Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2023

Andrew Largin

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2023-0027, written 25 Jan 2023. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report25 Jan 2023
Reference2023-0027
DeceasedAndrew Largin
CoronerMary Hassell
Coroner areaInner North London
CategorySuicide (from 2015) · Mental Health related deaths
Organisation namedEast London NHS Foundation Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Regulation 28:  Prevention of Future Deaths report 

Andrew Mark LARGIN (died 06.02.22) 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

1. 

Chief Executive Officer 
East London NHS Foundation Trust (ELFT) 
Trust Headquarters 
9 Alie Street 
London  E1 8DE 

1 

CORONER 

I am:   Coroner ME Hassell 
           Senior Coroner  
           Inner North London 
           St Pancras Coroner’s Court 
           Camley Street 
           London  N1C 4PP 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,  
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and  
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, 
regulations 28 and 29. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 10 February 2022, one of my assistant coroners, Jonathan Stevens, 
commenced an investigation into the death of Andrew Mark Largin, aged 
60  years.  The  investigation  concluded  at  the  end  of  the  inquest  last 
Friday, 20 January 2023.  

I made a determination  at  inquest that Andrew Largin died  by  suicide.  
His mental health had been identified as deteriorating by a community 
rehabilitation  team  on  1  February  2022.    That  team  notified  the  home 
treatment team who had discharged him from their care on 25 January 
2023.  However, the home treatment team failed to reassess him. 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mr Largin asphyxiated himself in the early hours of 6 February 2022, at 
the home of his sister and brother in law where he lived.   

His medical cause of death was: 
1a)  asphyxia 
1b)  inhalation of inert gas 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving 
rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur 
unless  action  is  taken.  In  the  circumstances,  it  is  my  statutory  duty  to 
report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  

1.  The  ELFT  serious  incident  (SI)  review  report  identified  that, 
although  Mr Largin  was  discharged  to  the Woodberry  Wetlands 
neighbourhood  rehabilitation  team  from  the  crisis  (i.e.  home 
treatment) team on 25 January 2022, the neighbourhood team did 
not allocate him to a team member until 3 February.   

2.  The report also identified that, despite receiving an email from the 
Homerton University Hospital community rehabilitation team on 2 
February, saying that Mr Largin had been seen on 1 February and 
was still very depressed, the crisis team failed to reassess him or 
to  re-open  his  case  to  the  crisis  team,  but  instead  referred  the 
community team to the neighbourhood team. 

3.  However, the SI report did not identify that the crisis team member 
who  made  the  decision  on  2  February  simply  to  advise  that  Mr 
Largin should be dealt with by the neighbourhood team failed to 
record any reasons for her decision. 

4.  The SI reviewer giving evidence in court said that the SI reviewing 
team had not even spoken to that crisis team member as part of 
their investigation, let alone fed back to her.   

5.  He said they did not at the time realise that she still worked for 
ELFT, though he accepted that it would have been an extremely 
straight  forward  matter  to  find  out.    The  crisis  team  member’s 
manager  gave  evidence  that  she  thought  the  relevant  decision 
maker had left the team before Mr Largin’s death, so between 3 
and 6 February 2022.  When I invited that manager to make a call 
while the inquest was ongoing to check, she later told me that the 
team member had not left the crisis team until 29 April 2022.   

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6.  It  is  believed,  I  was  told,  that  there  was  a  hot  de-brief  after  Mr 
Largin’s  death.    However,  no  notes  were  made  of  that  and  no 
entry was made on Mr Largin’s medical record.   

7.  Thus,  nobody  from  ELFT  found  out  what  the  decision  maker’s 
thinking had been, or what misconceptions she might have had 
that  other  staff  members  might  share.    The  former  crisis  team 
member who made the decision still works for ELFT.  As far as I 
could  ascertain,  her  decision  making  concerning  Mr  Largin  has 
never been discussed with her by ELFT managers. 

8.  The SI review also did not identify that members of the crisis team 
and the neighbourhood team did not share an understanding of 
how quickly the neighbourhood team aims to make contact with 
patients,  to  assist  in  their  decision  making  about  the  correct 
pathway  for a  patient.    In  fact, a  member of  the  neighbourhood 
team  itself  gave  evidence  about  the  response  times  that,  I  was 
told later, was not correct. 

9.  Finally, the operations lead for the neighbourhood team had great 
difficulty  in  giving  me  clear  evidence  about  whether  his  team 
would or could refer a patient back to the  crisis team if they felt 
the circumstances warranted.  He demonstrated a lack of clarity 
on the point that I found very concerning. 

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In  my  opinion,  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  future  deaths  and  I 
believe that you have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date 
of this report, namely by 27 March 2023.  I, the coroner, may extend the 
period. 

Your  response  must  contain  details  of  action  taken  or proposed  to  be 
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise, you must explain 
why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the following. 

• 
 sister of Andrew Largin 
•  HHJ Thomas Teague QC, the Chief Coroner of England & Wales 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I  am  also  under  a  duty  to  send  a  copy  of  your  response  to  the  Chief 
Coroner and all interested persons who in my opinion should receive it.  
I  may  also  send  a  copy  of  your  response  to  any  other  person  who  I 
believe may find it useful or of interest.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted 
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who 
he  believes  may  find  it  useful  or  of  interest.  You  may  make 
representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about 
the release or the publication of your response. 

9 

DATE                                                  SIGNED BY SENIOR CORONER 

25.01.23                                              ME Hassell 

4

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from East London NHS Foundation Trust (PDF)
Private & Confidential 

Office of the Interim Chief Medical Officer 
Trust Headquarters 
5th Floor 
9 Alie Street 
London E1 8DE 

27 March 2023 

Dear Madam,  

RE: Regulation 28 Response for Andrew Largin 

This is a formal response to your Regulation 28 report dated 20 January 2023 where you 
set out concerns relating to the care of Andrew Largin whilst under East London NHS 
Foundation Trust’s (the Trust’s) care. 

I understand that at the inquest into Mr Largin’s death you heard evidence from the Trust’s 
Serious Incident (SI) review author outlining the learning that has taken place as a 
consequence of his death. However, you remained concerned about the risk of future 
deaths in relation to the following areas: 

1.  The ELFT serious incident (SI) review report identified that, although Mr Largin 
was discharged to the Woodberry Wetlands neighbourhood rehabilitation team 
from the crisis (i.e. home treatment) team on 25 January 2022, the neighbourhood 
team did not allocate him to a team member until 3 February. 

2.  The report also identified that, despite receiving an email from the Homerton 

University Hospital community rehabilitation team on 2 February, saying that Mr 
Largin had been seen on 1 February and was still very depressed, the crisis team 
failed to reassess him or to re-open his case to the crisis team, but instead 
referred the community team to the neighbourhood team.  

3.  However, the SI report did not identify that the crisis team member who made the 
decision on 2 February simply to advise that Mr Largin should be dealt with by the 
neighbourhood team failed to record any reasons for her decision.  

4.  The SI reviewer giving evidence in court said that the SI reviewing team had not 

even spoken to that crisis team member as part of their investigation, let alone fed 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 back to her. He said they did not at the time realise that she still worked for ELFT, 
though he accepted that it would have been an extremely straight forward matter 
to find out. The crisis team member’s manager gave evidence that she thought the 
relevant decision maker had left the team before Mr Largin’s death, so between 3 
and 6 February 2022. When I invited that manager to make a call while the inquest 
was ongoing to check, she later told me that the team member had not left the 
crisis team until 29 April 2022.  

5.  It is believed, I was told, that there was a hot de-brief after Mr Largin’s death. 
However, no notes were made of that and no entry was made on Mr Largin’s 
medical record.  Thus, nobody from ELFT found out what the decision maker’s 
thinking had been, or what misconceptions she might have had that other staff 
members might share. The former crisis team member who made the decision still 
works for ELFT. As far as I could ascertain, her decision making concerning Mr 
Largin has never been discussed with her by ELFT managers.  

6.  The SI review also did not identify that members of the crisis team and the 
neighbourhood team did not share an understanding of how quickly the 
neighbourhood team aims to make contact with patients, to assist in their decision 
making about the correct pathway for a patient. In fact, a member of the 
neighbourhood team itself gave evidence about the response times that, I was told 
later, was not correct.  

7.  Finally, the operations lead for the neighbourhood team had great difficulty in 

giving me clear evidence about whether his team would or could refer a patient 
back to the crisis team if they felt the circumstances warranted. He demonstrated a 
lack of clarity on the point that I found very concerning.  

I wish to assure you and the family of Mr Largin that the Trust has reviewed the issues 
highlighted by the Regulation 28 report and has planned or undertaken the actions 
outlined below. 

1.  Allocation Times 

I have reviewed your concern about the time gap between when Mr Largin was 
discharged from the City and Hackney Home Treatment Team (HTT) on 25 January 
2022 to the Woodberry Wetlands Neighbourhood Rehabilitation Team (WWNT) and 
that a team member was allocated on 3 February 2022.  

The WWNT’s Operational Policy states that, ‘The service provides a non-urgent 
mental health service and should see newly referred  residents within and up to a 
maximum 28 days.  Contact with the resident is to be made  within a week of 
allocation to arrange an assessment appointment.’ It appears that a team member 
was allocated to Mr Largin, however it is unclear whether or not contact was made 
within a week 

However, I agree that this may result in a care gap in some circumstances. With this 
in mind the WWNT are updating their Operational Policy to ensure that patients with 
the most serious mental health concerns are risk assessed within 7 days of referral to 
the WWNT. 

This  was  discussed  at  the  Joint  Community/Crisis  Service  Quarterly  Meeting  on  17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 March 2023. It is anticipated that the WWNT Operational Policy will be updated by 1st 
May 2023.I am happy to send a copy to the Coroner for its records.  

2.  CRISIS TEAM REASSESSMENT 

The Deputy Borough Director of City and Hackney Directorate has explored in more 
detail, and with the relevant HTT member, the HTT’s failure to re-assess Mr Largin 
and instead refer him to the WWNT. They confirmed to the Deputy Borough Director 
that the email was shared with the MDT and discussed. It appeared to the Deputy 
Borough Director that the MDT did not have a full picture of Mr Largin’s needs leading 
to the decision to refer him to WWNT and not reassess him.  

The City and Hackney Directorate is currently in the process of transforming the 
Crisis Pathway. Consequently, the HTT is presently being divided into two discrete 
sub-groups. A smaller number of staff will be allocated to a specific group of service 
users, with the goal of ensuring they have better knowledge of the service users 
individual needs. It is anticipated that this will greatly enhance continuity of care and 
ensure that the MDTs have full information when making decisions about appropriate 
referrals.  

3.  RECORDING CLINICAL RATIONALE 

I was troubled that the Trust’s SI review did not highlight that the relevant crisis team 
member did not record their rationale explaining why Mr Largin should remain with 
WWNT. I asked the Trust’s Associate Director of Governance and Risk to explore this 
further.  

They informed me that the SI Lead Reviewer did not interview the relevant crisis team 
member. They were advised that the crisis team member no longer worked with the team 
and made the incorrect assumption that the HTT member had left the Trust.  The SI Lead 
Reviewer did not follow up with Human Resources (HR) to obtain the HTT members new 
contact details.  

I am reassured by the Associate Director of Governance and Risk that amends have been 
made to the SI Lead Investigators and Co-Reviewers Responsibilities document so that 
going forward all staff members deemed relevant to an SI review must be contacted and 
approached via HR  – as appropriate – to (a) advise that a SI Review is being undertaken 
and (b) request their involvement.  

Additionally, the Deputy Borough Director for City and Hackney has reassured me that 
training will be provided to all HTT staff around documenting the following three principles 
of care:  

1)  What are you implementing? 
2)  Why are you doing it?  
3)  How are you doing it.  

This has already been discussed in the Joint Community/Crisis Service Quarterly Meeting 
on 17 March 2023 and will form part of a Referrals and Screening training programmed 
being led by one of the Trust’s consultant psychiatrists that will take start in March 2023 
(see further details in point 6). 

4.  OMISSIONS 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SI Author 

I apologise to you and Mr Largin’s family that the Lead SI reviewer did not interview the 
relevant HTT member, nor did they feed back their SI findings to them. I believe I have 
dealt with this matter fully in the query above. 

Crisis Team Manager 

I am aware that the HTT manager provided you with incorrect evidence about when the 
relevant crisis team member left the crisis team. All staff members have been made aware 
by the Deputy Borough Director that if there is any ambiguity about dates of employment 
when cooperating with investigations into service users’ care they must contact HR. It has 
been emphasized how important precision in detail is in order for the Trust to learn from 
Serious Incidents.  

5.  HOT DE-BRIEF RECORD 

Following serious incidents such as violence, aggression or death, clinical teams at the 
Trust hold a debrief as soon after the incident as is practicable. The debrief is usually 
facilitated by the manager or the team psychologist to explore thoughts and feelings 
around the incident, the impact on staff, the service user and the team. These incidents 
are not documented in the clinical notes as it is focussed on initial staff reactions and is 
not a formal process to look at lessons learned. 

Initial learning after an incident is considered in a 48 hour report (which is completed 
promptly after the incident) and then in more detail in the subsequent SI report. It is 
expected that any learning discussed in the initial debrief (as outlined above) will be 
incorporated into the 48 hour report. 

The process of effectively capturing learning from incidents is currently being reviewed as 
part of the Trust’s implementation of the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework 
(PSIRF). It is anticipated that PSIRF will meaningfully address the current gaps in how the 
Trust’s learning from incidents is investigated and recorded. 

6.   SHARED UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CRISIS TEAM AND 

NEIGHBOURHOOD TEAM OF CONTACT TIMELINE 

I have considered that the Trust SI review failed to highlight that there was no shared 
understanding between the HTT and the WWNT about referral timelines and I agree that 
this should have been explored.   

To ensure that this does not happen again, the Associate Director of Governance has 
confirmed that during the Trust SI quality assurance process all SI Reviewers will be 
asked whether they have considered integrated working practices between different 
services.   

Additionally, the Deputy Borough Director for City and Hackney has confirmed that the 
Neighbourhood Teams and Crisis Pathway teams (which includes HTT) are resuming 
their regular pathways meeting on 7 April 2023. They will produce an action plan around 
communicating a shared understanding of referral process and criteria. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Further, the Trust is implementing a training programme for all Neighbourhood Teams to 
highlight issues of clinical risk when triaging incoming referrals. This programme, due to 
start on 22 March 2023, will run monthly for 6 months in a rolling fashion. It aims to train 
staff and maintain a constant discussion in how to think about complex issues of risk for 
patients referred to the Neighbourhood Teams, whether that is from Crisis Pathway 
Teams (which include HTT), GPs, or elsewhere. It will use didactic teaching, role play with 
actors, sample cases, discussion, and reflection, and will be facilitated by an experienced 
Consultant Psychiatrist, as well as the Associate Clinical Director for the Neighbourhood 
Teams. An important part of this training will be to improve understanding of referrals and 
risk signifiers from the Crisis Team to the Neighbourhood Team. 

7.  Referral to Crisis Team 

The Deputy Borough Director has spent time reviewing procedures for both the HTT and 
WWNT. He has also met with the relevant managers. He is reassured that all WWNT 
members are clear on the standard operating procedure for how WWNT clinicians may 
refer service users back to the crisis team.  

The Deputy Borough Director has also explained to WWNT staff members that they must 
be able to clearly explain Trust procedures to the Coroner as part of their clinical roles. To 
facilitate this, they will all be required to attend the next Coroner’s Training provided by the 
Trust’s Legal Affairs Team which is currently being planned.   

I hope I have provided reassurance to you and the family of Mr Largin about the learning 
that has taken place as a consequence of his sad death.  

I offer my sincere and heart-felt condolences to the family at this difficult time.   

Yours sincerely,  

Interim Chief Medical Officer

Related reports

Other reports by Mary Hassell

See all →

More reports categorised “Suicide (from 2015)”

See all →

Track East London NHS Foundation Trust

See every Prevention of Future Deaths report matching East London NHS Foundation Trust, and how often a new one appears.

What would an alert for this have sent me? Search the full text

Free to try — the preview shows the real matches and how many arrived in the last 12 months. Your first email alert is free.

These reports are published by the Chief Coroner's office at judiciary.uk and are © Crown copyright. The text here is reproduced from the published PDF so it can be searched. If something on this page is wrong, or you are a person named in it and want it reviewed, email drcjar@gmail.com and we will act promptly.