Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2022
Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2023-0031, written 7 Dec 2022. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.
| Date of report | 7 Dec 2022 |
|---|---|
| Reference | 2023-0031 |
| Deceased | Joan Ferguson |
| Coroner | Carly Henley |
| Coroner area | Newcastle upon Tyne and North Tyneside |
| Category | Emergency services related deaths (2019 onwards) |
| Organisation named | North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust |
| Source | judiciary.uk record · original PDF |
| Responses published | 1 |
Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.
Newcastle upon Tyne Coroners MRS KAREN L DILKS HM SENIOR CORONER Civic Centre , Barras Bridge , Newcastle Upon Tyne , NE1 8QH Date: 7 December 2022 REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: CORONER I am Carly Henley for Newcastle and North Tyneside Coroners CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS I make this report under paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/schedule/5/paragraph/7 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1629/part/7/made INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 1 2 On 10 May 2022 I commenced an investigation into the death of Joan Alison FERGUSON. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest . The conclusion of the inquest was Joan Alison FERGUSON died at the Royal Victoria infirmary, Newcastle upon Tyne on 5th May 2022 of acute chronic congestive cardiac failure due to biventricular cardiac hypertrophy and an open fracture of her left tibia/fibula and distal femur. She had been discharged home following a short hospital admission at North Tyneside General Hospital. She had super morbid obesity and required ambulance transfer. During transfer on 3rd May 2022, she fell in the ambulance and sustained an open fracture 3 to her tibia/fibula and a fractured left femur requiring surgical repair which was carried out the same day. She did not survive the consequences of her injuries in light of her comorbidities. 1a Acute on Chronic Cardiorespiratory Failure 1b Biventricular Cardiac Hypertrophy and Open Fracture of Left Tibia/Fibula and Distal Femur (operated on 03/05/22) 1c II Morbid Obesity, Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus, Hypertension, Cor Pulmonale, Mitral Stenosis and Liver Cirrhosis CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 4 64yr female Recent NTGH admission with constipation, AKI and increasing oxygen requirements was being discharged home falling getting out of ambulance (DNACPR in place) open right tib/fib+distal femur # Significant Co-morbidity 1. Super Morbid Obesity ~130kg 2. OHS/ OSA CPAP intolerant, possible COPD, Home Oxygen 3. AF, HTN, Pul HT RV dilation severe biatrial dilatation , mitral stenosis (2019) 4. DM Family attended ED as probable un-survivable injury given co-morbidity Theatre GA and splinting of # with tibial nail and femoral retrograde nail, for analgesia and as open # L3 post op ventilated on high CVS support Nad/Ad Following morning woke and extubated onto HFNC, unfortunately no sig improvement in CVS support Deteriorated overnight with retained secretions, respiratory distress Fentanyl started Family attended and HFNC / pressor stopped Discussion with paramedics transport team Deborah (Investigating) , Coroners Family very happy with care at RVI and opportunity to have time with Joan CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. 5 The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. – [BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) (2) (3) ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 6 In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you the power to take such action. YOUR RESPONSE have You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by I, the coroner, may extend the period. 7 Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner 8 I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. 7 December 2022 9 Signature Carly Henley Assistant Coroner for Newcastle upon Tyne Coroners
1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.
Strictly Private and Confidential
Mrs Carly Elizabeth Henley
His Majesty's Assistant Coroner for
Newcastle upon Tyne and North Tyneside
Civic Centre
Barrass Bridge
Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 8QH
Ambulance Headquarters
Bernicia House
The Waterfront
Goldcrest Way
Newburn Riverside
Newcastle upon Tyne
NE15 8NY
Date: 26 January 2023
www.neas.nhs.uk
Dear Mrs Henley,
Inquest into the death of Joan Ferguson
Regulation 28 – Report to prevent future deaths
I am writing in my role as Chief Executive of North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation
Trust ("NEAS") and in response to the Regulation 28 report for the prevention of future deaths
dated 17 December 2022 as issued by you following the inquest into the tragic death of Joan
Ferguson.
The matters of concern listed in your report are: -
1. During the course of the inquest I heard evidence from the Health and Safety Manager
at NEAS. He accepted that a risk assessment should have been carried out prior to
every transfer conducted in respect of a complex bariatric patient. Joan was a complex
bariatric patient and yet received no up to date risk assessment. He stated that this risk
assessment should have been carried out by a Scheduled Care Team Manager and
should have included information taken from Joan and/or her family and/or clinicians
involved in her care.
2. During the course of the inquest and investigation, the family provided information that
Joan had fallen on three or four earlier occasions during hospital transfers. NEAS have
no record of these incidents. I accept the family’s account and am concerned that no
records were made of these incidents. The absence of recorded incidents prevented an
accurate risk assessment taking place.
3. During the course of the inquest and investigation, I heard evidence from the Health and
Safety Manager that a dynamic risk assessment should have been conducted during the
transfer. I heard evidence from the Clinical Support Assistant who should have received
effective training on dynamic risk assessment. There was no evidence that he performed
an effective dynamic risk assessment on 3.5.22.
The North East Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust is registered, and therefore
licensed to provide services, by the Care Quality Commission (Provider ID: RX601).
4. During the course of the inquest, the three members of NEAS who effected Joan’s
transfer on 3.5.22 each gave evidence. They each accepted that they did not ask Joan
and/or did not wait for a response from her, did not ask ward staff prior to leaving hospital
and did not ask Joan’s husband who was in the vicinity of her home, prior to them
encouraging Joan to stand, whether she was able to stand safely. Instead, they relied
on historical information and encouraged her to stand.
You will note that we have removed the names of the Trust witnesses from our letter of
response and simply use their position. I hope that this is appropriate in considering the
response will potentially be published via the Ministry of Justice website.
We will address each point you have raised in your matters of concern below: -
1. During the course of the inquest I heard evidence from the Health and Safety Manager
at NEAS. He accepted that a risk assessment should have been carried out prior to
every transfer conducted in respect of a complex bariatric patient. Joan was a
complex bariatric patient and yet received no up to date risk assessment. He stated
that this risk assessment should have been carried out by a Scheduled Care Team
Manager and should have included information taken from Joan and/or her family
and/or clinicians involved in her care.
The ’Care and Transportation of Bariatric and Complex Patients’ procedure has been
updated to provide more robust processes to prevent reoccurrence and strengthen the risk
assessment process. This applies to those cases classified as ‘patients with complex needs
and those deemed as bariatric or require complex extrication’.
The following details are an extract from the enclosed ’Care and Transportation of Bariatric
and Complex Patients’ procedure.
‘In the case of a planned journey for Scheduled Care, a risk assessment must be carried
out prior to the actual journey taking place. This is to identify any potential risks and
obstacles that may be present and gives time to call in additional help/support or
involvement from other agencies. If the patient has previously travelled, this can initially be
done over the telephone. The Scheduled Care Team Manager should ascertain whether
any of the previous risk assessment details have changed and if so, arrange a face to face
assessment’.
‘Scheduled Care pre-planned journeys should be booked at least 48 hours in advance, risk-
assessed by a Scheduled Care Team Manager with input from a Clinical Support Assistant
is required, documented on the correct form (Patient Moving Handling Risk Assessment
Form & Plan) and sent electronically
team
(special.patient.notes@nhs.net) and Patient Transport Service Dispatch Support. If a
request is made with less than 48 hours’ notice, Patient Transport Service Dispatch Support
must make contact with a Team Manager via telephone to ascertain if it is possible for the
assessment to be carried out’.
the special patient notes
to
‘On receipt of a planned journey of a known or suspected bariatric or complex patient, the
Emergency Operations Centre will take the booking via the Scheduled Care booking
process and then inform Patient Transport Service Dispatch Support who will request the
assessment is undertaken by contacting the Scheduled Care Team Manager. Patient
Transport Service Dispatch Support will provide as much relevant information as possible
to allow the Team Manager to carry out the assessment’.
2
‘The Scheduled Care Team Manager will contact the patient or person who requested the
assessment and arrange a suitable time to attend. If the Team Manager feels specialist
input is required, then they must make contact and arrange this. Once the assessment has
been carried out, the Team Manager/ Clinical Support Assistant will complete the relevant
documentation (Patient Moving Handling Risk Assessment Form & Plan) and send this back
to Special Patient Notes and Patient Transport Service Dispatch Support’.
‘The Special Patient Notes Team will place any relevant flags in all Cleric systems prior to
the journey being undertaken. The Patient Transport Service Dispatch Support team will
add notes to any live bookings’.
The ’Care and Transportation of Bariatric and Complex Patients’ procedure is enclosed to
provide full details of the updated procedure. The procedure does cross into the other
concerns raised within the Prevention of Future Deaths (Regulation 28) Report.
2. During the course of the inquest and investigation, the family provided information
that Joan had fallen on three or four earlier occasions during hospital transfers. NEAS
have no record of these incidents. I accept the family’s account and am concerned
that no records were made of these incidents. The absence of recorded incidents
prevented an accurate risk assessment taking place.
Internal investigations have not identified any reported incidents prior to the incident
associated with the case. We have spoken with internal and external partners to try and
identify any incidents. Upon checking the integrated risk management system (Ulysses) we
have not found any additional records except historic safeguarding referrals which
generated the original risk assessment. We cannot find any records of previously reported
incidents or complaints/concerns raised by our crews/staff.
The only information we have sourced is from the Investigating Officer who undertook the
internal investigation into the specific incident. As you know the Investigating Officer was
not able to attend the inquest due to unforeseen circumstances and with your permission
another witness took their place. We acknowledge this was not ideal nor helpful to the
inquest and those involved.
The Investigating Officer re-calls that a member of the EVAC team had advised Joan had
mentioned a previous fall. It was explained that this occurred when Joan was more mobile
and living upstairs. The member of staff has advised that Joan suggested the fall had
occurred when going down the house stairs but could not recollect more about it, including
date, time and circumstances. It is understood it was likely before 2020 but we have not
identified any information or evidence during our inquiries. This did not form part of the
investigation report as we could not identify if the fall had occurred during one of our
attendances to Joan.
External inquiries have included speaking with third party providers which reached the same
conclusion with no incidents been reported or recorded. Internal inquiries extended to
reviewing bookings for Scheduled Care transport and emergency calls involving our
Unscheduled Care crews. Upon reviewing the case notes on each case/attendance, we
have not identified any records to indicate a fall or ‘dropping’ of Joan.
3
Due to our inability to identify any historic incidents, we will approach the family to ask if they
are able to help with further details/information. It is however important to note that during
our original investigation and liaison with the family, no previous incidents were disclosed.
The same applies to the inquest, during evidence the family intimated previous incidents
when Joan was dropped, however no details were provided.
In respect to the point ‘the absence of recorded incidents prevented an accurate risk
assessment taking place’. Whilst we acknowledge that information regarding previous
incidents is important to assist with risk assessments, it is important to draw upon the
response below. The fact that our staff had not spoken with hospital staff, Joan’s family and
Joan is a key factor in the effectiveness of the dynamic risk assessment. As heard during
the inquest evidence provided by the Trust’s Health and Safety Manager, dynamic risk
assessment was explained as “merely a thought process when things change, and you
think on your feet, and you might need to change process or put a new risk control
measure in place to do something safely”.
In considering a planned risk assessment, then previous incidents would certainly be a key
consideration to help formulate effective control measures. We refer onto the ’Care and
Transportation of Bariatric and Complex Patients’ procedure for more information in this
regard.
3. During the course of the inquest and investigation, I heard evidence from the Health
and Safety Manager that a dynamic risk assessment should have been conducted
during the transfer. I heard evidence from the Clinical Support Assistant who should
have received effective training on dynamic risk assessment. There was no evidence
that he performed an effective dynamic risk assessment on 3.5.22.
Whilst the crew did undertake a dynamic risk assessment our own internal investigation
concluded that they had not established any changes in mobility. This included not seeking
information from hospital staff or the patient’s family. This fundamentally flawed the quality
of the dynamic risk assessment which was therefore based on previous experience and
without clear communication with the patient.
We can confirm that our operational staff receive dynamic risk assessment training as part
of statutory and mandatory training and other specific information, instruction, and training.
In this case the main issues related to the lack of communication/information with hospital
staff, Joan’s family and indeed Joan. This factor is linked with the fact the planned risk
assessment had not been re-visited in a timely manner and the wider compliance with
existing procedures. These factors are addressed within the responses for the related
concerns raised within the Prevention of Future Deaths (Regulation 28) Report.
In addition, we can confirm, as per our serious incident investigation report, that information
has been shared with staff in respect to communication, before and during dynamic risk
assessments.
4
4. During the course of the inquest, the three members of NEAS who effected Joan’s
transfer on 3.5.22 each gave evidence. They each accepted that they did not ask Joan
and/or did not wait for a response from her, did not ask ward staff prior to leaving
hospital and did not ask Joan’s husband who was in the vicinity of her home, prior
to them encouraging Joan to stand, whether she was able to stand safely. Instead,
they relied on historical information and encouraged her to stand.
This point is directly linked with the previous concerns and our responses. I will not repeat
the information previously detailed and that contained within the enclosure. We would
however like to acknowledge that this point was identified within the internal investigation
report and added into the recommendations/action plan. We can therefore confirm that the
importance of communication with partners, those involved in the care, families and patients
has been shared with our staff as a reminder.
These factors and others will be monitored via our adverse incident reporting and
investigation processes, equally important is the learning outcomes from such adverse
events. Work is on-going to strengthen internal processes to ensure the triangulation of
information and intelligence to help improve the experience, quality and safety of service
services users.
I hope that this addresses the matters of concern which you have highlighted.
Yours sincerely
Chief Executive
Enclosure
5
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