Prevention of Future Deaths reports · 2018

Kamal Al-Hirsi

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths, reference 2018-0265, written 13 Aug 2018. A coroner writes one of these when an inquest reveals a risk that could cause further deaths unless something changes.

Date of report13 Aug 2018
Reference2018-0265
DeceasedKamal Al-Hirsi
CoronerMary Hassell
Coroner areaInner North London
CategoryOther related deaths
Sourcejudiciary.uk record · original PDF
Responses published1

The report

Text extracted from the PDF text layer. Reproduced verbatim, including the scan's own layout.

Regulation 28:  Prevention of Future Deaths report 

Kamal Yahyia AL-HIRSI (died 10.10.17) 

THIS REPORT IS BEING SENT TO: 

1.  Mr Justin Musgrove 

Chief Executive Officer 
Bannatyne Group 
Bannatyne Head Office 
Power House 
Haughton Road 
Darlington 
DL1 1ST 

1 

CORONER 

I am:   Coroner ME Hassell 
           Senior Coroner  
           Inner North London 
           St Pancras Coroner’s Court 
           Camley Street 
           London  N1C 4PP 

2 

CORONER’S LEGAL POWERS 

I make this report under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009,  
paragraph 7, Schedule 5, and  
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, 
regulations 28 and 29. 

3 

INVESTIGATION and INQUEST 

On  16  October  2017,  I  commenced  an  investigation  into  the  death  of 
Kamal Al-Hirsi. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 
9 August 2018. The jury made a narrative determination, which I attach. 

The medical cause of death recorded was: 

1a  acute cardiac arrhythmia 
1b  cocaine and alcohol toxicity and fatty liver disease 

4 

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mr Al-Hirsi worked as a cleaner at the Bannatyne Health Club in Maida 
Vale,  London.    On  the  morning  of  10  October  2017,  he  cleaned  the 
swimming pool, swam two lengths and then slipped under water to the 
bottom, having suffered a cardiac arrhythmia.   

By  the  time his situation  was  appreciated,  resuscitation attempts were 
too late to change the outcome. 

The pathologist gave evidence that any person may suffer an arrhythmia 
from a natural cause, but on this occasion the alcohol and cocaine (not 
dose related) were probably responsible. 

5 

CORONER’S CONCERNS 

During the course of the inquest, the evidence revealed matters giving 
rise to concern. In my opinion, there is a risk that future deaths will occur 
unless  action  is  taken.  In  the  circumstances,  it  is  my  statutory  duty  to 
report to you. 

The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows.  

1.  Mr Al-Hirsi cleaned the pool by diving down with a suction hose 
and  holding  his  breath.    This  had  always  been  the  method  at 
Maida Vale, because there was no pole or extension head.   

Whilst this did not have an impact on Mr Al-Hirsi’s death, evidence 
was heard that it was inherently dangerous. 

2.  No  thought  appeared  to  have  been  given  to  the  fact  that  the 
cleaner  who  often  partnered  Mr  Al-Hirsi  in  the  pool  cleaning 
process,  standing  on  poolside  and  directing  him,  was  a  non 
swimmer and not confident to enter the water even at a depth of 
1.5m.   

In the event, she relied on a club member to undertake the rescue. 

3.  Members of staff had not been given any water safety awareness 
training.  Some did not have a proper understanding of the ways 
in  which  a  person  in  difficulty  in  the  water  may  present,  for 
example that they will not necessarily wave in distress, and that 
they may sink rather than float.   

Mr Al-Hirsi simply sank to the bottom of the pool. 

Bannatyne’s had not trained staff in the use of pool lifesaving aids.  
The cleaner who first tried to help Mr Al-Hirsi attempted to poke 
him with a float, but the float did what it was meant to, it floated. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.  Some  members  of  staff  did  not  know  the  exact  location  of  the 
panic  buttons,  nor  the  circumstances  in  which  they  should  be 
pressed.    The  panic  buttons  did  not  sound  an  audible  alarm 
throughout  the  building,  so  anyone  pressing  a button  would  not 
know  if  it had alerted others,  and  staff elsewhere  (other  than  at 
reception) would be unaware that there was an emergency. 

It  did  not occur to  the cleaner who first  realised  that  Mr Al-Hirsi 
was in difficulty to press the alarm, but even if she had, this would 
not have brought other staff running to help. 

5.  The  panic  button  alarm  was  audible  by  a  beeping  sound  in 
reception and a light was illuminated on a control panel there, but 
this relied solely on the reactions of one individual who was not 
necessarily  first  aid  trained  and,  if  the  receptionist  did  call  999, 
s/he would not necessarily know the nature of the emergency.   

In this instance, the receptionist who called an ambulance did not 
know that Mr Al-Hirsi had suffered a cardiac arrest. 

6.  The  protocol  in  place  was  that,  on  hearing  an  alarm,  the 
receptionist should simply contact the duty manager (who was the 
designated  site  first  aider):  first  by  radio;  failing  that  by  sending 
someone to find him; and failing that by ringing the duty manager’s 
mobile  phone.    The  receptionist  gave  evidence  that  the  radios 
often didn’t work, though the regional manager disagreed. 

When the receptionist was notified that there was an emergency, 
she could not use the radio because the duty manager had not 
picked a radio up; she was unsure where he was; and when she 
rang him on his mobile, she did not get through because there is 
a poor reception in the plant room where he was working. 

7.  There seemed a lack of meaningful awareness of the defibrillator 

location and function.   

The first person trained in CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) to 
respond to the calls for help was a freelance personal trainer who 
was not a member of Bannatyne staff.  Although he was trained, 
he  did  not  take  the  defibrillator  (there  was  only  one  and  it  was 
located  in  the  gym)  with  him,  because  at  that  stage  he  did  not 
know that Mr Al-Hirsi had suffered a cardiac arrest. 

Some staff members had not received defibrillator training.  When 
the  personal  trainer  reached  Mr  Al-Hirsi  and  realised  the  exact 
nature of the emergency, the only other person on poolside at that 
point who seemed confident of the location of the defibrillator, was 
a club member who happened to be a retired doctor.   

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8.  The pool was not under continuous supervision and there was no 
legal  requirement  for  a  lifeguard,  but  it  was  under  CCTV 
surveillance.    However,  the  camera  was  placed  at  in  such  a 
position that it could not detect what was happening under water, 
and  there  was  a  blind  spot  in  that  part  of  the  pool  nearest  the 
camera.  After Mr Al-Hirsi slipped under water, he was completely 
invisible to the camera. 

9.  The  CCTV  monitor  was  in  reception.    This  was  meant  to  be 
observed every 15 minutes (to ensure maximum bather load had 
not been exceeded, rather than to look for bathers in distress), but 
these observations had fallen out of practice, and the monitor was 
behind the head of the receptionist, so it was never in her normal 
field of view.  She had to turn her back on the public to look at it. 

10. The  written  procedures  did  not  detail  the  action  that  should  be 
taken  on  noting  a  bather  in  difficulty;  they  talked  about  RLSS 
(Royal Life Saving Society) techniques being used but these were 
never  taught;  and  the  duty  manager  at  the  time  gave  evidence 
that  he  did  not  ever  remember  reading  the  standard  operating 
procedures or emergency action plan. 

Of  particular  concern  to  me  is  that,  ten  months  following  Mr  Al-Hirsi’s 
death, many of these practices remain entirely unchanged.  For example, 
evidence was heard that no thought has been given to obtaining another 
camera;  no  thought  to  moving  the  CCTV  monitor;  and  no  thought  to 
giving the staff water safety awareness training.   

Some  refresher  training  is  being  given,  but  this  was  only  started  two 
weeks before the inquest began on Monday, and still no consideration 
has  been  given  to  including  the  freelance  personal  trainer  (whose 
response  to  Mr  Al-Hirsi  was  immediate  and  effective)  in  training 
regarding health and safety procedures within the club.  

6 

ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN 

In  my  opinion,  action  should  be  taken  to  prevent  future  deaths  and  I 
believe that you have the power to take such action.  

7 

YOUR RESPONSE 

You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date 
of this report, namely by 8 October 2010.  I, the coroner, may extend the 
period. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Your  response  must  contain  details  of  action  taken  or proposed  to  be 
taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain 
why no action is proposed. 

8 

COPIES and PUBLICATION 

I have sent a copy of my report to the following. 

  HHJ Mark Lucraft QC, the Chief Coroner of England & Wales 
  Camden Council, Environmental Health Department 
  Swim England  
 

, brother of Kamal Al-Hirsi 

I  am  also  under  a  duty  to  send  the  Chief  Coroner  a  copy  of  your 
response.  

The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted 
or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who 
he  believes  may  find  it  useful  or  of  interest.  You  may  make 
representations to me, the Senior Coroner, at the time of your response, 
about  the  release  or  the  publication  of  your  response  by  the  Chief 
Coroner. 

9 

DATE                                                  SIGNED BY SENIOR CORONER 

13.08.18 

5

Responses

1 response published against this report on judiciary.uk. A response is a body's written reply to the coroner's concerns; publication is at the discretion of the Chief Coroner's office, so an absent response does not mean nobody replied.

Response from Bannatyne Fitness Limited (PDF)
1.

-Hirsi e pool by di down with a suction hose ani

Prior to the incident, the Board of Directors of Bannatyne Fitness Limited (‘the
Company”) were unaware that the pool at Maida Vale had been cleaned in this
unauthorised manner. Steps have now been taken across all of the Company's sites
to ensure that pools are not cleaned using this method. It is understood however that
this was an isolated occurrence and not commonplace in the Company's other sites.
For the record however, the Company wishes to state that the evidence given at the
inquest did not show, certainly to the Company's satisfaction, that this method of
cleaning, whilst not acceptable, was “inherently dangerous”. indeed the pool had
been cleaned at Maida Vale in this way for a number of years without incident, and as
the evidence confirmed, it played no part whatsoever in Mr Al Hirsi’s death.

1.5m. In the event, she reliod © ona club member to undertake the rescue,

The Company has clarified and reissued instructions to all of its Clubs to reaffirm that
no employee is to enter the water for purposes of cleaning the floor of the swimming
pool.

The Company has updated its recruitment processes and introduced a new question
on it's CV Supplement Application Form in order to determine the swimming
competency of its new employees, which can then be utilised when allocating
responsibilities. The Company will also ascertain the swimming competency of its
existing employees by 14 October 2018.

It is also the Company's intention to upskill its designated first aiders to have a pool
responder qualification. We will endeavour to complete this by 31 December 2018.

ied to bel ; Mr Al-Hirsi atte ed | 0 DOK joke hi with 2 a oat but the float did
itwas meant to, it floated.

In January 2018, the Company employed two new members of staff; a Health &
Safety Compliance Manager (who was previously employed by the Company's
Primary Authority) and a Learning & Development Manager to improve its training
and compliance. Subsequent to this, the Company procured and, in May 2018,
launched a new online Learning Management System. In order to enhance its
employees’ existing knowledge, all staff are currently undertaking mandatory training
modules.

The Company has introduced a new module on its Learning Management System on
water safety awareness, which will be mandatory for all employees of the Company.
The Company will ensure that all existing employees complete this by 31 October
2018.

The Company also now requires all of its new and existing employees to undertake a
documented Workplace Induction Checklist, where they will be given a guided tour of
their site to ensure that they are aware of the location and use of the building's
emergency and life saving apparatus. The Company will ensure that all existing
employees complete this by 15 November 2018.

Giving evidence in a Coroner's Court, and reliving the events of the day when Mr Al
Hirsi died, was extremely stressful and emotional for those Company's employees
who attended. This, combined with language barriers, resulted in them being
confused, which meant that regrettably, their evidence did not accurately reflect the
actual circumstances of their day-to-day knowledge of the Maida Vale Club. For
example, Mrs Islania was originally employed as a Domestic (cleaner) at the club and
it was her responsibility to clean and dust the panic buttons located around the
building.

As noted above, the Company requires all of its new and existing employees to
undertake a documented Workplace Induction Checklist, where they will be given a
guided tour of their site to ensure that they are aware of the location and use of the
building’s emergency and life saving apparatus. The Company will also review its
Emergency Action Procedures (“EAP”) and ensure that its employees participate in
regular documented drills. The Company's new Health & Safety Compliance
Manager will audit these centrally on a quarterly basis from 1 October 2018.

The Company will also review its EAPs and ensure that its employees participate in
more regular documented drills to cover multiple emergencies. The Company's new
Health & Safety Compliance Manager will audit these centrally on a quarterly basis
from 1 October 2018.

The Company has reviewed and amended its EAP, procedures and notification
process for emergencies at the Maida Vale Club. Receptionists have been re-trained
in recognising an alarm and the immediate next steps to be taken. The panic buttons
when pressed will activate an automated message, which will be audible from all
member areas of the Club and will notify all staff, including the Duty Manager(s), to
muster at the Club’s Reception, The Duty Manager will dispatch employees to the
emergency together with the Defibrillator and the other emergency equipment. The
Company's contractors will complete the installation work by 10 October 2018. It is
the Company's intention to pilot this revised emergency response system at its Maida
Vale and Durham health clubs. Following a review of these systems, the Company
intends to roll it out across its estate.

The Company has reviewed and amended its EAP, procedures and notification
process for emergencies at the Maida Vale Club. As noted above, Receptionists have
been re-trained in recognising an alarm and the immediate next steps to be taken.
The panic buttons when pressed will activate an automated message, which will be
audible from all member areas of the Club and will notify all staff, including the Duty
Manager(s), to muster at the Club’s Reception. It is the Company's intention to pilot
this revised emergency response system at its Maida Vale and Durham health clubs.
Following a review of these systems, the Company intends to roll it out across its
estate.

7.

There seemed _a lack of meanin ful_ awareness of the defibri lato lon_and

At the time of Kamal’s death there was signage at the Club's reception stating the
whereabouts of the defibrillator. This was standard at all of the Company's sites;
defibrillators were not encased or hidden away in offices, but were located in a
bracket on gym floors clearly signed in prominent locations and visible to employees,
members and visitors. However, following the inquest and your Regulation 28 Report,
the Company has taken the decision to relocate defibrillators to sites’ reception area,
where they can be readily seen and accessed by all. The Company can confirm that
this has been completed across all of its sites.

The Company has also reviewed its EAPs, procedures and notification processes
across all of its sites.

The Company has undertaken a review of its CCTV coverage of the pool at its Maida
Vale Club and has commissioned the work for the repositioning of the CCTV
cameras. These works will be completed by 31 October 2018 and will include
additional cameras to remove the blind spot noted at the Inquest. It should be noted
that the purpose of these cameras is to monitor the number of people within the
poolside environment as identified in HSG179. The images from these newly
positioned cameras will be available to view on the monitor at reception.

for in_distress), bu se had fallen out of practice, and the
itor i of the receptionist, so it was never in her normal field of
Ss @) ack on the public

The Company has moved the CCTV monitor at its Maida Club to a more suitable
location so that the CCTV monitor is in the constant line of sight of its Receptionists.
The Company has also reinstated the 15 minute CCTV checks at its Maida Vale
Club, which formed part of the Company's Normal Operating Procedure and risk
assessments.

evidence that he did not ever remember readina th the standard operating procedures
or emergency action plan

The Company has removed references to RLSS techniques from the Club's
documentation. This was an unfortunate error. In September 2017 the Company set
up a Water Users Group consisting of representatives of the Company's general
managers, regional operations managers, regional estates managers, the Company's
board of directors and external stakeholders/suppliers. The Company has widened
the scope of the Water Users Group’s remit and will review and update the
Company's procedures in relation to this area by 31 March 2019.

refre: ining is bein ven, but this was 0) started two ee! s before the

Pending the outcome of the inquest, and investigations by the Metropolitan Police
and the London Borough of Camden, the Company was advised not make any
changes to its policies and procedures. Changes will now be implemented at both
Maida Vale and across the Company where necessary, in the light of the concerns
that have been raised.

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