Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2022

George Elliott

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2022-0309, written 4 Oct 2022. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report4 Oct 2022
Reference2022-0309
DeceasedGeorge Elliott
CoronerRobert Sowersby
Coroner areaAvon
CategoryOther related deaths
Organisation namedNorth Bristol NHS Trust
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

M. E. Voisin  
 Her Majesty’s Senior Coroner 
Area of Avon 

4 October 2022 

REF: 24431 

REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO:   

1. Chief Executive,  North Bristol NHS Trust 
2. Head of Clinical Governance / Clinical Governance Lead, North Bristol NHS 
Trust 
CORONER 

1 

I am Robert Sowersby, Assistant Coroner for the Area of Avon 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. 

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On 13 September 2021 an investigation commenced into the death of Mr George 
Michael ELLIOTT, aged 81.  The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 
20 September 2022.  

The medical cause of death was: 

1a)  Traumatic brain injury 

1b)  Fall in hospital 

2)    Coronary artery disease 

The conclusion was that this was an accidental death, and the brief circumstances of 
the death were recorded as follows:  

On 4 September 2021 George Michael Elliott was an inpatient at Southmead Hospital, 

receiving investigation and treatment for an underlying cardiac condition, when he fell, 

sustaining a serious brain injury.  Unfortunately his condition deteriorated some days 

later, and on 9 September 2021 he died in hospital as a result of the injury sustained in 

The Coroner's Court, Old Weston Road, Flax Bourton, BS48 1UL 

  
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the fall. 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

At the time of his death Mr ELLIOTT was in hospital for investigation / treatment of an 
underlying cardiac condition.  His underlying cardiac condition was treatable, but he 
suffered a fatal brain injury when he had an inpatient fall. 

Mr ELLIOTT had been admitted to Southmead Hospital on 29 August 2021. 

On 31 August 2021, while he was on the Acute Medical Unit, Mr ELLIOTT’s falls risk 
was assessed by a member of the nursing staff, who completed online documentation 
using the Trust’s “Lorenzo” system. 

That online documentation included a list of risk factors that had to be considered, the 
very first of which was whether the patient was aged 65 or over. 

To reiterate, Mr ELLIOTT was 81 years old at the time (a fact that was recorded on the 
Lorenzo system). 

The nurse recorded that Mr ELLIOTT had no risk factors (in respect of his risk of falls), 
despite his age.  

The risk assessment was not only in error, but the error was obvious (and on an 
objectively verifiable basis – not simply on a subjective assessment of how the patient 
presented). 

On 1 September 2021 Mr ELLIOTT was transferred to Cardiology ward 27a.  In the 
early hours of 4 September 2021 he fell while trying to use the en-suite bathroom in his 
room, suffering a serious head injury which ultimately proved fatal. 

There was uncontentious evidence that Mr ELLIOTT’s underlying cardiac condition was 
treatable, and that if not for his fall (and head injury), he would have survived the 
inpatient admission and could have received treatment for his heart while in the 
community. 

Mr ELLIOTT’s brain injury led to a deterioration in his condition on 7 September, and he 
sadly died on 9 September 2021. 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern.  
In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken and in 
the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  –  

My concerns are about the quality (or otherwise) of the Patient Safety Investigation 
(“PSI”) which took place after Mr ELLIOTT’s death.   

In Mr ELLIOTT’s case the investigation (and accompanying report) overlooked obvious 
failings in his care.  As a result important learning opportunities (and therefore important 
opportunities to improve patient safety in the future) were also missed.   

The Coroner's Court, Old Weston Road, Flax Bourton, BS48 1UL 

  
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I am concerned that if this investigation (and report) is in any way representative of the 
quality and rigour of such investigations within the Trust, then the Trust may be missing 
vital opportunities to learn from its mistakes, and to make its patients (now and in the 
future) safer as a result of that learning. 

To give a little more detail: 

•  The stated remit of the Patient Safety Investigation was to “review the care 

episode… [and] to understand the events and identify opportunities to learn and 
to improve patient safety” (see page 4 of the resulting report) 

•  Given that this was a case where a patient suffered a fatal injury as the result of 
an inpatient fall, one of the first and most obvious points to investigate would 
have been the adequacy (or otherwise) of his falls risk assessment/s, and the 
extent of the nursing staff’s compliance with any relevant Trust protocols / 
procedures 

•  Notwithstanding that background, the PSI report failed to identify the (very 

obvious) fact that although a falls risk assessment had been performed, it had 
not been performed properly 

•  There were also numerous other failings in the approach that had been taken to 
the assessment of Mr ELLIOT’s falls risk, and/or the way that risk had been 
managed while he was an inpatient, but none of these were identified by the PSI 
/ present in the report.   

•  For example: 

-  Para.6.13 of the Trust’s then-current Falls Prevention Policy stipulates that 
Mr ELLIOTT’s family should have been made aware of the outcome of his 
falls risk assessment.  That did not happen, but the fact that it did not 
happen is not mentioned in the PSI report.  

-  There is no indication that Mr ELLIOTT’s falls risk was ever re-assessed 

(after 30 August 2021).  According to the Trust’s policy it should have been 
reassessed after he moved to the Cardiology ward, and again after his fall 
on 4 September, but no such reassessment took place, and the PSI report 
makes no mention of these oversights/omissions. 

-  After Mr ELLIOTT’s fall on 4 September, he continues to be described as at 
“low risk” of falls in the Daily Intentional Rounding documentation within his 
medical records.  This is an alarming error, but one which has been 
overlooked entirely by the PSI report. 

• 

I asked Nurse 
 (one of the PSI-report authors, who gave evidence at 
the inquest) about the fact that none of these errors had been identified in the 
report and she had no explanation for why that was the case. 

As stated above, if PSI reports overlook clear / obvious failings, then learning 
opportunities are missed, patient safety is compromised, and there is a risk of future 
deaths. 

In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. 

In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 

The Coroner's Court, Old Weston Road, Flax Bourton, BS48 1UL 

  
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you have 
the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, 
namely by 29 November 2022.  I, the coroner, may extend the period. 

Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out 
the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested 
Persons – the family of the deceased.  I have also sent it to the Care Quality 
Commission who may find it useful or of interest. 

I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary 
form.  He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it 
useful or of interest.  You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of 
your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief 
Coroner. 

9 

04/10/2022 

Signature   

Robert Sowersby Assistant Coroner Area of Avon 

The Coroner's Court, Old Weston Road, Flax Bourton, BS48 1UL

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from North Bristol NHS Trust (PDF)
Trust Headquarters 
Gate 3 Level 2, Brunel Building 
Southmead Hospital 
Westbury-on-Trym 
Bristol BS10 5NB 

The Coroner’s Court  
Old Weston Road 
Flax Bourton 
BS48 1UL  

Dear Mr Sowersby,  

Re: Regulation 28 following the Inquest into the Death of Mr George Elliot 

I write further to the Regulation 28, dated 04th October 2022, issued as a result of the inquest into 
the death of Mr Elliot. 

Quality of the Patient Safety Investigation: 

The Regulation 28 raised concerns about the quality of the investigation report and supporting 
process following Mr Elliot’s fall in hospital. Furthermore, it raised concerns that if this report were 
representative of the wider quality of such reports it may indicate that North Bristol NHS Trust may 
miss opportunities to learn, which may contribute to further deaths.  

We recognise the investigation in the case of Mr George Elliott missed key elements and that the 
process of approval did not identify these. Accuracy in our investigations is very important to us to 
provide insights for learning. A key driver for North Bristol NHS Trust is being open and honest with 
patients and families following an incident. To achieve this, it is essential that we understand the 
facts of what has happened. Therefore, we take this Regulation 28 report very seriously as it tells 
us that on this occasion, we have not achieved the degree of understanding that we strive for.  The 
Patient Safety Incident Investigation relating to Mr Elliott was commissioned early under the new 
PSIRF framework and was completed at during a period in which North Bristol NHS Trust was 
experiencing extreme pressures relating to the covid pandemic. This was a particularly challenging 
time for both clinical and nursing staff. It is likely to be due to the pressures at this challenging time 
that this investigation missed key elements.          

A University of Bristol Teaching Trust. 
A University of the West of England Teaching Trust. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We would like to assure you that this is not reflective of the standard and quality of patient safety 
investigations at the Trust and of the rigour placed on conducting such investigations, as well as 
the process for approving and learning from them. 

The Trust has extensive governance relating to Patient Safety Incident Investigations. When a 
Patient Safety Incident Investigation is commissioned, the responsible Clinical Division allocate an 
investigation team/panel. The process of investigation is supported by the Clinical Division, with 
oversight through the Patient Safety Group and then ultimately being received and approved 
through the Patient Safety Committee. The Patient Safety Committee in February 2022 that 
approved this report was chaired by the Director of Nursing and Quality. 

As further assurance, the Trust recently had an audit into its PSIRF conducted by KPMG. This 
audit looked at the processes and controls over learning from incidents that are part of PSIRF. This 
audit returned a finding of significant assurance in relation to the PSIRF policy and procedure 
framework, the Patient Safety Incident Response Plan (PSIRP), the supporting investigation 
templates as well as the key guidance documents and educational materials available. The audit 
identified minor improvements; however, these did not relate to the investigation process. Prior to 
rolling out PSIRF at the Trust in June 2021, key staff involved in undertaking investigations 
received training on this new investigation process from Baby Lifeline/Cranfield University as well 
as ongoing coaching and training provided through the Trust’s Patient Safety Team.  

Key national changes – Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF): 

North Bristol NHS Trust has been one of the national early adopters for the Patient Safety Incident 
Response Framework (PSIRF) which we have previously written to the Coroner about to update 
about changes that are likely to be seen in inquests.  I have attached a copy of this letter for ease 
of reference.  

PSIRF replaces the Serious Incident Framework and represents comprehensive changes to the 
way in which NHS organisations respond to patient safety incidents, including what and how to 
investigate. 

In August this year, the final PSIRF documentation was published by NHS England, with all NHS 
Trusts now transitioning to PSIRF. We in NBT are using the newly published documentation to 
conduct a gap analysis about the end-state framework documentation. The core reason for the gap 
analysis is to ensure that, as an early adopter, we are now working in full alignment with the final 
guidelines that other (non-early adopter) organisations are starting to transition to. This is a 
process being adopted by all other early adopters.   

There are key points during the pathway of investigation that we have and continue to strengthen. 
For clarity, we have set out the key points below:- 

A University of Bristol Teaching Trust. 
A University of the West of England Teaching Trust. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 Identification and commissioning of an investigation: 

Patient safety incidents are routinely reviewed, with automatic flagging in our electronic system set 
for types of incidents and harm levels. A Patient Safety Incident Investigation will be commissioned 
for any incident in which we believe that a death was more likely than not due to a problem with 
care (as per the Learning from Deaths processes). This was the case for Mr Elliot, with the incident 
report for his fall triggering a PSII. The investigation was assigned an investigation team. 

Investigation process and support: 

Supporting high quality investigations is a key objective for North Bristol NHS Trust. PSIRF 
continues to change the way that the NHS should consider and support patient safety 
investigations, with a key principle of moving away from the Serious Incident Framework to PSIRF, 
being to do fewer investigations but to do them better, focussing on Patient Safety Incident 
Investigations requiring expert, professional investigation knowledge and skills, supported by the 
required time to conduct them. This represents a significant change for the NHS, and North Bristol 
NHS Trust as part thereof, as many NHS organisations rely on investigations being carried out by 
staff members, often clinicians, that already have a fulltime role – therefore doing the investigation 
in addition to their existing role.  

Over the past 4 years, the governance teams within our divisions have undergone significant 
investment, part of which has been to ensure governance teams are better resourced to support 
and undertake investigations in relation to patient safety incidents.  To continue to strengthen our 
approach, we are also reassessing our approach to how we support detailed, high-quality 
investigations, and considering establishing new posts that focus entirely on investigations. This is 
in line with the recently published national PSIRF guidelines.  

Oversight:     

Oversight of investigations is a key area that we have and continue to focus on. With PSIRF, the 
way this works will be significantly different, both at organisational and system levels.    

The new national PSIRF “Oversight roles and responsibilities specification” published in August 
2022 states “Oversight of patient safety incident response has traditionally included activity to hold 
provider organisations to account for the quality of their patient safety incident investigation 
reports. Oversight under PSIRF focuses on engagement and empowerment rather than the more 
traditional command and control”.  

At NBT we have developed and are implementing a process in which the central Patient Safety 
Team routinely review the progress of investigations. This process focuses on the timeliness, but 
also the rigour being applied to the actual investigation process. Any concerns and feedback will 
be communicated with the respective Division and, where necessary, escalated to the Chief 

A University of Bristol Teaching Trust. 
A University of the West of England Teaching Trust. 

 
 
 
 
 
 Medical and Nursing Officers through the established weekly meetings that oversee patient safety 
learning and investigations.  

Falls Policy: 

Whereas the Regulation 28 does not note the Falls Policy as the reason for the Regulation 28, it 
raised specific points about it that I would like to take this opportunity to address. The Falls Policy 
referenced is no longer in place, it was replaced with an updated policy in December 2021 that 
maps to the NICE Guidelines relating to falls. A routine review of this policy is due to be presented 
to the Patient Safety Committee in December 2022.   

Next Steps 

Carrying out robust patient safety incident investigations is a key tenet in our learning systems and 
culture.  

As noted above, we accept that the George Elliott investigation missed some key elements, but do 
not consider this is reflective of the standard of our Patient Safety Incident Investigations at the 
Trust.  We are presently conducting a gap analysis using the recently published PSIRF national 
guidance. As part of this, we are re-focusing on how we support expert investigations being 
conducted by scoping the structure and capacity within our central and divisional teams.  

The findings of the gap analysis, as well as any associated improvements to strengthen our 
systems and processes will report through our Patient Safety Committee and Quality Committee, 
with oversight from our Chief Nursing Officer and Chief Medical Officer.  

I hope you will take some assurance from this letter setting out our response in relation to the 
concerning points you made in your Regulation 28 report.  

Yours sincerely, 

Chief Executive 

A University of Bristol Teaching Trust. 
A University of the West of England Teaching Trust.

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