cardiac Arrest Asphyxiation Personality Disorder The conclusion of the inquest was: Misadventure. 4. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Tracy Wood had a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder and a history of self-harm and suicidal ideation. Tracy was admitted to Hellesdon Hospital in February 2021 as an informal patient for a proposed period of two weeks. Suitable alternative accommodation in the community was not able to be identified for Tracy until May 2021. A Behavioural Support Plan was put into place which included one to one talk time for Tracy with staff and she had regular psychological therapy. On 31 March 2021 Tracy and a note was put onto her records “ Tracy is not to be given a ”. The importance to her of one to one talk time was also highlighted in before she went for a visit in the community, the records. On 1 June 2021 Tracy was given a on the understanding it would be taken back on her return. The record was made of the decision to give Tracy a phone and told staff she required help. On going to her room Tracy was found with a was not taken back. No . At 20.53 hours Tracy called the ward due to risk of as . Tracy was assessed and said she had not intended to die. There were many meetings with Tracy the next day. There was no evidence as to in depth discussion between professionals with regard to the incidents the previous day. During 2 June 2021 Tracy presented as anxious and agitated and complained of shortness of breath. Her observations were taken on four occasions. Tracy was seen for a consultation with regard to her physical health at 20.47 until 20.48. Tracy closed the door to her room at 20.58.34. At 21.13 hours Tracy was found in her room unresponsive with a was taken to Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital. Her prognosis was poor and Tracy did not regain consciousness. Tracy died on 3 June 2021. There was no evidence that Tracy intended to die as a result of her actions . Emergency services were called and Tracy 5. CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances, it is my statutory duty to report to you. The matters of concern are as follows: 1. Tracy Wood was placed on Yare Ward, an acute ward which was staffed in accordance with “Safer staffing levels”. We heard that additional staffing could be requested if necessary. The ward was described by witnesses as “busy” and at times “chaotic”. Staff were not always available to give Tracy one to one talk time which was recognised as being important to her and for her mental wellbeing, so much so a note was placed in red and bold on her SBAR records “If we are allocated to TW 1-1 we need to make sure we are doing it, she needs consistency”. Evidence was heard that steps are being taken to recruit more staff and also to retain existing staff and that this is a national problem. The evidence was that the staffing levels are still not sufficient and that recruiting staff remains a problem 2. Following Tracy on the evening of 1 June 2021 the Duty Psychiatric Doctor was called to attend to see and assess Tracy, but did not attend. She was assessed by nursing staff but she was not seen by a Psychiatric Doctor as requested by them, until the next morning during a review meeting 3. Tracy on 30 March 2021 and a note was placed on her SBAR ”. On 1 June 2021 , at her request, before leaving the ward for a community visit. records in red and bold “Do not give Tracy Tracy was given a Evidence was heard that following a “risk assessment” it was acceptable for this decision to be made by a Band 6 Nurse when the was used off the ward and not on the ward where the original not specify whether this applied on or off the ward. There was no discussion with a Doctor or any other clinical staff when making this decision. There was no record of the being given to Tracy in the written records and no record of the rationale for the decision being made incident had occurred. The instruction not to give the did 4. Part of the Risk Assessment for giving a to Tracy was that she was to hand the to return the 5. Following Tracy back on her return to the ward. Tracy did not return the . That Tracy had been given a and was not asked was overlooked on her return. on the evening of 1 June 2021, there was no investigation as to where she obtained the instruction in the SBAR records that Tracy was not to be given a By the date of the inquest some witnesses were still unaware as to how Tracy had come by the used as a 6. Following Tracy on 1 June 2021, there was a review meeting and then a Multi Disciplinary Team Meeting. She had a meeting with the Psychologist later that day. No evidence was heard that there was a review of her hourly observations with. Some witnesses were still unaware as to what Tracy had , despite there being a bold, red . 7. Written records did not specify correct dates and times as to events, for instance the Event Date/Time of the Notes as “02 Jun 2021 06:49”. Tracy’s date of death is recorded as 5 June 2021 and her date of birth in the SBAR records is recorded as 1 May 1981, when it is the 1 June 1981. incident on 1 June 2021 at 20:53 hours is recorded in the Clinical 8. Certain events are not included in the records, for example that a had been given to Tracy on 1 June 2021 on her going off ward, contrary to the instruction contained in the SBAR records and of 121 Talk times with Tracy. Evidence was heard that steps are being taken to improve record keeping. However this matter has been raised with NSFT previously and evidence from one witness at the inquest was that not “every discussion” with a service user is recorded in the Clinical Record and that entries are made by one allocated person on a shift who will be told orally what to put by members of staff. This witness had had a 30 to 40 on 1 June and talk time minute one to one meeting with Tracy the day prior to her with Tracy on the day following her helpful to other staff and regarded of some importance to Tracy’s care on 1 June, details of which may have been 9. On Tracy being found on the 2 June 2021 with a around her neck, emergency life- saving equipment was not brought immediately to Tracy’s room. Monitoring equipment was obtained by a member of staff who gave evidence they were unaware Tracy was not breathing. On return to Tracy’s room the emergency “crash bag” was then requested and obtained. 10. A draft Patient Safety Incident Investigation Report (PSII) has been prepared. Evidence was heard that this is now used rather than a Serious Incident Requiring Investigation Report and has the advantage of being “more timely” and providing more learning. The report was still in draft form at the date of the inquest (nine months following Tracy’s death) and the draft was only available to me on the morning of the first day of the inquest, despite assurances at Pre Inquest Review Hearings that it would be available prior to the inquest. 11. The PSII Report contains many inaccuracies including Tracy’s date of death, stating it to be 5 again at 21:00 on 3rd June 2021. The correct June 2021. The report refers to Tracy date is the 2 June 2021 12. The PSII report refers to the notes of the incident on 1 June 2021 that Tracy but goes on to say that in interviews a cord from her with a was used. Confusion remained as between the events on the 1 June 2021 and the 2 June 2021. The report refers to the view of the MDT meeting on 2 June was to keep Tracy on hourly observations. There is no reference in the Clinical Notes to observations being discussed. Witnesses asked about observations at the inquest could not recall observations being discussed or that they were not discussed. 13. The PSII did not involve interviews with members of staff who had involvement with Tracy in to Tracy and a the hours and days prior to her death, including staff who gave the Nurse who had regular involvement with Tracy’s care and who knew her well 14. The PSII stated that statements of members of staff “for the Coroner” were reviewed. However many of these statements contained inaccurate dates and times including the date of death. 15. The PSII does not make findings with regard to areas of concern raised at the inquest such as with regard to Tracy being given a being a bold red note contained in the records that Tracy should not be given a this was not discussed with any other senior member of staff, no record was made of the decision and the rationale for the decision, nor that the return. The PSII does not include reference to inaccurate record keeping and full records of important events not being kept. on the morning of 1 June 2021 despite there was not returned on Tracy’s , that 16. The first draft of the PSII Report contains a sentence “However, staff noted there was a lack of clinical or management leadership supervision on the ward at the time and they were often left to “firefight” with patients who they perceived carried a greater level of acute risk than Tracy.” This view of staff was not included in the final draft Report 6. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe your organisation has the power to take such action. 7. YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 03 June 2022. I, the coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 8. COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: , Parents Care Quality Commission I have also sent it to: Department of Health HSIB Healthwatch for Norfolk who may find it useful or of interest. I am also under a duty to send a copy of your response to the Chief Coroner and all interested persons who in my opinion should receive it. I may also send a copy of your response to any other person who I believe may find it useful or of interest. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response. 9. Dated: 11 April 2022 Jacqueline LAKE Senior Coroner for Norfolk Norfolk Coroner Service County Hall Martineau Lane Norwich NR1 2DH
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Ms Jacqueline Lake
Norfolk Coroner’s Service
County Hall
Martineau Lane
Norwich
NR1 2DH
Dear Ms Lake
Trust Management
Main Administration Block
Hellesdon Hospital
Drayton High Road
Norwich
NR6 5BE
31st May 2022
Chair:
Chief Executive:
I write in response to the prevention of future deaths issued on 11th April 2022 in relation to the tragic death
of Tracy Wood who died on 3rd June 2021. The inquest concluded on 7th April 2022 with a conclusion of
misadventure, a number of concerns were raised as part of the inquest process and summed up in the
conclusion. I will address these within this response but firstly would wish to extend my heartfelt condolences
and sincerely apologise to Tracy’s loved ones and friends for the sad loss of this young woman whilst under
our care.
For ease I outline the concerns raised below with our action in response:
1. Tracy Wood was placed on Yare Ward, an acute ward which was staffed in accordance with
“Safer staffing levels”. We heard that additional staffing could be requested if necessary. The
ward was described by witnesses as “busy” and at times “chaotic”. Staff were not always
available to give Tracy one to one talk time which was recognised as being important to her
and for her mental wellbeing, so much so a note was placed in red and bold on her SBAR
records “If we are allocated to TW 1-1 we need to make sure we are doing it, she needs
consistency”. Evidence was heard that steps are being taken to recruit more staff and also to
retain existing staff and that this is a national problem. The evidence was that the staffing
levels are still not sufficient, and that recruiting staff remains a problem.
The Trust has committed to ensure that staffing on all our inpatient areas is within safe limits this includes
nurses, support workers and other allied health professionals as well as medical staff. In response to
vacancies, within the context of a national shortage and retention crisis of staff in the NHS, the Trust has
embarked on an ambitious recruitment campaign which includes holding recruitment fairs across the
region, attracting overseas nurses, social media campaigns, full page adverts in national newspapers,
medical and nursing journals, continual refreshed adverts on the NHS Jobs website, incentives and
improved development opportunities.
At the time of Tracy’s stay on this ward the ward did not have a permanent Consultant Psychiatrist, this
has since changed and a permanent medic is in situ, this appointment supports the multi-disciplinary
team in providing consistency which in turn brings stability to the ward environment. Equally the senior
nursing presence has been increased with the recruitment of a Deputy Lead Nurse to support the Lead
Nurse and enhancing the Matron and Clinical Nurse Specialist cohort across the hospital site.
The inpatient wards are part of a quality improvement project to enhance and increase therapeutic
activities including 1:1 time, exercise and fitness, external and ward-based art and craft activities amongst
other initiatives.
Norfolk Headquarters
Hellesdon Hospital,
Drayton High Road, Norwich NR6 5BE
Suffolk Headquarters
Endeavour House,
8 Russell Road, Ipswich, IP21 2BX
- 2 -
2. Following Tracy self-ligaturing on the evening of 1 June 2021 the Duty Psychiatric Doctor was
called to attend to see and assess Tracy but did not attend. She was assessed by nursing
staff but she was not seen by a Psychiatric Doctor as requested by them, until the next
morning during a review meeting.
In discussion with the Matron for this area her account is that the Duty Doctor was asked to attend
however had to prioritise other tasks given that Tracy was unharmed and responding well to 1:1
discussion with the staff on the ward. This is reflected in the patient record. The next morning Tracy was
seen by her regular doctor who knew her well. It is noted within the record that the ward staff were aware
the Duty Doctor had not been able to attend but they did not escalate any further concerns for the reasons
stated. However, it is not clear if the Duty Doctor discussed this decision with the senior on-call medic;
an action for the Trust has been to improve the induction for junior and trainee doctors to include the
escalation process for both psychiatric and physical health concerns and to implement improvements to
the handover format.
3. Tracy self-ligatured with a bandage on 30 March 2021 and a note was placed on her SBAR
records in red and bold “Do not give Tracy bandages due to ligature risk”. On 1 June 2021
Tracy was given a bandage, at her request, before leaving the ward for a community visit.
Evidence was heard that following a “risk assessment” it was acceptable for this decision to
be made by a Band 6 Nurse when the bandage was used off the ward and not on the ward
where the original ligaturing incident had occurred. The instruction not to give the bandage did
not specify whether this applied on or off the ward. There was no discussion with a Doctor or any
other clinical staff when making this decision. There was no record of the bandage being given
to Tracy in the written records and no record of the rationale for the decision being
made.
Senior nursing staff at Band 6 level have completed their basic training, preceptorship programme and
gained sufficient work experience and clinical skills within an inpatient setting to enable them to be in
charge of the ward. Undertaking a risk assessment within the inpatient setting is inherent to this role and
one that our nursing staff are fully capable and supported to conduct given their clinical knowledge and
expertise.
The decision to allow Tracy to cover her self-harm wounds with a bandage whilst out on leave due to her
expressed concern and embarrassment was a reasonable, compassionate and considered decision to
make at the time albeit with hindsight one which is no doubt regretted by the staff member. This was not
the root cause of this tragic event; we would not seek to hold an individual staff member to account for
this tragedy. This is in line with the Trust’s commitment to fully embed and apply a Just Culture Framework
to incidents to aid learning, and more broadly to support staff to feel comfortable to raise concerns without
fear of blame or recrimination. This is in line with the new NHSEI Patient Safety Framework which
advocates a human factors/systems-based approach to improving safety and is fundamental to the
Trust’s cultural improvement strategy.
4. Part of the Risk Assessment for giving a bandage to Tracy was that she was to hand the
bandage back on her return to the ward. Tracy did not return the bandage and was not asked to
return the bandage. That Tracy had been given a bandage was overlooked on her return.
This is a regretful omission which was human error.
5. Following Tracy ligaturing with the bandage on the evening of 1 June 2021, there was no
investigation as to where she obtained the bandage, despite there being a bold, red
instruction in the SBAR records that Tracy was not to be given a bandage due to ligature risk.
By the date of the inquest some witnesses were still unaware as to how Tracy had come by
the bandage she had ligatured with. Some witnesses were still unaware as to what Tracy had
used as a ligature.
Norfolk Headquarters
Hellesdon Hospital,
Drayton High Road, Norwich NR6 5BE
Suffolk Headquarters
Endeavour House,
8 Russell Road, Ipswich, IP21 2BX
- 3 -
On discussion with the Matron for the ward the article used was a dressing gown cord not a bandage, it
is not clear however who this cord belonged too or if it was in fact Tracy’s own. Tracy would secrete
objects in her room to self-harm with, this was a symptom of her illness, it may be that she had obtained
this cord from another patient or indeed hidden it on admission to the ward. The fact that some staff were
not aware of this incident or what was used is of concern. The Lead Nurse and Matron for the area will
ensure that all incidents are shared through the ward safety huddles and handovers, this will be monitored
through the unannounced attendance of huddles and handovers by the Lead Nurse or Matron to embed
and role model good practice.
6. Following Tracy ligaturing on 1 June 2021, there was a review meeting and then a Multi
Disciplinary Team Meeting. She had a meeting with the Psychologist later that day. No
evidence was heard that there was a review of her hourly observations.
Tracy was an informal patient working towards discharge; within ward reviews, therapy and 1:1 sessions
there were regular discussions, which are documented, with Tracy regarding the treatment approach of
the ward which was to support and enable her to a successful discharge, and not to foster dependence
on ward staff. Increasing observations would have been a retrograde step and may have increased
Tracy’s sense of being stuck or indeed failing in her goal to be discharged to new accommodation; she
was at this time both “happy and anxious” about moving on from the ward. To enable her to do this the
team utilised clinical judgement and their knowledge of Tracy by validating her concerns, being
responsive to her needs whilst at the same time promoting independence and self-regulation.
7. Written records did not specify correct dates and times as to events, for instance the Event
Date/Time of the ligaturing incident on 1 June 2021 at 20:53 hours is recorded in the Clinical
Notes as “02 Jun 2021 06:49”. Tracy’s date of death is recorded as 5 June 2021 and her date
of birth in the SBAR records is recorded as 1 May 1981, when it is the 1 June 1981.
The issue of contemporaneous record keeping of a high standard is a priority for the Trust and we have
commissioned an external law firm to provide training to staff on this subject. This will be underway within
the next 6-8 weeks.
8. Certain events are not included in the records, for example that a bandage had been given to
Tracy on 1 June 2021 on her going off ward, contrary to the instruction contained in the SBAR
records and of 121 Talk times with Tracy. Evidence was heard that steps are being taken to
improve record keeping. However this matter has been raised with NSFT previously and
evidence from one witness at the inquest was that not “every discussion” with a service user
is recorded in the Clinical Record and that entries are made by one allocated person on a
shift who will be told orally what to put by members of staff. This witness had had a 30 to 40
minute one to one meeting with Tracy the day prior to her ligaturing on 1 June and talk time
with Tracy on the day following her ligaturing on 1 June, details of which may have been
helpful to other staff and regarded of some importance to Tracy’s care.
On discussion of this point with both the Matron and Lead Nurse for the area the allocation of one person
to update records is not common practice. This has been discussed with the ward teams and reiterated
that this is not good practice.
There have been some ICT barriers to agency staff accessing the electronic patient record historically
however this is being corrected to ensure that all staff have access and are aware of the expectation to
record contemporaneous notes individually and comprehensively, see response to question 7.
9. On Tracy being found on the 2 June 2021 with a ligature around her neck, emergency lifesaving
equipment was not brought immediately to Tracy’s room. Monitoring equipment was
obtained by a member of staff who gave evidence they were unaware Tracy was not
breathing. On return to Tracy’s room the emergency “crash bag” was then requested and
obtained.
Norfolk Headquarters
Hellesdon Hospital,
Drayton High Road, Norwich NR6 5BE
Suffolk Headquarters
Endeavour House,
8 Russell Road, Ipswich, IP21 2BX
- 4 -
Training and ward-based simulations have been restricted through the pandemic however these are
being reinstated, the Trust is currently 85% (the Trust target is 90% allowing for sickness, maternity leave
and new starters) compliant with basic life support training for the relevant staff groups, this includes
ensuring that clear instructions are given by the resuscitation leader in such a scenario. The trajectory to
achieving 90% compliance in this subject is September 2022. The Trust has recently revised and
improved the induction of new starters which means that all staff will receive all the necessary safety
training in their first week of employment, this programme commences on 4th July 2022.
10. A draft Patient Safety Incident Investigation Report (PSII) has been prepared. Evidence was
heard that this is now used rather than a Serious Incident Requiring Investigation Report and
has the advantage of being “more timely” and providing more learning. The report was still in
draft form at the date of the inquest (nine months following Tracy’s death) and the draft was
only available to me on the morning of the first day of the inquest, despite assurances at Pre
Inquest Review Hearings that it would be available prior to the inquest.
It is always regrettable when reviews are delayed however this occurs for many reasons and does not
prohibit early learning safety actions from being implemented on initial screening of an incident. In this
case a patient safety alert was sent to all ward areas to highlight the necessity to consider all forms of
potential ligature paraphernalia and the ward in question undertook a review of incident antecedents to
look for trends or themes which they could mitigate against to prevent further incidents amongst patients.
The Trust always would wish to engage with family members and significant others in these
circumstances to ensure that any questions they have are included in the terms of reference for a review,
with this in mind the new review framework advises a period of 90 days to complete a review which is an
extension on the previous framework of 30 days (60 days previously). The Trust received questions from
Tracy’s family via your office in September 2021, at which point we had already hit the 90 day target, in
October 2021 the author visited the family and again in November 2021 to ensure their questions were
fully explored, this was good practice and responsive to the family’s needs.
The sign off process for a draft report has four or in some cases five stages; firstly, it is seen and agreed
by the family, and/or significant others, then the leadership team of the area where the incident happened,
then it goes to a Clinical sign off panel for quality checking against the Royal College of Psychiatrists
SIRAN standards and scrutiny of the efficacy of recommendation. If a non-complex case this is the final
stage before being formally issued. In a complex case such as Tracy’s the review must be signed off by
the Chief Nurse and Chief Medical Officer, this is the fifth stage.
This review was delayed at the leadership sign off stage due to a restructure of senior leads over the
Christmas and New Year period. Following a meeting between the family and the newly appointed Lead
Nurse further amendments were made, the leadership team signed the draft off in early March 2022, the
Clinical panel held on 24th March 2022 advised some amendments which took it to a further panel on 30th
March 2022. Following this at review by the Chief Nurse and Chief Medical Officer ratification was halted
due to further amendments being advised just prior to the inquest. Hence why the report remained a draft
and was in various version formats. To address the risk of version control issues in the future which
causes distress and undue confusion no drafts will be shared with any party in hard copy format as of
now, the final ratified version will of course be available to all relevent parties.
Whilst accepting that the review was heavily delayed, we would always err to include the family, and
significant others throughout the process prior to final ratification, this has to be done in the family’s
timescale. The purpose of the internal review is to facilitate learning and improvement it is not a process
to hold to account, ascertain cause of death or answer to a complaint, civil or legal process. This is a very
clear and appreciated direction under the new framework made by NHSEI.
11. The PSII Report contains many inaccuracies including Tracy’s date of death, stating it to be 5
June 2021. The report refers to Tracy ligaturing again at 21:00 on 3rd June 2021. The correct
Norfolk Headquarters
Hellesdon Hospital,
Drayton High Road, Norwich NR6 5BE
Suffolk Headquarters
Endeavour House,
8 Russell Road, Ipswich, IP21 2BX
date is the 2 June 2021.
- 5 -
The draft version shared with your office prior to inquest was correct, the earlier version shared with the
family is not, for this I apologise fully, see response to question 10 regarding version control.
12. The PSII report refers to the notes of the incident on 1 June 2021 that Tracy ligatured with a
bandage but goes on to say that in interviews a cord from her dressing gown was used.
Confusion remained as between the events on the 1 June 2021 and the 2 June 2021. The
report refers to the view of the MDT meeting on 2 June was to keep Tracy on hourly
observations. There is no reference in the Clinical Notes to observations being discussed.
Witnesses asked about observations at the inquest could not recall observations being
discussed or that they were not discussed.
See responses in questions 5 and 6.
13. The PSII did not involve interviews with members of staff who had involvement with Tracy in
the hours and days prior to her death, including staff who gave the bandage to Tracy and a
Nurse who had regular involvement with Tracy’s care and who knew her well.
The staff who were not spoken to were agency staff who are not compelled to comply with Trust reviews
despite the obvious ethical and professional drivers to do so. In this review one agency staff member
approached did make himself available however a female staff member did not. However, the review
panel were content that the staff who did engage knew Tracy well and were able to give a consistent
account of events as they knew them, this included a range of professionals: nursing, occupational
therapy, psychology, and psychiatry.
14. The PSII stated that statements of members of staff “for the Coroner” were reviewed.
However, many of these statements contained inaccurate dates and times including the date
of death.
See response to question 7.
15. The PSII does not make findings with regard to areas of concern raised at the inquest such as
with regard to Tracy being given a bandage on the morning of 1 June 2021 despite there
being a bold red note contained in the records that Tracy should not be given a bandage, that
this was not discussed with any other senior member of staff, no record was made of the
decision and the rationale for the decision, nor that the bandage was not returned on Tracy’s
return. The PSII does not include reference to inaccurate record keeping and full records of
important events not being kept.
It transpires the SBAR was a document not uploaded onto the electronic record. This led to the author
nor being aware of the SBAR and reporting on what was in the electronic record only, this was a gap in
attention to detail. This aspect regarding the risk posed by the bandage should have been included in the
review and was an omission, the author of the review has reflected on this and will ensure this is not
repeated.
Equally within the review panel oversight role and the review sign off processes it is the responsibility of
those senior staff who form those panels to ensure all information is accurately recorded, analysed and
appropriate conclusions met which address all safety concerns.
The SBAR tool is now routinely uploaded onto the electronic record.
16. The first draft of the PSII Report contains a sentence “However, staff noted there was a lack
of clinical or management leadership supervision on the ward at the time and they were often
left to “firefight” with patients who they perceived carried a greater level of acute risk than
Norfolk Headquarters
Hellesdon Hospital,
Drayton High Road, Norwich NR6 5BE
Suffolk Headquarters
Endeavour House,
8 Russell Road, Ipswich, IP21 2BX
- 6 -
Tracy.” This view of staff was not included in the final draft Report.
See responses to questions 1 and 10.
In respect of the care and treatment provided to Tracy by the Trust, the gaps in good practice highlighted as
part of the internal review and further expanded during the inquest demonstrate this fell below expectations.
We would all wish for the best quality care and treatment for our loved ones and despite the teams combined
knowledge of Tracy, their clinical expertise and genuine desire for Tracy to succeed in her recovery this was
not to be. For this I again fully apologise and express my condolences to Tracy’s family.
In completing this response to you, it is also clear that there were gaps in the governance and attention to
detail of the review process which has caused unnecessary distress to the family of Tracy and raised your
concerns regarding the quality of the review. I hope that the steps the Trust has taken and continues to take
to address these provides you with sufficient assurance regarding our sincerity to improve and address the
shortfalls.
Yours sincerely
Chief Executive Officer
Norfolk Headquarters
Hellesdon Hospital,
Drayton High Road, Norwich NR6 5BE
Suffolk Headquarters
Endeavour House,
8 Russell Road, Ipswich, IP21 2BX
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